

The Asianization of Northeast China: Fragmented Integration of Local Authority and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture*

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the characteristics of China's neoliberal integration in the post - Cold War period. To do this, it uses the term Asianization, and examines the changing nature of the Yanbian local authority in Northeast China through the interactions between different ideologies and nationalisms. The results of the analysis reveal that the Korean local authority was a system comprised of competitive communist nationalists whose organization was made necessary by the Cold War. It was maintained through the inverse relations of leftist ideology and Korean nationalism. The local authority experienced systematic reorganization in the post - Cold War period and the concrete reflection of this reorganization was the fragmentation of local authority through partial opening, decentralization, and deautonomization. This fragmentation can be seen as one characteristic of China's neoliberal integration process, and the fragmented integration of local authority can be regarded as an aspect of the Asianization of Northeast China.

Keywords: Asianization, Northeast China, Yanbian, Korean, fragmented integration, globalization

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Introduction

From the late 1800s to the early 1900s, Manchuria was an arena of various conflicts between political and economic regimes including the Qing Dynasty, Tsarist Russia, Korea, and Japan. In 1932, this region was placed under the rule of Japanese imperialism, and reborn as a modern nation state called Manchukuo (Duara 1991, 2004). After the collapse of Japanese imperialism, it became the northeast region of the newly born People's Republic of China. The industrial heritage of Manchukuo led China's economic development. However, the Northeast region, which had undergone a period of turbulent socialism, had to react to the challenges brought on in the post-socialism period. In contrast to the rapid economic growth of China, the Northeast region has become synonymous with backwardness (Lin et al. 2017). For this reason, Manchuria received much attention not only in the early 20th century,¹ but also in the era of China's globalization (or neoliberalism). Northeast China has been regarded as a subject of research that can derive meaningful social science implications including "collective memories and labor protests" (Lee 2000, 2007), the "people and urban poor" (Cho 2012, 2013), the "ethnic minority and developmental citizenship" (Park 2018), "local party and social management" (Baek et al. 2017), and "the state and enterprise" (Park 2015). From the viewpoint of sociology (specifically international political sociological perspectives)², the Northeast is a region that shows the "compressed modernity" (Chang 1999, 2010) of East Asia (Park 2018). Therefore, the experience of globalization of the Northeast region not only enriches the interpretation of modernity of China, but also provides theoretical implications in the study of the surrounding societies.

The adaptation of globalization in Asia was a complex process. The trend of Asia's globalization has been termed the "Asianization' of (modern) Asia".³ According to Chang (2014, p. 337):

(Asianization of Asia) is a trend much *comparable to the Europeanization of (modern) Europe* in earlier centuries, but has required the disembedding of

¹ Manchuria had been a hot issue in the conferences held by Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1920 – 1930s.

² IPS provides theoretical and methodological imagination of sociology in the era of globalization. Please see Basaran, ed (2017), Guilanume and Bilgin ed (2017).

³ See also Funabashi (1993).

Asian nations from the EuroAmerica – dictated order of bilateral dependencies and controls and their (re) embedding into the neoliberal global system of capitalist political economy whose parameters are still dominated by EuroAmerica. Asia *is* rising while it is being simultaneously integrated or even (re) constructed internally..... In essence, however, a neoliberal capitalist Asia is on the rise, so that its economic ascendance has been accompanied by diverse and complex tendencies toward transnational socioeconomic exploitation, cultural conflict, human rights abuse, environmental destruction, etc.

Thus, the Asianization here can be seen as “neoliberal integration”; the basic unit of the subject being integrated is a country (a nation or a regime) with obvious political and economic sovereignty, and the globalized Asia is a “neoliberally integrated society” consisting of a very wide range of contradictions and conflicts.⁴ In this sense, why and how, at a concrete level, does one Asian country change (or have to change) its existing domestic order in the process of this kind of integration?

