

## The Construction of the Cold War Landscape and Tourism: the Possibilities and Limitations of its Peaceful Use

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*This paper examines the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the militarization of the surrounding border area in the context of the Cold War landscape formation. This paper also examines the possibilities and limitations, based on the ongoing peace process in Korean Peninsula today, regarding the extent to which security tourism—which began to appear during the Cold War—can be turned into peace tourism. For a more systematic exploration of the social changes which have taken place in the border area, this paper has defined as “division border” as the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), including the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), the DMZ, and the neighboring area. This paper also conceptualizes the “Cold War landscape” as the ecological and geographical environment formed by the militarization of the space. Security tourism mediates the transformation of militarized space into a social landscape. The Cold War landscape of security tourism is consumed as a resource with the aim of bolstering anti-communism efforts. Security tourism is based on a unique gaze and attitude in seeing the Cold War landscape; so, new attractions are constructed accordingly.*

*Around the year 2000, when the Inter-Korean summit was held, changes began to be seen in the gaze and attitude towards the Cold War landscape, and the term “peace”, as well as “ecology”, began to be used. The paradigm change from security tourism to peace tourism entails the change in the value and semantics of the Cold War landscape—along varied trajectories. The process by which the Cold War landscape of reality is redefined as a legacy is not only affected by macro-level structural changes, but also is a factor facilitating those changes.*

**Keywords:** *division border, militarization, strategic village, the Cold War landscape, security tourism, gaze, peace tourism*

## Context for the Research Question

On April 27, 2018, the 3rd inter-Korean summit took place at Panmunjeom, where the fate of the Korean Peninsula has been settled over the last 66 years. The summit was held 11 years after President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il met at the 2<sup>nd</sup> summit in 2007. At the 2018 summit, President Moon greeted Chairman Kim Jong Un at the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), and briefly crossed over into the North Korean side of MDL—following Chairman Kim’s lead—and then came back over, creating a dramatic border-crossing performance. CNN reported it as breaking news that “the two leaders crossed over the MDL hand in hand. It is a historic moment” also emphasizing the fact that “it is the first that the North Korean leader stepped into the territory of the South since 1953.”

After 14 months, on June 30, 2019, president Trump, along with president Moon, visited Guard Post Ouellette (OP), near Panmunjeom, just 25 meters away from the MDL for a view of the surrounding landscape. Arriving at Panmunjeom, Trump once again performed a symbolic gesture by crossing the border: he crossed the MDL together with Kim Jong Un—as President Moon had done. After Trump and Chairman Kim crossed over into the North Korean territory and came back to the South Korean side, they had a meeting at the House of Freedom<sup>1</sup>. CNN reported that president Trump said “crossing the border is a great honor.”

In several ways, a lot of political significance was imbued into the events of that day. There were many things to discuss regarding the day; first, was the meeting between the U.S. president and North Korean leader, which had been planned in an impromptu fashion. Second, the South Korean president and the U.S. president visited Panmunjeom together, so it was the first time the two Koreas’ and the U.S. leader met together. Third, it was the first time that a visiting U.S. president wore a suit, instead of a military jacket. But the most important event was the border-crossing itself, and, accordingly, the complex semantics that were revealed. What is the MDL really? Why did the

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<sup>1</sup> The Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953 stipulated that Panmunjeom would be set as the Joint Security Area (JSA) with no MDL in it. However, on August 18, 1976, the Korean axe murder incident occurred where two U.S. army officers, who were supervising a work party that was cutting down poplar trees, were killed by North Korean soldiers inside Panmunjeom, JSA. This incident created a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which was still under the armistice, where it was feared that the war may be resumed. Ultimately, the crisis subsided when North Korean leader Kim Il Sung showed his regret; however, after this, the JSA was separated into southern and northern parts, just like the MDL did for parts which were outside of the JSA.

political leaders of the three nations create such a dramatic border-crossing scene, and what political effect was each trying to make? If the border is not just a national border between South and North Korea but also has important implications for the U.S. as well, how should we think of it? How can we conceptualize this space and landscape in which political leaders—on the long journey towards denuclearization and the establishment of a system of peace on the Korean Peninsula—are viewed when they visit the guard posts of the border area? And, can these events lead to the public's continued interest in visiting the area, or even towards peace?

Until the 1990s, studies on the border area in Korean academic circles were largely undertaken in the context of security policies focusing on the Cold War. With the opening of the Mt. Geumgang Tour Program in South Korea in 1998, the inter-Korean summit in 2000, and the establishment of Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2003, views on the DMZ and border to change. The most noticeable change was that the terms “peace” in addition to “ecology” began to see widespread usage. Additionally, more attention was given to the development of the border region, leading to the establishment of the Special Act on Support for Border Area, which went into effect in 2003.

This paper examines the MDL—which the three leaders of the two Koreas and the U.S. crossed—the DMZ surrounding the MDL, and the militarization of the border area in the context of the Cold War landscape formation. This paper also examines the possibilities and limitations, based on the ongoing peace process on the Korean Peninsula today, regarding what extent security tourism—which began to appear amidst the context of the Cold War—can be turned into peace tourism. For a more systematic exploration of social changes with regards to the border area, this paper defines “division border” as the CCZ including the MDL, DMZ, and the neighboring area; it also conceptualizes “the Cold War landscape” as the ecological and geographical environment formed out of the militarization of the space.<sup>2</sup> In Lefebvre's terms (2000), the militarization of the border area becomes the very production of a militarized space. The process through which those produced spaces transform into “attractions”—or a social landscape—overlaps the formation of security tourism by national powers.

The paradigm of security tourism, which began in 1977 and matured in 1988, is one of the ways to consume militarized spaces. Security tourism not only creates the Cold War landscape theoretically but also defines the

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<sup>2</sup> My academic interest in “border landscapes” came into being when I first visited Kinmen Island and witnessed the unique landscape. See Jung & Kim (2016).

subjects and objects that are viewing militarized spaces, and their unique gaze and attitude towards those spaces. The unification observatories symbolize a way in which to consume the Cold War landscape. Another way to consume the militarized space or the Cold War landscape can be found in peace tourism. The reconciliatory mood between the South and North that has emerged, as mentioned above, has gradually watered down the Cold War landscape into a remnant from the past rather than being a present reality; the elements that had constituted security tourism changed or began to take on different meanings. The typical example of such changes is the establishment of peace observatories, replacing unification observatories. The change from security tourism to peace tourism leads viewers to see the same objects in new light. In John Urry's terms, one reinterprets the meaning of the Cold War landscape while gazing at it.

The change in the meaning and the way of consuming the Cold War landscape—that is, the change from security tourism into peace tourism—is underway on various trajectories. However, since it is occurring alongside the macro-level shift towards reconciliation between the two Koreas, it is difficult to say that the changes have been fully realized. Based on those cases in Korea, this paper tries to theorize the Cold War landscape as a social landscape.

## Division Border and the Militarization of the Border Area

### *Division border*

Contemporary societies have physical borders, preventing imaginations as well as bodies from moving about freely. Of the most well-known are national borders. In the world of modern nation-states, national borders have functioned as walls, defining the scope to which sovereignties can be exerted, leading people to identify as belonging to the nation, and imposing restrictions on free movement.

The Cold War era in the past had another border that divided the world and restricted movements. That is, the border of divided nations such as Korea, and the border dividing the capitalist Western Bloc and the communist Eastern Bloc; I call this a division border.<sup>3</sup> The best examples of division borders include the Berlin Wall, the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone,

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<sup>3</sup> Valérie Gelézeau (2011) called it meta-border.

and the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula.