Despite the growing interest of researchers on Northeast China, little research has been done on the changes in local authority and the effects of these changes on the local social and political order. Many aspects of this integration can be seen in Northeast China, especially in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (hereafter Yanbian) adjacent to Russia and North Korea. In Yanbian there were some development projects simultaneously promoted by the central government and international organization (such as United Nations Development Programme). Despite the development projects, Yanbianese migrated overseas and to southeast coastal areas to work. Although there are differences in degree, politically and economically, South Korea maintained an interest in Yanbian. Also, Russia and North Korea planned to develop their border areas to Yanbian. Moreover, Japan and the United States are still interested in this area (Colin 2006; Gomàà 2006; Paik and Ham 2011; Luova 2006, 2009; Kim 2010; Scalapino 1992; Piao 2017). According to this research, it can be argued that because of the determinants of the establishment of Yanbian local authority had changed in line with neoliberal transformation, Yanbian had to experience changes of its existing political and economic authorities in the process of globalization. So, what are these determinants?

Starting in the 19th century, Koreans began to live in Manchuria on a

⁴ See also Rosenau (1997).

large scale, and in 1934, the densely populated area became the administrative district of Gando province. In 1952, Gando province became Yanbian, and after the reform and opening, people became worried that Yanbian might disappear (politically or administratively). Geographically and culturally, the Yanbianese who belonged to the communist regime had to be integrated into the neoliberal order in the post - Cold War period. Yanbian's globalization following China's pragmatism was achieved by introducing liberal elements without completely abolishing socialist factors. Koreans in Yanbian were required to undergo "proletarianization with a rejected ethnicity" in the socialist era, this role was reset to various, contradictory roles (Chinese national and Korean ethnic, entrepreneurial and proletarian roles) in the process of globalization (Park 2018). Yanbian's local citizenship regime has repeatedly been restructured simultaneously through the interaction between competitive nationalism of Korean and Chinese and the conflictive ideology of socialism (or totalism) and liberalism. If the Yanbianese were required to play these roles under contradictory relationship between ideology and nationalism in the transition period, then what changes took place within the local authority, which was governed by ethnic Koreans and steered by a strong socialist ideology? Furthermore, what aspects of Asianization can be revealed through this characteristic of Yanbian?

In order to identify this changing nature of Yanbian local authority, the current paper will answer following two questions. First, how did the Yanbian local authority formed and maintained by competitive Korean and Chinese communist nationalist? Second, how did this competitive communist nationalism change under globalization (or neoliberalism), and how did it restructure the Yanbian local authority?

Issues of Gando Korean Autonomy and the Emergence of Local Authority under Japanese Imperialism

From the middle of the nineteenth century, due to the large influx of Koreans, the Qing and the Republic of China always had to react in some way (politically or diplomatically).⁵ The expansion of Russian or Soviet and Japanese imperialism further complicated the governance of the region. In

⁵ Many Koreans were engaged in the socioeconomic activities early on in the northern lands (such as ancient *gojoseon* and *goguryeo* (BC 37-AD 668)).

this complex structure, a part of Andung, Songjiang, and Jilin Province (or Fengtian and Jilin Province) directly collided with “Gando”, which was a spatial direction for the Koreans.⁶

As Japanese imperialism began to rule over Korea, Koreans in Gando became targets for “protection” by Japan. In 1907, the Gando Police Office of Korean Resident-General (hereafter Gando Police Office) was established in Yongjeong (Longjing in Chinese), and the police officers began researching the area’s social, economic, political, and military characteristics. In 1909, Qing and Japan signed the Gando Convention, and Japan acknowledged that Gando was the territory of Qing and instead acquired the right to construct railroads in Manchuria. Japan abolished the Gando Police Office and established the Japanese Consulate General in Gando, and continued to intervene in Gando’s affairs (Gando Police Office 1909, 1910a, 1910b).⁷

Koreans in Gando resisted both Japanese colonial rule and the discriminatory class structure of China. They pursued Korean autonomy (governance by Koreans) in Gando through active organization. Typically, there were Ganminhoe (1910s), composed of Korean religious leaders, and the Hyanggap Movement (1920s), which was promoted in response to the Korean deportation policy by Fengtian warlords. In 1930s, there were attempts of a “Korean Soviet” by Korean communists, and demands of Korean autonomy by Minsaengdan (Kim C. 1999, p. 160; Kim S. 1999, pp. 425-426, 2006, pp. 54-57; Shin 1999, pp. 185-186). Among these attempts, the influence and impact of the Minsaengdan was relatively important. Since the establishment of the Minsaengdan in February 1932, it demanded Korean autonomy in Gando. They complained to the Japanese Government General of Korea (JGGK) that “Since 400,000 Korean compatriots living in Gando are extensions of Korea, the administrative organization of Gando should adopt a form similar to that of Korea, which is different from the political organization of the new state (Manchukuo)” (Kim S. 2006, pp. 55-57). However, the issue of Korean autonomy over Gando was a disagreeable issue for the JGGK, the Tokyo authority and the Kwantung Army.

On the other hand, with the expansion of Japanese imperialism and the attacks of the National People’s Party (NPP), the CCP began to actively discuss the autonomy issues of Manchuria and other regions. In 1930, the Manchuria Committee of the CCP said that it was trying to “build the Soviet

⁶ See also Park (2000).

⁷ This Gando Convention has become the basis for some of the South Korean nationalists today to claim the sovereignty of Gando, because they saw that Japan and Qing had arbitrarily decided on the sovereignty of this region.

TABLE 1
CADRES OF GANDO PROVINCE BY NATIONALITY (END OF 1935)

Government	Korean	Japanese	Chinese	Total
Provincial	24	27	23	74
County (or City)	4	18	5	27
Police Office	2	11	6	19
Total (Percentage)	30 (25.0)	56 (46.7)	34 (28.3)	120 (100.0)
Population of Gando Province	452,246 (73.6)	8,461 (1.4)	153,387 (25.0)	614,094 (100.0)

Source.—Yoon (2014: 174)

self - determined republic of the Goryeo (Korean) people of Manchuria”, and the Chinese Soviet Republic (CSR), founded in 1931 with the support of the Soviet Union, recognized the right of self - determination of ethnic minorities in China and the right of each minority to leave China and form an independent state (Yeom 2010, p. 1287) However, because the so - called “self - determination” or “independence” was controlled by the leftists (or proletariat), the CCP could not agree with the Korean autonomy of Gando that was promoted by the nationalists (such as Christians, intellectuals, and economic elites).

The administrative localization of this region, though not Korean autonomization, was promoted in the process of state construction after the establishment of Manchukuo. In 1932, the Kwantung Army established this country (a puppet state), and in 1934, the last emperor of Qing, Aisian Gioro Puyi, was reborn as the Emperor of Manchukuo. The elites of the country were made up of groups such as the Japanese (Kwantung Army), the remaining forces of the Qing Imperial family, the ethnic Han who had grown politically in the Qing dynasty, and the pro-Japanese ethnic Han. The processes of state construction were readily apparent; including the installation of the local governments. Manchukuo officially established Gando Province,⁸ which included areas such as Antu County in Fengtian Province, Yanji, Helong, Hunchun and Wangqing of Jilin Province, and Yanji became the Capital City. The geographical boundary of Gando Province today was the area of Yanbian excluding Dunhua City. Unlike other local authorities, the political elites of Gando consisted of Japanese, Koreans and

⁸ Manchukuo established five provinces and one special municipality in 1932, and in 1934, reorganized 5 provinces into eleven provinces (including Gando province).