The division borders in Korea and Germany were created through World War II. The Allied Forces including the U.S. and Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula and Germany for postwar aide. Since the 38th Parallel was an abstract border, not considering the physical surroundings, the division was realized through disconnecting the roads and railways connecting north and south Korea. As late as 1947 and 1948, the 38th Parallel had a disconnecting effect, and after 1948, when the South founded its government, military conflicts began to occur. Small-scale skirmishes broke out in 1949 at Kaesong or Woongjin (Jung 2006). In Germany, the division was complete by 1949; after 1961, when the Berlin Wall was constructed at the division border in Berlin, the wall served as a symbol of the Cold War in Europe.

The Cold War on the Korean Peninsula, which became visible after 1946, began to be linked to the Chinese Civil War, swelling up into the Cold War in East Asia. In 1949, in the Chinese Civil War, when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was about to win the war, Korean ethnic People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers entered North Korea. After the declaration of New China, the U.S.'s policy towards East Asia was modified; in the early 1950s, the so-called Acheson Line was announced, which is the division border of East Asia. According to the border, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan were located "outside" the border and Japan, "inside." The meaning of the 38th Parallel on the Korean Peninsula was ambiguous.

The Korean War not only dramatically changed the division border, but also caused the U. S. to change its passive approach towards the border. The U.S.'s immediate intervention in the Korean War is a good example of this change. China's intervention in the Korean War enabled this war to become a war which encompassed the whole East Asia region, and it meant that politically and psychologically a bridge was drawn connecting the front lines of the Korean Peninsula and the borders of the Chinese Civil War. The MDL and DMZ, which were born through the Armistice Agreement, later became not just a line firmly dividing the Korean Peninsula but also a border of hostile confrontation dividing East Asia. The political-psychological border crossed for the repatriation of prisoners of war from the Korean War, the conflict border that started again in 1954 in the Taiwan strait, and the border cleaving Vietnam into the North and South, all three of these were conceptually intertwined. This indicates that the East Asian Cold War system began to be expressed powerfully through the Korean armistice.

The Korean War changed the border between the South and the North

from the 38th Parallel to the MDL. A “Reclaimed Area” was born, on the northern part of the parallel and also the southern part of the DMZ. However, on the contrary there was also a “Lost Area” consisting of the southern part of the parallel, the northern part of DMZ, and the Han River’s neutral waters. However, in reality, the term of “Lost Area” is not really used. North Korea gave it the name “New Liberated Area.” The MDL, which was created during the Armistice talks, was outlined with signs built about 200 meters apart from each other. The armistice talks included a decision to define the scope of the DMZ. Both the North and the South agreed to move their troops back two km from the MDL, to mark the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the North and the Southern Limit Line (SLL) on the South, and to create a buffer zone: the DMZ. The construction of the DMZ was primarily terrestrial, with Panmunjeom notably serving as the Joint Security Area (JSA). The waters where the Han River and the Imjin River meet and flow into the Yellow Sea was declared a Neutral Zone. At the Yellow Sea, the border dividing the North and the South remained unclear. The UN forces set the limit that restricted how far north ships from the South could sail, which was declared the NLL. This NLL began to serve as an actual division border after around 1968 when the Cold War intensified.

In February 1954, after the Armistice Agreement was reached, the commander of eighth US army, who assumed control of the DMZ and the “Reclaimed Area,” set up a farming limit line to control civilian access in order to protect and secure the military facilities placed in this area, and to better execute military operations. The limit was set as approximately 5-10 km south of the SLL. A limit line for farming was also applied to Gimpo or Ganhwa, which is south of the 38th Parallel but nearby the division border. The basin of the Imjin River and the ports of the Han River Estuary were shut down, and residents were forced to leave.

The Reclaimed Area saw the reconstruction of villages. Prominent examples include Haean-myeon of Yanggu-gun, a so-called “Punch Bowl.” On April 25, 1956, 965 people from 160 households from every corner of the country moved there in order to be the first to cultivate the unused land. On May 11, 1957, in Myeongpa-ri, Goseong-gun, Gangwon-do, 50 households moved in for land-cultivation projects performed by refugees. Since the ROK army was in charge of defending the armistice line, except for the western area, on June 1958, the farm land between the DMZ and the farming limit line were opened to farming with daily access, on the condition that those activities did not affect military operations or security. The name of limit line for farming was changed into the Civilian Control Line (CCL). In the

Reclaimed Area, 99 self-sustainable and stable towns were constructed. The DMZ is within the jurisdiction of UN forces, but the authority to control the CCZ belongs to the Korean military.

The border area means that the area is close to the division border and “border area” also became a legal term according to the Special Act on Support for Border Area<sup>4</sup>, which went into effect in 2003. The “border area” described in this act includes cities and counties that are adjacent to the DMZ or the maritime NLL, which were established according to the Korean War Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953. It also included the cities and counties that are located below the CCL, defined in subparagraph 7 of Article 2 of the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act, and prescribed by Presidential Decree, based on their distance to the CCL and geographical conditions. The border area excludes the DMZ, however, clustered settlements in the DMZ are deemed to be a part of the border area. The implementation of this act enabled the division border of the Korean Peninsula to become a term entailing the overlapping borders which encompass the DMZ, defined through the MDL, SLL, CCZ, and areas subject to the Special Act on Support for Border Area.

#### *Militarization of the border area*

After July 1953, when combat ended on the Korean Peninsula and the armistice agreement was reached, the DMZ and the Neutral Zone of the Han River became the field of military tension between the South and the North. The border area including the DMZ and CCZ was historically a battlefield on which fierce battles were fought over the course of two years, from the spring of 1951 until July 1953, when Armistice Agreement was signed. The aspect of war shifted from mobile warfare in the beginning, to static warfare in the later parts. The towns and villages near the frontlines were destroyed by bombardment. Old Cheorwon is an example of a site where these traces of the past can be seen.

Conflict and the Cold War divided the Korean territory into two parts: one, a real territory south of the MDL, the other, a potential territory covered under the Constitution. The former was divided again into the front and the

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<sup>4</sup> This act was intended to create a new engine for growth and to support the enhancement of residents' welfare through defining what is necessary for the sustainable development of the border area, that has had lagging development since the division of Korea. It also was intended to strengthen national competitiveness and contribute to holistic development through the systematic preservation and maintenance of the natural environment.

rear, having a hierarchy. The border area was defined as the front, facing the enemy, the rear area was considered a support for the front.

Since the border area of Korea was a treacherous battlefield during the second half of the Korean War, it is containing certain imprints from the past. However, the borders such as the DMZ or CCL placed restrictions on the development of the areas which led the areas becoming neglected, and left to ruin. These ruins are legacies of prior combat and, simultaneously, they are the current geographical border area (Jung 2018). Not long after the ceasefire, the area began to see, one by one, the establishment of battle monuments commemorating specific battles, memorial stones to remember fallen victims of the war, or victory monuments commemorating battle victories. A well-known example is the Battle of White Horse Hill Memorial Park, where the Battle of White Horse Memorial was built in 1957, then a memorial stone in 1985, a battle monument in 1990, and a victory monument in 1994. The memorial park was built in 1990, right after the establishment of Cheorwon's plans for security tourism. The park was constructed by relocating the memorial monument, that had been at Ipyeongri, to Cheorwon, dividing the space into three parts representing past, present, and future, and building several monuments.

Residents who had been living near the border area were forced to relocate during the Korean War. The newly established border areas saw the displacement of previous residents, vanishing of towns, and the deployment of troops. When the areas were designated as "infiltration routes" or "enemy visibility areas," all those changes would occur. This happened in places including Yeonan, the northern part of Imjin River, Gimpo, and Ganghwa of the Han River Estuary. Towns attempting to attract new residents by being established as self-sufficient and stable villages, which formed in the late 1950s in the "reclaimed area," and reconstructed villages and unification villages, which formed from 1968 to 1973 in the CCZ. Residents who settled in these strategic towns included discharged soldiers who were from those regions originally or residents who were farming with the daily access they were allotted.