Chinese (Yoon 2014, pp. 174-181), (See Table 1).⁹

It is unclear whether the demand for autonomy by Koreans in Gando had been accepted, but it is certain that in 1934 Gando became a provincial administrative district. The state of Manchukuo, which was based on the Kingly Way, always wanted to reveal its modernity in comparison to the warlord era. Manchukuo created the slogan Harmony of the Five Ethnic Groups to demonstrate the multiethnic nature of the newfound state. The emperor was Manchu and Xing'an Province was built in the Northern part, where the population of Mongols was large. The establishment of Gando Province, where the majority of the population was Korean, can be understood in this context.

However, Manchukuo did not guarantee a happy life for most people (Han 2004). Since Manchukuo did not revolutionize the existing agrarian economy and rural class structure, Gando Province had to maintain a hierarchical class structure based on the relations of the Han landlords, Korean farmers, and large-scale unemployment among Koreans (Yoon 2014, pp. 344-345). Gando Province was located on one of two major economic routes connecting Japan, Korea, and Manchukuo, and was also economically and politically connected to the Soviet Union, Manchukuo, and Korea. However, domestic and international trade was controlled by Han Chinese business magnates and Japanese capital, the Korean economic elites could not emerge through the distribution industry even though agriculture was the major industry of Koreans. At the same time, Gando Province had not experienced massive industrialization because the heavy industrialization of Manchukuo was promoted around an economic belt connecting Harbin, Xinjing, Fengtian, and Guangdongzhou. This economic structure naturally increased the number of Korean proletariats (such as poor farmers and urban poor) and suppressed the emergence of Korean capitalists. Before the establishment of Gando Province, the elites of the Korean community were nationalist who were educated and possessed property. Since the emergence of Manchukuo and Gando Province, paradoxically, the Korean community became a community where the proletariats occupied the majority of the population.

Interestingly, after the establishment of Gando Province the CCP began to more actively emphasize Korean autonomy. In 1935, when the Long March

⁹ Since the end of 1930s, some Korean elites including Lee, Beom-Ik (the governor of Gando Province) became high - level cadres of Manchukuo.

was in full swing due to the repression of the Republic of China (RC),¹⁰ Wuping, the inspector of East Jilin of Manchurian Committee of CCP (hereafter Jilin Committee) argued that, in order to win the Chinese revolution, the anti-Japanese United Front of Chinese and Koreans was urgently needed, and for this United Front, the CCP should actively consider Koreans' urgent desire for autonomy. He also said that the Japanese and the CCP were competing for the hearts and minds of the Koreans in East Manchuria, and that the political struggle was beneficial to the Japanese side because they had the political weapon of Korean autonomy in their back pocket (Han 2001, pp. 267-268). Subsequently, in March 1936, according to a letter sent to the Raohe Central Committee and the Fourth Army Fourth Regiment by East Jilin Committee, the East Jilin Committee argued that the Chinese and Koreans should unite and overthrow the rule of the Japanese – Manchurian and establish a Gando Korean People's Autonomous Region (Yeom 2010, p. 1289).

The CCP needed solidarity with the people oppressed by colonial rule to win the revolution. In the year of Kwandung Army's Mukden Incident, the CCP established the CSR within the territory of the Republic of China, and appealed vigorously to other ethnic groups to resist the KMT's Republic of China. When Manchukuo was established and Gando Province was created, the CCP emphasized the necessity of ethnic self - determination and independence more energetically. Koreans in Gando continued to demand autonomy, but Manchukuo did not allow it. Perhaps it was a very important strategic opportunity for the CCP. The CCP proposed a better policy than Manchukuo for solidarity with Koreans. Koreans regained independence in 1945 with the promise of autonomy (even self - determination and independence) from the CCP. After the collapse of Japanese imperialism, Chinese communists encountered Korean communists in Gando, who had a common revolutionary goal under Japanese rule. In the absence of the common enemy of Japanese imperialism, the issue of autonomy had become one of the major problems that Chinese and Koreans had to resolve.

Competitive Socialists Nationalism, Eclectic Systematization, and Korean Local Authority under the CCP Regime

In 1945, Japanese imperialism collapsed and the Soviet Union occupied

¹⁰ More specifically Kuomintang.

Manchukuo. In mid-August, the Red Army established the Provisional Government of Gando Province (hereafter Provisional Government) (Chair: Yoon, Tae-Dong) after taking control of the Gando area. The Korean community quickly adapted to the transition of this political structure. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the political power of the Koreans had become more active than in the oppressive Manchukuo period. The representative political power of the Koreans was the Alliance of Workers, Farmers, and Youth (hereafter Alliance). At the same time, the Korean delegation of the Northeast Allied Anti-Japanese Army (hereafter Allied Army) entered Gando in September and joined the existing Korean political elites in the CCP, and reorganized the Alliance into the Grand People's Democratic Alliance of Yanbian (hereafter Grand Alliance) (Ren 2009, pp. 494-450; Moon 2014). The Grand Alliance announced its program shortly after its establishment. It wanted to promote China - Soviet friendships, Anti - Japaneseism, the deposition of enemy properties, land reform, etc. Meaningfully, the establishment of the (Korean) democratic autonomy regime in Gando and the development of Korean culture and education were also mentioned (Ren 2009, pp. 474-480). In addition, at the end of 1945, the Fifth Branch of the Korean Volunteer Army (hereafter Korean Volunteer Army) arrived at Yanbian and was combined with the existing armed forces of Gando (Yeom 1994, pp. 242-243). Thus, in addition to the existing Korean political forces anti-Japanese militants had been added, and massive Korean political and military forces were developed. They seem to have been preparing for regional governance by Koreans.

On the other hand, Yan'an's Central Committee of the CCP reorganized the Northeast Committee of CCP (hereafter Northeast Committee). Although there was a Northeast Committee, which centered on the Allied Army, Yan'an built a new Northeast Bureau of the CCP (hereafter Northeast Bureau) and established the Jilin Provincial Committee and the Yanbian Branch (committee) of CCP (hereafter Yanbian Branch). Based on this party organization, Yan'an sent a "33 executives group" to Yanbian, replacing the existing Northeast Committee-centric local authority. Existing Korean organizations were disbanded, and Chinese officials replaced the Korean leaders. On November 20, 1945, the Yanbian People's Congress was convened by the Yanbian Branch and a government agency, the Yanbian (Prefectural) Commissioner's Office (hereafter Yanbian Office), was established. The scope of the Yanbian Office was Yanji, Helong, Wangqing and Hunchun. The Yanbian Office abolished the Provincial Government, changed the name of Gando to Yanbian, and changed Gando City to Yanji City. Yanbian Office

emphasized the promotion of ethnic unity and ethnic equality policy through the proclamation soon after its establishment (Lee 2002, pp. 97-98). This proclamation did not mention at all about the Korean autonomy of Yanbian, even though the proclamation guaranteed commercial freedom, corporate profit, etc. The Yanbian Office, hurriedly constructed by people unrelated to Gando or Manchuria, completely ignored the ethnic and class issues of the region.

Starting in 1946, Soviet troops began to withdraw, and the forces of the Kuomintang were expanded. Therefore, the Jilin Provincial Committee withdrew from the center of Manchuria to Yanbian, the first red zone of Manchuria founded by Korean revolutionaries. The Jilin Provincial Committee, which was in a desperate situation, had to get support from the Koreans in Yanbian. The Jilin Provincial Committee actively implemented policies that were beneficial to the Koreans. One of them was land reform. Land reform was carried out from July 1946 to April 1948. The first land reform in 1946 began with the so-called public land distribution movement (the land was owned by the Oriental Development Company and Japanese military). The CCP distributed the land to the farmers free of charge (Lee 2002, pp. 102-103).