The border areas are, considered spatially, the "front line." There they are acutely confronted with a military presence and highly concentrated military power. The area has rigorous routine military drills and they must cope with psychological warfare. However, there are few studies on the militarization which has occurred in these areas. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 affected the militarization of the affected areas. The military government which seized power through the



coup d'état in 1961 planted landmines underground on a large scale near the border area in 1962. In 1967, when the Vietnam War was in full swing, wooden fences installed at the ceasefire line in Korea began to be replaced with barbed-wire fences, and these barbed-wire fences became a symbol representing the division of the Korean Peninsula. On the barbed-wire fences, razor blades began to be attached along with the barbed wires. It is said that defoliants were also widely sprayed around the border during in this period.

It is guard post that exists together with the fences. Guard posts can be classified into GP (Guard Post) inside the DMZ, GOP (General Out Post) and OP (Observing Post). GPs began to be built after the Armistice Agreement was made. At that time, GPs were just shabby wooden structures and were built as a contingency for incidents that might unfold inside the DMZ. The soldiers from the two Koreas would frequently encounter one another since there were no special borders or obstacles between them.

The first GP the North Korean soldiers built was located at the confluence of the Imjin River and Sacheon River, at the far west of the DMZ; to its east was the first GP belonging to the South, with an east coast GP built in Goseong at the farthest reaches in that direction. There are approximately 90 to 100 GPs belonging to South Korea, but only about 65 are actually being operated. Since the GPs are in the DMZ and therefore under the jurisdiction of the UN, the Taegukgi, South Korea's national flag, and UN flags are flown together. Some GPs with no flags are unmanned posts. Some GPs are located on plains, but most are on hills.

North Korea is known to have approximately 160 to 200 GPs. While GPs in the South look like mighty fortresses, many of North Korea's GPs are underground, which marks a stark contrast with their South Korean counterparts. They are built this was as a result of the legacy of the trench warfare employed in 1952-1953. That is to say, though the structures of underground facilities might look small, they are well-equipped and interconnected. At the GPs belonging to the North they put up two red flags, one is the North Korea flag and the other the flag of North Korean People's Army. Some GPs are located on plains, but most GPs are on hills.

Although the SLL was established to be two km away south of the MDL, the distance is subject to slight fluctuations depending on the topography. As the conflict between the two Koreas escalated, the scale of the DMZ was gradually reduced and the DMZ actually began to turn into heavily militarized zone. From around 1963, the GPs of North Korea began to be established further south into the DMZ. In response, the military of South

Korea and the US began to build GPs gradually going north looking for vantage points from which they could have clear lines of vision, and they set up the barbed wire north of the SLL. During this process, GPs often changes into GOPs or Ops. The Gaewoong Mountain Post is an example of this.

The unconventional warfare of North Korea, including the Blue House Raid incident on January 21, 1968 and the “communist guerrilla” Uljin-Samcheok Landings, served as a catalyst for the DMZ and CCZ to transform into a heavily militarized zone. Militarization of those areas was undertaken including the establishment of GPs in the DMZ, building tank traps on major roads, and constructing concrete walls in the central plains area. GPs were shoddily built guard posts for camps until the early 1980s, but as part of the Modernization Project for the Defense Facilities of Demilitarized Zone in 1983 substantial concrete structure were newly built<sup>5</sup>. Barbed wire fences were also built, linking between GPs. That is why today GPs and forward barbed wire fences, which connect those GPs, look quite unique. Because soldiers live cloistered in GPs, many accidents have occurred.<sup>6</sup>

The trend of militarization of the DMZ continued after the 1980s as well, and it continued to reduce in size. In 2013, for the first time, Green Korea examined the DMZ with the cooperation of the Korean military and their survey results revealed that the shortest distance between the SLL and the NLL is 700 m, and the size of the DMZ was reduced “from 992km<sup>2</sup> in 1953 to 570km<sup>2</sup> in 2013” (Green Korea 2013).

One of the features that the militarization of the border area is revealing is the relationship between the experiences of war and trauma. A source of terror for the North Korean army was the bombing runs of the US air force, and for those in the South the Soviet-made tanks. To avoid these terrors military facilities were built underground in the North and obstacles like concrete walls were installed by the South to stop tanks. As a result, an array of anti-tank obstacles became a characteristic feature of the Cold War landscape of the border area. In order to utilize these obstacles, check points were installed at the entrances of a lot of strategic villages.

Under the system of Cold War division, militarization of the border area and details regarding it were kept as military secrets. The general public did not have access to these military facilities. To protect the facilities, the Korean government promulgated the Military Facilities Protection Act No. 2338 on

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/842523.html#csidx469b8d9758ff7e1abc7a750693215ce>

<sup>6</sup> One of the most unfortunate incidents recorded was the incident of Private Jo Joon Hee, in June 1984. He was the victim of Chun Doo-hwan regime’s policy, named the Greenification Project, that forced university students who stood against the government to conscript into the army.

Dec. 26, 1972. This act was intended to protect important military facilities and to define essential details for effectively performing military operations through its 15 articles.<sup>7</sup>

The Cold War landscape formed relatively early in its physical construction and related semantics, but it developed more slowly in terms of its social semantics. It is the prohibited access and controlled access that created this temporal discrepancy. Furthermore, because military facilities and environments were objects which could not be represented in photos or pictures, they existed but their existence was not well known; they existed, but their existence was one that could not be represented. They were places of “prohibited access” in which “no photography” was permitted.

Military camp towns began to spring up around the military camps near the border area, particularly around the U.S. camp. The U.S. army in charge of the western frontline area in the early 1970s began to handover the security tasks to the Korean army and withdrew their troops. After that military camp towns dwindled or relocated. The camp towns that lost their functionality also partially formed the important face of Cold-War landscape.

### *The formation of strategic villages*

One of the unique semantic issues of the militarization of the border area lies in the issue of farming inside the DMZ. Outside of the CCZ, the “reclaimed area”—the northern part of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and south of the MDL—saw the revival of villages that had existed before the Korean War. For the purpose of cultivating farmland inside the CCL, starting from the latter half of the 1950s, daily-access farming began to be undertaken and it developed into temporary farming with temporary stay. At Cheorwon, self-sustaining and stable villages were established, including Wolha-ri in 1959, Gwanjeon-ri, and Mahyun-ilri in 1960, in order to cultivate farmland inside the CCZ. After 1968, for the purpose of allowing farmers to live near their farms, the reconstructed villages began to be built. The mass media at that time reported it as stated below.

*On February 13, 1967, the Ministry of National Defense announced that it*

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<sup>7</sup> This act has been revised seven times until now and, at the time of its abolishment, it had 18 articles. In 2006, there was a debate on whether the act could be applied to the protestors that were in objection to the land scheduled to be stationed by the U.S. military camp. In replacement of the act, Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act was established on Dec. 21, 2007, as No. 8733, and was put into effect in Sept. 22, 2008, with 25 articles.