In April 1947, when land reform was in full swing, Kim, Kwang-Hyeop, head of the Jilin Provincial Committee for Ethnic Affairs, publicly insisted that Yanbian should be incorporated into Korea. It is not clear in what context this claim emerged and what effects it had. However, presumably, the Korean revolutionaries would have been very uncomfortable because the Yan'an had aggressively taken control of Yanbian.

With the completion of the first land reform, the second land reform movement began in October 1947. By the end of 1946, the population of Yanbian was 690,195 (132,444 households), of which more than 70% were Koreans. In 1948, the population of Yanbian including Antu County was 718,886 (154,242 households), of which the Koreans accounted for 81.9%. Until the end of the land reform in 1948, 551,670 Koreans received an average of 4.5~7.06 mu (1 mu = 0.0667 hectares) of land, indicating that many of the Korean farmers benefited from land reform. As a result, Korean farmer's support of the CCP skyrocketed, and many Korean farmers became new members of the CCP. About 63,000 Koreans joined the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) and participated in the three - year Chinese Civil War. It is equivalent to 9% of the total population of the Yanbian Koreans. In addition to the PLA, about 6,500 Koreans participated in the control of the public order in the rear base (Yanbian) of the Chinese Civil

War, and about 302,000 a year were mobilized for labor (Lee 2002, p. 111). The Korean soldiers were mobilized, not only in Manchuria, but also in the liberation of Hainan Island.

On the other hand, the CCP established a Military and Political College and began fostering Korean communists. In early 1946, the Northeastern College of Military and Politics (hereafter Northeast College) was established. There were two institutions in Yanbian, namely the Chaoyangchuan Teaching Team and Eastern Jilin College of Military and Politics (hereafter Eastern Jilin College). Most of the students in both colleges were Korean. There were approximately 300 students at the time of the college's opening (Feb 10, 1946) and this increased to 700 in June when it was integrated into the Northeast College. Most of the students were sons and daughters of poor farmers and urban poor. The Eastern Jilin College, which was established in early 1946, had about 500 students at the time of opening. Among them, 380 were Koreans. The two colleges taught leftist ideology (Ren 2009, pp. 505-507).

After graduating from the Northeast College, Koreans began to work in various roles in the local community. The Korean Communists who were in their teens and twenties were armed with a very thorough leftist ideology through the training of the CCP. The most influential work by young Korean communists in Yanbian was the rectification movement. In 1947, they began to investigate the past career of former Korean communists. However, it was not easy for the Korean elites to prove their past careers during the Manchukuo period. The rectification movement ordered by the CCP was very radical, and many native Korean elites were purged (Ren 2009, pp. 511-514).

Yet, Lim, Chun-Chu, who was the head of the rectification movement, and later served as the deputy secretary of Yanbian Branch (August 15 1948), stated that the homeland of the Yanbian Koreans was the Korean Peninsula (Yeom 2010, pp. 1291-1292). With the establishment of a single government in Seoul and Pyongyang in 1948, the Pyongyang authorities would have needed the support of Yanbian Koreans who would have been their revolutionary base.

In December 1948, a conference on the citizenship issues of the Yanbian Koreans was held in Jilin City. The Beijing authorities said the Koreans should be recognized as Chinese citizens, and the Pyongyang authorities and Lim said that the CCP should keep the promise of past self-determination and separation of territories, and if independence is not achieved, Yanbian should belong to North Korea along with Hailin, Ning'an, and Dongning, where many Koreans reside (Lee 2002, pp. 113-114). Lim also insisted that

Yanbian should be given to North Korea in exchange for the bloodshed of many Koreans for the CCP during the Anti – Japanese struggle and the Civil War of China (Yeom 2010, pp. 1292). It was revealed that Lim made such a request according to Kim, Il-Sung's will. In November 1948, Lim led a celebration delegation for the establishment of the Korean Socialist regime to Pyongyang, which consisted of members of Manchuria's Korean population. At a meeting at the house of Kim Chaek, the Deputy Prime Minister of Pyongyang regime, the top leaders of the delegation and the Pyongyang regime discussed the issue about building a self - determined republic and incorporating it into North Korea (Yeom 2008, p. 145).