*will cultivate unused land which was abandoned for the last 17 years, since the armistice. The ministry will establish strategic villages for 155 miles along the MDL so that 100,000 farming households can settle there until the next year. This strategic village plan for the frontline was modelled after the collective farms of Israel. The limit line for farming, which was the control line in the southern part of the ceasefire line, will be abolished. 45,000 farming households scattered across the northern part of the limit line of farming and 55,000 farming households which have daily access will be allowed to settle so that the estimated tens-of-billions-meter-squared of farmland cultivation can be kicked off.*

This strategic village plan aimed to ① resolve the shortage of food and the over-crowding of the population ② develop the abandoned land into fertile farmland, ③ seal off routes that spies could take, and ④ operate psychological warfare directed at North Korea through the creation of a picturesque village right in front of the enemy. The ministry said that in order to solve difficult problems such as the defense of the ceasefire line, removal of explosives, concerns about spies, self-defense would be carried out by renting weaponry out to reserve military personnel whose anti-communist ideology is sufficiently thorough. The ministry made a policy that among the land which has been abandoned for military operations and unused, the private-owned land will be returned to the people who own the rights to it; state-owned land would be managed by a newly-created collective farm, discharged military personnel taking the lead for it, and military equipment would be deployed as well. At the moment, to solve the problems of administrative effectiveness, fertilizer supply, and the budget for farming, technical collaboration is underway with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Ministry of National Defense decided, as a first phase of the project, to cultivate approximately ten million m<sup>2</sup> of land at Cheorwon-Gun, and approximately two million m<sup>2</sup> at Inje-Gun using military equipment within this year, and to let people move in here.<sup>8</sup>

The construction of these revived villages was mainly modelled after the kibbutz model of Israel (Ahn 1966; Ko 1967).<sup>9</sup> Each strategic village had a different background through which they connected with their residents. Some villages were mostly populated by discharged military soldiers. Some

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<sup>8</sup> North of limit line of farming will turn into "strategic villages", Joongang Ilbo, February 14, 1967.

<sup>9</sup> The idea behind and knowledge for the strategic village came from Japan's armed colonial villages in Manchuria from the 1930s, the April 3 incident on Jeju-do, in 1948, and England's reaction to the Malabar rebellion in 1850.

villages were populated largely by people who had been living there before Korean War and worked in the farming industry with daily access after the war. The new residents cultivated the wasteland going outside the farmland where landmine accidents frequently occurred. In particular, Daema-ri, the first strategic village formed in 1968, had many mine accidents. To the residents, the surrounding nature or militarized environment was not a landscape that could be considered an “attraction,” but was a kind of “work” they had to do to struggle for their survival.

In 1971, the Korean government started regional development plans on the western border area, such as Ganghwa, Paju, Pocheon, and Yeoncheon. These plans were insufficiently researched, however, and the reason might be related to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops which were stationed at the western border area. In 1973, the Unification Village, or Tongil-chon, which had more of a strategic purpose than compared to the other existing reconstructed villages which were founded in Paju and Cheorwon respectively. The Unification Village benefitted from more support from the government; Yougok-ri was constructed to the direction in which the North Korean side could observe them.

Combined, the reconstructed village and the unification village are referred to as a strategic village, meaning a village strategically-built by the nation. The function of the strategic villages included producing food, deploying manpower for military aid, and for producing domestic and foreign propaganda. In 1979, Gangwon Province completed the development project on the northern part of the CCL, mainly with house renovation projects in five strategic villages such as Daema-ri, Yougok-ri, Saengchang-ri, Jeongyeon-ri, and Mahyun 2-ri, and with a village organization project including the construction of village halls, common warehouses, and playgrounds.

In 1981, the incorporation details of the villages in northern part of the CCL, which were owned by Cheorwon district office, show five general villages, six reconstructed villages, and one unification village with written information regarding the distance to the MDL, distance to the CCL, enemy-visibility, audibility of North Korea's propaganda broadcast to South Korea, move-in dates, and other reports. Furthermore, there is detailed written information including households, population, residential environment, cultural welfare, common facilities, land use patterns, condition of farms, current status of farms by size, agricultural foundations, special reports, schools and students, records of village development, and long-cherished resident projects.

**TABLE 1**  
**THE STATUS OF VILLAGE OF NORTHERN CCL,**  
**CHEORWON DISTRICT (1981)**

Village name	distance to MDL	distance to CCL	enemy-visibility	audibility of N. K.'s propaganda broadcast to S.K.	move-in dates	Reports (household)
Daema-ri(reconstructed village)	6	5	0	0	January 1968	Cheorwon veteran 85 Yeoncheon veteran 65
Jeongyeon-ri(reconstructed village)	3	8	0	0	December 1971	Farming with daily access 120
Igil-ri(reconstructed village)	4	8	0	×	November 1979	Branch of Jeongyeon-ri 68
Saengchang-ri(reconstructed village)	3	3	0	0	October 1970	Veteran 100
Yangji-ri (reconstructed village)	9	5	×	0	March 1973	Farming with daily access 100
Yougok-ri (unification village)	2	6	0	0	January 1973	Enlisted officer, reserved army 30 inhabitant 30
Wolha-ri(unification village)	18	1	×	0	April 1959	inhabitant and farming with daily access 72
Gwanjeon-ri(unification village)	18	1.3	×	0	November 1980	Branch of Wolha-ri
Dochang-ri(unification village)	7	1	0	0	May 1960	inhabitant and farming with daily access 60
Dongmak-ri(unification village)	15	3	×	0	October 1974	farming with daily access 50
Mahyun 1-ri(unification village)	3	7	×	0	April 1960	Ulsan Disaster victim 66
Mahyun 2-ri (reconstructed village)	4	6	×	0	August 1968	Veteran 60
Sagok 2-ri(unification village)	8	0.5	0	×	April 1971	farming with daily access 50

source.—Cheorwon district office

This village from the northern CCL had 956 households and 4,721 residents at the time of move-in, and 1,153 households, 6,162 residents in 1981. At the time of move-in, it had 427 inhabitant households with 529 alien households, which became 472, 681 respectively.

The Cheorwon Statistical Yearbook 1992 says that the village in the northern part of the CCL had 14 neighborhoods, with 1,227 households, and 5,151 residents in total, which is 9.3% of the entire population of Cheorwon. Each farming household had 2.2ha farmland on average, bigger than the 1.7ha average farmland per household in Cheorwon. It is interesting to note that the farming households with daily access to this area account for about half of all the farming households in Cheorwon.

TABLE 2  
THE STATUS OF FARMLAND IN THE VILLAGE  
IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE CCL (1992)

Category	Number of households			Population			Farmland Size (Ha)			
	total	farming	Non-farming	total	male	female	total	field	paddy	
Total	1,277	1,078	199	5,151	2,688	2,463	2,397.5	940.5	1,457	
Self-sufficient and stable	Wolha-ri	72	62	10	284	142	142	103	32	71
	Gwanjeon-ri	32	32		132	70	62	80	31	49
	Dochang-ri	181	148	691	691	357	334	215.4	84.4	131
	Dongmak-ri	44	36	215	215	103	112	151	109	42
	Sagok 2-ri	57	51	263	263	145	118	257	165	92
	Mahyun 1-ri	218	115	758	758	365	393	206	81	125
Reconstructed village	Daema 1-ri	104	98	424	424	222	202	209	47	162
	Daema 2-ri	97	89	435	435	223	212	168	36	132
	Saengchang-ri	98	94	410	410	250	160	138	43	95
	Jeongyeon-ri	76	70	330	330	178	152	187	106	81
	Igil 2-ri	68	67	327	327	172	155	176	53	123
	Yangji 1-ri	97	97	401	401	200	201	229	36	193
Unification village	Mahyun 2-ri	74	63	276	276	152	124	175	85	90
	Yougok-ri	59	56	205	205	109	96	103.1	32.1	71

source.—Cheorwon Yearbook, 1992, Cheorwon District

The militarization of the border area, in Lefebvre's terms, is the production of militarized space. This space is controlled by the political-military environment of the Cold War conflict, and by the hostile gazes of supervising and coexisting with one's "enemies". To the residents of strategic villages, established in the CCL near the border, this space is not so much a "landscape of attractions" as it is the "object of labour" which they must domesticate.

## Security Tourism and the Cold War Landscape

### *The momentum for security tourism: underground tunnels*

When military facilities on border area were built for the first time, the majority of them were classified as secret or for exclusively military purposes, imbuing them with a characteristically veiled existence. Despite their existence, the failure to recognize their existence is derived from the fact that they are objects covered-up or to which access is prohibited. These military facilities become the social landscape, finally, when they are revealed, partially or in a limited manner, to the public in the context of presenting security as an "attraction."

The underground tunnel that was found for the first time in 1974 showed well the features of Korea's Cold-War division system, and also a significant momentum to form 'landscape' of Cold-War. Underground tunnels are known to have started in 1971 from Sept 25 teaching by Kim Il Sung. The existence of the tunnels was first known by the intel from Kim Boo Sung, who was defected from North Korea on Sept. 5, 1974, and an actual tunnel was first discovered at Gorangpo on Nov. 15, 1974. The clue for the discovery was that the reconnaissance unit of ROKA on their mission watched a steam coming from under the ground. Another underground tunnel was found on March 24, 1975 at Cheorwon. Upon its discovery, seven ROK soldiers who were scouting fell victim to the North Korean soldiers. The tunnels were named as the first underground tunnel and the second underground tunnel, respectively. In October, 1978, another underground tunnel was found near Panmunjeom. In March 1990, at Yanggu was found another underground tunnel.

The underground tunnels were considered the best place to show North Korea's evidenced intention of invasion and the North's ongoing intention towards 'unification under communism'. The government of the South tried



to arouse people to have a sense of national security by showing the tunnels to them, as the result of which security tourism was introduced. Except Panmunjeom, an exceptional place where the truce talk takes place, the trend of such security tourism formed first at Cheorwon. After the second underground tunnel was found at Cheorwon in 1975, Cheorwon district in 1976 started to come up with 'the tourism destination development plan of communist-defeating ring'. After 1977 when the Ministry of Transportation designated Goseokjeong, which was located at Cheorwon, as tourist destination for the people, the plan to promote tourism was initiated with other 'attractions' all combined. Security tourism was born, in a way, both with underground tunnels as resource to enhance anti-communism, and with picturesque scenery as traditional tourism resource

The political upheaval during 1979 and 1980, however, hindered the idea of security tourism from realizing in detailed plans. The plan for security tourism was given detailed shape when Gangwon province confirmed in 1981 its plan for establishing tourist destination for the people, and when Cheorwon was selected as a tourist destination in preparation of '88 Olympic Games'. From 1986, the military and Cheorwon-gun worked together to carry forward the plan for security themed, excavating and preserving national battlefields, and in February 1987, they completed a general plan for security tourism of Cheorwon. This plan consisted mainly of 15 battlefield including underground tunnels, remains of Labor Party Office, restored Woljeongni Station, two cultural heritages such as Dopiansa Temple, and two picturesque sceneries such as Goseokjeong and Jiktang Falls. After that, over the name of the security tourism, the executive of the district office voted to decide its name as 'the Iron Triangle Battlefield'<sup>10</sup> In 1988, was built the biggest education facility for national security, and among different candidates for its name such as Loyalty Center or Communism-Defeating Center, 'the Iron Triangle Battlefield Center' was finally selected. In July 1988, an observatory was built that enables one to see the landscape of DMZ and North Korea. Despite different preferred candidate names from the civil, governmental, and military side respectively, the 'the Iron Triangle Battlefield Observatory' was finally selected for its name<sup>11</sup>. The field trip to the

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<sup>10</sup> The candidates for its name, other than the Iron Triangle Battlefield of Cheorwon, included the Unification Security Battlefield of Cheorwon, the Security Battlefield, the 2nd Underground Tunnel Security Battlefield, the Historic Battlefield Site of Cheorwon. Source: Cheorwon District office

<sup>11</sup> According to the data owned by Cheorwon District Office, the military side preferred CheongSeong Observatory or PilSeung Observatory, using their troop's name, or Hogook Observatory; the residents Taebong Observatory or Waljeong Observatory, highlighting the history

underground tunnels became the core program of the security tourism in Paju and Yangu, which have underground tunnels as Cheorwon. Those areas also saw the establishment of observatory to see the landscape of DMZ, and development of their own tour programs.

*Social construction of the Cold-War landscape*

As shown in the case of Cheorwon, from 1982 Korean government began to proactively carry forward the security tourism to prepare Seoul Olympics, on the one hand, and to raise people's awareness of national security. Consequently, the military environment and the wartime legacy of the border area began to be recognized as 'attractions.' The birth of Cold-War landscape or division landscape as social landscape almost coincided with that of security tourism.

What consist of Cold-War landscape as the object of security tourism? To create interesting 'attractions' for the tourists, in terms of time, the disappeared and the newly-generated should be included; in terms of space, nature outside or inside of the border and the military facilities that are permitted to be open to the public should be included. If we limit the candidates for attractions to something that can be observed at the border area, the Cold-War landscape includes the sign of MDL, barbed wire-fences, GPs, checkpoints, bunkers and military camps, defense facilities such as obstacles of concrete wall to stop tanks, signs of no-crossing, broadcasting facilities for psychological warfare, military camp towns, and strategic villages. The remains of ruins that are left in Cheorwon as the battlefield of the past are the critical constitutions of the Cold War landscape. The Security tourism map made by Cheorwon district in 1988 has eight remains of ruins including Baekma Hill Memorial Stone, the second underground tunnel, and Dopiansa Temple. Those who designed the security tourism frequently use the slogans carrying anti-communist messages in order to induce people to read the ruins in particular ways. The typical ruins such as the remains of Labor Party Office or the place of Water department should be interpreted as the site of 'red violence' occurred during North Korean occupation or Korean War period. The ruins, however, often produce an effect outside the designer's intention. Ruins are likely to function as mediate to make people

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of the region; Cheorwon District office Cheorwon Unification Observatory or Waljeong Observatory. In the end, the name of the security tourism—the Iron Triangle Battlefield Observatory—was selected.

feel fragility of war or violence rather than hostility—which can be called the peace effect of ruins.

In principle, the Cold War landscape exist underground as well as on the ground. The positions or tunnels underground are of course included. Are the laid landmines underground also included? If the landscape means something visible, the laid landmines should be excluded here since they are hidden; however, the signs that indicate the location of the laid landmines, and the warning signs that show different shapes of landmines and urge reporting of them upon one's finding of them should be included.

Other than land such as DMZ, riverine areas and sea also have the Cold-War landscape. Dragon's teeth, obstacles to stop vessels' landing, are of the most conspicuous. Dragon's teeth, which were used extensively by German army during the Second World War<sup>12</sup>, have many different shapes—mostly pillar or saw blade shapes. The installations that were constructed to impede vessels from falling from the air, which can be found in Kinmen Island of Taiwan, can be included here; however, in Korea, those installations were rarely made due to the expectation that Korean air force is superior.

The Cold-War landscape includes people and buildings that disappeared during the war, ruins such as remains of towns, monuments of battlefield for commemorating wars, memorial stones for commemorating victims, immigrants' memorial stones for commemorating towns that disappeared or were lost, and memorial stones of homesickness for commemorating ancestors. The Cold War landscape also include the memorial stone of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, which used to be the division border in the past, the memorial stone for commemorating the reclamation, and the memorial stones for commemorating residents' hardship of their initial stage at strategic villages.

Security tourism created observatory to better watch the border area's landscape and the reality of South-North confrontation. Spots that allowed better observation were selected, and telescopes, that allowed to observe what is invisible to the naked eye, were introduced. The eye that 'overwatches' the enemy at the military post changed into the one that 'guard' the barbed-wire fences and beyond at the observatory. The physical beyond here means the landscape of the North that is seen behind the fences. Gazing the beyond encompasses not just seeing spatially over there beyond the border, but also imagining temporally the future beyond the present, which is the limit and also paradox of security tourism.

The significant incident in the history of security tourism and

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<sup>12</sup> At Kinmen island in Taiwan, the dragon's teeth is called Gyeojochae (軌條砦).

observatory was the unification observatory built at Goseong in 1984. It was built in order to “ruminate the pain of division and the wishes for reunification”, and was considered a place that the displaced people and tourists visit and “soothe the pain of separation and wish for reunification” In the history of observatories in the border area, Goseong Observatory takes a unique position. It is because that in security tourism, ‘unification’ was first introduced as opposed to the notion of division, and the observatory is located at the place that commands the view of Kumgangsan. Inspired by this, troops that are guarding DMZ began to build observatories which are named after their troops. In 1990, Korean government decided to found a unification observatory at Mr. Odu, at which Imjin River and Han River meet, with a good view of the North’s landscape; the observatory opened in 1992.

The Cold War landscape forms along with security tourism; national power uses the Cold War landscape in order to enhance anti-communism of the Cold War through calling its people’s names. The approaches to the Cold War landscape in security tourism is limited, and its representation is mostly prohibited. Only a few cases are permitted such as photographers’ shooting for promotional purpose. It takes plenty of time for the taken photos to be released to the general public. Under the paradigm of security tourism, the general public should ‘guard’ the Cold War landscape; ‘enemies’ are assumed alive, but they are out of our sight.

## The Shift of Tourism and Another Interpretation of the Cold-War Landscape

### *Introduction of peace and ecology*

With the start of Mt. Geumgang tour in Nov. 1998<sup>13</sup>, and the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2003 according to the agreement of the 2000 Inter-Korean summit<sup>14</sup>, the view on DMZ and border area began to change gradually. The most significant change is that the term of ‘peace’

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<sup>13</sup> Mt. Geumgang tour began on Nov. 18, 1998. At first, sea route was used for the tour, but from Sept 2003, land route was used. In 2007, the tour area expanded to Naegeum River area. On Dec. 5, 2007, Kaesong tour started as well. On July 11, 2008, however, a visitor was killed by the shooting of North Korean soldier, which ended the whole tour.

<sup>14</sup> Kaesong Industrial Complex began to be constructed after August 2000 when the agreement was made. From 2004, pilot complex was operated.

replaced the position that was occupied by the term 'security'; or the term of 'ecology' in DMZ began to be emphasized. Long time has passed since the idea came that DMZ should be used in terms of peace. The idea of setting up peace park inside DMZ was first proposed by International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1979. This idea, however, could not be realized under the situation of Cold-War confrontation at that time. With the 2000 Inter-Korean summit held, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, then president of Republic of South Africa, met president Kim Dae-jung in March 2001, "how to use DMZ—based on the experience of Republic of South Africa—for improving the South-North relations and making a bridge building to reunification" was mentioned in the summit. The project propelled by Korean Government was construction of ecological peace park. The project aims to preserve the ecological environment of DMZ and also use it in terms of peace. From 2002 Korean government began to research about it (Korean Environmental Institute 2002), local governments also began to be active in designing the project.

The momentum that expanded the consumption of Cold-War landscape at border area and changed its characteristics was the adjustment of CCL in northward direction and the reduction of CCL. In 1983, Ministry of National Defense set the scope of CCL to 20-40 km south of MDL, and for the first time specified it in the domestic law; later in 1993, in 1997, and in 2008 it adjusted CCL to the north direction. These adjustments turned the 'attractions' within CCZ to become objects which can be accessed and represented even more freely than they were, accordingly.

The significant change that occurred in Cheorwon, the center of security tourism, is the development of the bird watching tourism on which migratory birds arriving in this area in the winter season such as cranes and white-naped cranes are centered. The border villages at Cheorwon, particularly the strategic villages such as Daema-ri, Yangji-ri, and Igil-ri, named themselves as the Crane Peace Village, and are now trying to attract as many visitors as possible. Saengchang-ri, for example, uses marsh and cormorant, which inhabit marsh. Cheorwon gun is supporting the construction of related infrastructure. Peace tourism in this area is characterized by going in line with ecology tourism. The bird watching tourism including watching cranes and migratory birds is closer to the sensibility of peace rather than the awareness of national security.

As noted above, the perspective to see the Cold War landscape of the border area has changed over this kind of political momentum from the above and the door-opening of the regional society through the CCL's going

north. However, it is often stimulated as well by the inner elements of security tourism. When tourists gaze the remains of the ruins such as the remains of Labor Party Office, place of Water department, or the icehouse, —essential part of security tourism—they feel peace based on the fragility of war, rather than the awareness of national security. The intention and the consequence of their tour, thus, have no other option but to contradict. The ruins were registered as cultural heritage in 2002. The placards accusing ‘the puppet from the North of brutality’ were hanging at the Labor Party Office or the Agricultural Products Inspection Center, in the context of security tourism, but they were all removed after the introduction of term of peace.

Observatory is another mediate which allows one to reinterpret the Cold War landscape of the border as resource of peace tourism instead of in the context of security tourism. When the tourists who visit the unification observatory at Goseong, which was established in the beginning of the 1980s, or other observatories which were built later and whose names are after the troops’ names in the region, see the barbed wire fences—close view—and at the scenery of the North beyond DMZ—distant view—, they imagine peace as an alternative different from this reality of Cold War. This change is noticed in the name of observatories. In 2006, at the northern side of CCL in Ganghwa Island was constructed the Ganghwa Peace Observatory; following it, in 2007, at Cheorwon was built the Peace Observatory. These observatories are not that different in their function compared to the existing observatories or the ones named after regional troops. The term of peace, however, affects the way we see and imagine an alternative. Urry (2010) argued that the change in how we see something affects how we feel as well as how we imagine it. Given his argument, the transition of observatory names—from unification observatory or observatories with troop’s names into peace observatory—involves that the purpose or effect of seeing is switched from anti-communism awareness into peace sensibility, and that how to see is also switched from over watch or guard to gaze. The peace observatory established at Cheorwon is the one that replaced the previous ‘Iron Triangle Battlefield Observatory’, standing at a hill that commands a better view. The previous Iron Triangle Battlefield Observatory turned into Cheorwon International Crane Center to show the ecological characteristics of Cheorwon. In front of the center, was built peace cultural square.

At the second Inter-Korean summit between the leader Kim Jong Il and president Roh Moo-hyun in 2007, discussions were made on converting the Yellow Sea, which was turned into a troubled area, into the peace zone. In accordance with the discussion, one of the projects done within CCZ

includes Korea DMZ Peace-Life Valley, that was established in 2008. The purpose of the project is to practice the value of the life and peace in everyday life. The valley was located in the CCZ of InJe Gun, Gangwon Province. At that time, Gangwon Province and Gyeonggi Province, which are located in the border area, made plans for promoting the industry of peace tourism, through using the ecological resources of DMZ (Research Institute for Gangwon 2006; Gyeonggi Research Institute 2008).

President Lee Myung-bak, who was inaugurated in 2008, made a concept of 'green growth' that is an infusion between ecology and developmentalism. In 2009, the Government enacted Forest Protection Act to protect ecology and forest resources in DMZ, and designated the Reserve Area for the Forest Genetic Resources. In February, 2008, the government selected the building project of Ecology and Peace Park around DMZ as the national task, and established the ground plan for building the Ecology and Peace Park for the first time in 2009. For the project, candidate village began to be examined, that is SaengChang-ri of Gimhwa-eup, Cheorwon gun, Ganghwa Island (Korean Environmental Institute 2009). Based on the examination, 'the promotion plans for the pilot project of Ecology and Peace Park' was prepared in June 2010. Through the consultation with the Ministry of National Defense and the local governments, public presentation for the local residents was held in Dec, 2010. In 2011, Ministry of Environment made a more detailed plans (Gwon 2011); its report included a new course via Cross Tower other than the proposed course in 2009. In October, 2011, the final tracking courses were confirmed. Though the incident of ROKS Cheonan sinking of March 2010 affected this plan, making the original plan go backward<sup>15</sup>, the construction started in March, 2012—with the first course of Cross Tower course, finished in 2013, the visitor center in April 2014, and the second course of YongYangBo course in July 2015. After its pilot running, the park opened to the public in May 2016. In 2018, the pavilion of 'The story of KimHwa, the lost town' was established.

President Park Geun-hye, who was inaugurated in 2013, suggested establishment of DMZ international peace park, but the response from North Korea was cold. Rather, North Korea's nuclear development significantly worsened the two Korea's relations. Nevertheless, the removal campaign of barbed-wire fences was continuously held in areas where the fences put people's everyday lives in trouble such as Gimpo and Goyang—Han River

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<sup>15</sup> Mt Gyeong loop course was suggested at the original plan, but the actual course went backward a little bit south due to the disapproval of the commander at the site.

Estuary—and Goseong and Sokcho—the eastern coast of Korea. Efforts to remove dragon's teeth and anti-tank obstacles appeared in islands of the western coast.

The change in the way to consume the Cold War landscape, and a momentum to shift security tourism into peace tourism was emergence of art projects. The typical examples include 'Real DMZ' projects, which began in 2012. The participating artists read the Cold War landscape in different ways that people did in the past, make use of the landscape, and produce artworks or represent the landscape. They placed DMZ or military facilities in the aesthetic and cultural context instead of military context; in so doing, they describe it in relative ways.

### *Issues of representing and exhibiting the Cold-War landscape*

The 'attractions' at DMZ and border area did not have particular names at first; however, as they gradually turned social landscape, they gained objectified names—Cold-War landscape, or division landscape. Although they become the objects of observation to the visitors from outside, their representation is mostly forbidden. In particular, military facilities or the landscape of the North can be viewed with the naked eye or through a telescope at the observatory, but cannot be photographed. The Cold-War landscape goes through a period of transition—a state of permitted access, but forbidden representation—and it goes to a status that the access and representation is free.

Photographing Korean ceasefire line and the border area has a long history. Those areas were photographed over and over around the time of Korean armistice by the U.S. army's photography troop, and the photos have been preserved at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The starting point of representing Cold-War landscape was Panmunjeom, that granted official press permission. Japanese photographer Shisei Kuwabara took photos from 1964, and they have the theme of Cold-War landscape of Panmunjeom and military camp towns. We can assume that he faced plenty of restrictions in photo shooting, because his photobook of 1990 is titled, "No Photography".

The reconciliation mood between the two Koreas around 2000 and the elevated tension caused by North Korea's nuclear development after 2008 made a complicated differentiation of the perspective toward the Cold-War landscape of the border area. The view for security and the one for peace were not just mixed, but even competing each other. And the photobooks



began to be published on representation of the Cold-War landscape. In 2003, Lee Si Woo published his photobook—the collection of his photos taken through his field investigation of CCL from peace perspective. Jeong In-sook published a photobook titled *Land of Handicapped* in 2003. And later, other photobooks with collection of the photos taken long time ago by photographers were published. Photographer Choi Byung Gwan took photos of the Armistice Line when he walked along the whole 155 miles three times, round trip; it was when he lived at GP with soldiers for two years from February 1997. This photobook was published in 2010; the book highlights an ecological peace perspective including the lives that grass and flowers are together with barbed wire fences or landmines. It is because the scope of photo permission at that time excluded GPs or military facilities; he had no other options but to take photos of rusted helmets, landmines or flowers on the barbed wire fences. Photographer Kim Nyung Man started to photograph Panmunjeom from 1983, and his works are evaluated to feature a good catch of the tension of that time. Those trends go along with the consumption of the Cold-War landscape as the object of peace tourism. Peace tourism not only serves as a device to induce people to have different frame other than security in seeing the Cold-War landscape; it also arouses people to imagine ‘alternatives’ of the Cold-War and the current division.

The full-scale photos of DMZ were open to the public in 2017 through photographer Park Jongwoo's photobook 'DMZ: The Demilitarized Zone of Korea' by Steidl, a prominent photography-specializing publishing company of Germany. The photos were taken in 2009 with partnership with the Ministry of National Defense of Korea. The photos in Park's photobook give a good explanation of how Korean Cold-War landscape formed and has functioned. The photobook put the Cold-War landscape of DMZ into nine categories, which include the inside of DMZ, Reconnaissance, GP, JSA, SLL, GOP, FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area), CCZ, and The North landscape. Such an organized approach is hardly found in other photobooks of the similar topic. Interestingly, the book is taking the form of journal, since its publishing company Steidle made it as popular edition.

Park has an interesting background to started to photograph GPs. Park himself told me that one day Yoo Yong Won, who was at that time military reporter of Chosun Ilbo, stressed the need for systematic photographing of DMZ as archives with the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of Korean War ahead. After the discussion with the then minister of the ministry of national defense, photo permission was approved. Just at the moment, as TV Chosun, which was preparing to launch its TV channel, commissioned Park to make

DMZ documentary photos, Park had cooperation with each other<sup>16</sup>. One year before Park's photo-shooting of DMZ, French photographer Yann Arthus-Bertrand took aerial photos in partnership with KBS, on the South Korean military helicopter even 500 meters in the air close to the orange colored flying prohibition sign<sup>17</sup>—such a precedent helped Park to push ahead with the project.

Park's photos of GPs included not just the ones from the outside but also from the inside. There were fifteen photos that were taken by Park when he got into the GPs inside DMZ. As walls were built around GPs, the inside of GP, here, means not the barracks but inside of the walls. Park's original plan was to photograph all the things inside the GP at DMZ; however, when he finished photo-shooting of 17 GPs, the ROKS Cheonan sinking happened, and his project stopped there. At that time, it is said that the North 'showed a warning sign that reporters' frequent visit to GP would not be that desirable.' Despite Park's waiting for another several months from then, the situation did not improve; Park had to photograph at GOP or had to take aerial photos, approaching, on the helicopter, the flying prohibition sign in the air. For photo-shooting of DMZ on a helicopter, since the flight over the armistice line, left-right direction, is impossible, one has to enter and leave the accessible airline over and over. Thus, a leading vessel, whose pilot has a good command of the topography, is required. The job is extremely difficult, requiring such a large number of facilities; cooperation with the military side is absolute.

Park's photos of GPs of DMZ, which were included in the photobook above, were open to the public through an exhibition in 2019 at Culture Station Seoul 284<sup>18</sup>. His photos of GP come around 90 works, which means he photographed almost all the GPs of the South. His works can be put into two categories: first, having birds-eye-view of the whole landscape, second,

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<sup>16</sup> The photos which were released at TV Chosun as its launching documentary program were taken with novelist Kim Hoon.

<sup>17</sup> It is a pity that the photos did not be released to the public since the consultation with the ministry of national defense was not that smooth at that time.

<sup>18</sup> The exhibition at Culture Station Seoul 284 is full of different views on DMZ and border area. Upon going through the exhibition entrance to which barbed wire fences and passages were applied, one can find artworks of artists who joined Real DMZ project, film screening of North Korea's GP through the telescope and everyday lives of the soldiers who are on duty, and botanical specimen that is explaining DMZ ecology. As if a situation is shown that collected data by expert researchers and the archiving works by artists show few differences, photos were collected and displayed with devotion on the restoration scene of the border area from the 1950s to the 1970s, and on the scenes of soldiers of the military or the residents of the strategic villages.

highlighting the gaze of the individuals who are doing something inside DMZ. The former shows the magnificent and beautiful aspect of DMZ; the latter catches the critical tension of DMZ. The former not just brings into our view an object whose existence was unclear, but also transforms it into a kind of spectacles; the latter accurately picks up and presents the principle such as framing and focusing—the core principle of the Cold-War landscape. The rectangular-shaped frame found in bunkers and GP's surveillance windows, fire point of guns and telescopes exactly seize and show the features of military surveillance of DMZ or citizen's gaze.

It is not easy for photo exhibitions on DMZ to publicly exhibit facilities that are considered military secret or sensitive by the counter-part. It is also not easy to give proper titles to each photo, or to provide detailed information about the military facilities that are shown in the photos. Another sensitive part includes how to arrange each photo in the exhibition: it is also impossible to arrange photos in a way that the GPs actual location is exposed. That is why people visit such photo exhibitions, only to approach the Cold War landscape as image. Although GPs are at the corner of dissolution due to the agreement of the South and the North, their representation and exhibition has many limitations.

## Conclusion: Towards Theorization of the Cold War Landscape

The history of Cold-War landscape is divided into two parts: first, in physical dimension, construction and dissolution; second, in social dimension, approaches and representation of militarized space. The Cold War landscape has three phases: first, the militarization of specific space; second, the transition of the militarized space into the Cold War landscape through security tourism; third, with the change in the way to see the Cold War landscape, aiming for peace. The first phase is that with the militarization of space, the space is treated as secret, and its existence is not known. Security tourism is a paradigm to make the nation's people under the Cold War by enhancing anti-communism awareness through the restricted opening of this space. Here, the Cold War landscape is a living reality, and a situation that visiting and observing is allowed but its representation and public release is prohibited. Some photographers can take photos with the help of the military; however, their exhibition for the public is not possible. With the reconciliation between the South and the North, the Cold War landscape is defined the legacy of the past, instead of as reality. If peace tourism

establishes, citizens can freely consume the Cold War landscape; here, the freedom includes not only in access but also in representation. In this regard, the present peace tourism is, not in complete, but in a phase in transition, coexisting with security tourism.

To generalize the process that, as a way to use the Cold War landscape, security tourism shifts into peace tourism, based on the case study of Cheorwon, the post-Cold War mega-event from the above becomes the condition, and through different programs from the regional societies, the transition is gradually taking place. Here, its facilitating mediates include new meaning imposing of the ruins, major element of security tourism, ecological bird watching program on migratory bird such as cranes, and art projects including Real DMZ.

The ruins tourism, consisting of security tourism, brought political effect, which was different from the initial intention, due to tourists' gaze and reflection, which we can call ruin-effect. At Cheorwon, important remains of ruins were registered as cultural heritages in 2002. The tourism of bird watching including cranes and white-naped cranes came from ecological environment of Cheorwon, but it is a by-product of militarization of strategic village formation, which is an important channel to enhance the sense of peace. Also, Real DMZ project, started in 2012, is that domestic and foreign artists stay for some time in the region of CCL, create artworks, exhibit them, interact with the residents, and attract tourists.<sup>19</sup> Ecological tourism or art tourism not just change the image of militarized area, but enhance the sense of peace.

In April, 2018, the third Inter Korean summit took place, and officials in military officials talk were held; and DMZ began to face a significant change. At Sept 19 Inter Korean military talk, an agreement was reached: as an action to ease the military tension between the two, eleven GPs would be withdrawn, as a trial basis, that are too close to DMZ with risks of accidental conflict; remains-excavation would be carried at Arrowhead Hill. On Nov. 15, accordingly, except one GP, ten GPs were demolished at each side. Scenes of bombing or breaking down GPs with heavy equipment, or of the completed demolition were exposed to the mass media.<sup>20</sup> The GPs that avoided

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<sup>19</sup> The music video named 'Dreaming of Balhae' by Seotaegi and Boys, which was filmed in front of 'Labor Party Office', the typical ruin of Cheorwon, was the first cultural event showing the transition from security tourism towards peace tourism.

<sup>20</sup> At that time, some mass media argued that if the same number of GPs as the North are removed from the South, a crisis would occur in security, resulting North Korea having three times more GPs based on the component ratio. The removal continued, nevertheless. Environmentalists

**TABLE 3**  
**THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE COLD WAR LANDSCAPE**

		Momentum of change	Momentum of change
The subject who sees	Military/residents	The nation's people	citizen
Production/consumption of space	militarization	Security tourism	Peace tourism
accessibility	No access	Restricted access	*reconciliation Free access
Meaning of landscape	Tough environment	Discovery of the underground tunnels, designation of picturesque scenery as tourist destination for the people	The Cold War landscape as reality *reconciliation event between the South and the North The Cold War landscape as legacy
Object (component)	Landmine, barbed wire fences, obstacles, GP, strategic villages	Underground tunnel, checkpoint, battlefield, ruins, picturesque scenery, unification observatory	*designation of the ruins as cultural heritage *bird watching tourism *cultural and art project *establishment Ruins, ecology(town), peace observatory, art exhibition, museum
Purpose/effect	Defending the border	Anti-communism awareness	of ecology and peace park Sense of peace
How to see	Overwatch(focus, frame)	Guard(focus, frame)	Gaze (alternative, panorama)
Possibility of representation	Representation is prohibited	Privileged representation	Restricted representation

demolition are the GP of the North under Mt. Oseong, and the GP of the South having a good watch of the facilities for protective custody of Mt. Geumgang. In June 2019, Cultural Heritage Administration changed the name of '365GP' that luckily survived, into 'Goseong GP of eastern sea' and

expressed worries about the way of GP withdrawal through bombing.

registered it as cultural heritage. It is because the GP was the first GP that was ever built in the South.<sup>21</sup> Certainly, GPs that symbolized militarization of DMZ and the Cold-War are coming out of the reality and going into history. If this process moves forward, and DMZ becomes literally demilitarized zone, the GPs will be cultural site under different names.<sup>22</sup>

The remains excavation project was initiated at Arrowhead Hill, one of the hard-fought battlefields. The remains of French Armed Forces that were excavated during the project gained global attention. And the design to build DMZ Peace Park was propelled again. The Peace Park, a park where foreigners and people of the South and North Korea can freely access, will be built in DMZ Environment and Tourism Belt, that are along with MDL, with park built at Paju in the western part of DMZ, Cheorwon in the middle, Goseong in the eastern, respectively. In 2019 DMZ Peace Trails was open to the public at Goseong and Cheorwon; now Paju is waiting for its opening.

Ecological Peace Park or the building project of DMZ 'Peace Trails' that have been underway until now are all different passages towards development of peace tourism. Recently, there are many discussions on how to make a peaceful use of Cold-War landscape of DMZ and border area. It is not easy, however, to keep the balance between control for preserving purpose and development. Removal of barbed wire-fences and adjustment of CCL in the northward direction is the dissolution of Cold-War legacy, but at the same time, it could bring a crisis in ecological environment which has been well preserved in those areas until now. In addition, many people are worried that involvement of particular development within peace tourism might lead to destruction of ecological environment. Recently some strategic villages such as Minbook village reported increasing cases of running livestock industry using the uncontaminated environment, about which most residents of the village are giving harsh criticism.

The Cold War landscape in the division border and the border area, in the trajectory from security tourism to peace tourism, has seen the change in the way to consume it and to see it. It is hard to say, however, that the paradigm of peace tourism is complete to have developed enough. The

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<sup>21</sup> As this GP was constructed using concrete, chances are high that current GP has a different appearance than it was in 1953.

<sup>22</sup> This author visited, in November 2017, Nangan, which belongs to Matsu archipelago in Taiwan, and attended the event, that is, a ceremony to release a museum to the public. The museum was originally 'Shengli Water Reservoir', the first GP, one of the GPs established near the island. This Battlefield cultural museum represented the daily lives, experiences and the hardship of the soldiers who worked here, creating a model for peaceful use of the Cold War landscape.

representation of the Cold War landscape is limited; besides, at the macro-level, the scope of peace tourism is contained to the inside of South Korea, and the joint mutual program between the two Koreas has not been realized. In this regard, peace tourism in Korea at the moment is no more than ‘tourism longing for peace.’

(Submitted: September 13, 2019; Accepted: September 25, 2019)

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