The issues of Korean governance that were debated at the Jilin conference were as follows: (1) the regional autonomization of Yanbian (ethnic autonomy) promoted by the CCP (represented by Chu, Deok-Hae, Zhu Dehai in Chinese, the first leader of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture), (2) aligned republicanization of Yanbian promoted by some Korean Communists supported by the Soviet Union (represented by Lim, Min-Ho), (3) the North Korean territorialization of Yanbian promoted by Korean Communists close to the Pyongyang authority (represented by Lim, Chun-Chu).

Lim returned to Pyongyang in May 1949, and Chu became the Commissioner of Yanbian Office and the Secretary of Yanbian Branch. Pyongyang and Beijing considered the issue of citizenship of Koreans living in Manchuria and the territories they were living in as the same problem. From the standpoint of Pyongyang, the Koreans of Gando or Manchuria were Korean citizens, so they insisted that the area they live in should be incorporated into Korea (specifically North Korea). On the other hand, the CCP was also preparing to establish the People's Republic of China, so it had to secure territorial integrity. China believed that the Yanbian area was the territory of China, and the Koreans who acquired the means of production (land) and the educational opportunities there should of course be considered Chinese citizens. Since the CCP rapidly gained control of Yanbian in 1947, the governance issue for the region changed in favor of Beijing. But the CCP could not push it too aggressively because of an unstable domestic and overseas political environment.

Tensions of Nationalism within Communists Comrades, and the Chinesification and Proletarianization of Korean Local Authority under the far – left CCP Regime

In April 1950, the Yanbian branch of the CCP formulated the *Opinions on the work of Ethnic Minorities (Draft)*. This draft was formulated through a significant level of coordination between the Yanbian branch and the Central Party (Ren 2012, p. 232). However, most of the Koreans in Yanbian still recognized the Pyongyang regime as their Mother Land even after the foundation of the PRC. Moreover, after the Korean War broke out, China inevitably denied its own political position about the legal citizenship of Yanbian Koreans, so, the governance of Yanbian could not be promoted to the same level as before.

After the outbreak of the Korean War, there was a complaint from the US about the existence of the Korean army in China. In September 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it was the right and duty of Koreans to return to their home country for defense and state construction (Yeom 2002, p. 293). At the end of 1950, China again publicly stated that it was their sacred duty to return to their homeland and protect their country (Chen 1950). Because the Chinese government acknowledged that the homeland of the Manchurian Koreans is Korea, China has fallen into the self - contradiction of “denying” Yanbian’s sovereignty. The local newspaper, *Northeast Korean People (Dongbugjoseoninminbo)* also said (North) Korea is the Mother Land of Koreans living in the Northeast of China. As the “rear base” of the Korean War, Yanbian tried their best to support Pyongyang (Yeom 2004; Moon 2017).

This situation totally changed after the intervention of the Chinese army into the Korean War. It is unclear what issue had been discussed between Pyongyang and Beijing. However, it is certain that beginning in 1952, Pyongyang stopped emphasizing the Yanbian issue as it had before. Rather, Beijing accelerated the autonomization of Yanbian in earnest.

In February 1952, the Chinese Government Administration Council (*Zhengwuyuan*) adopted the *Outline for the Implementation of Regional National Autonomy of the People’s Republic of China* (promulgated in August 1952, hereafter Outline). Article 36 of the Supplementary Articles contains the following contents: “In areas inhabited by minority nationalities throughout the country, in addition to those who have already exercised regional autonomy, whenever revolutionary order is initially established and

people of all strata are willing to practice regional autonomy, they should proceed with the implementation of regional autonomy, and set up preparatory bodies or apply existing appropriate institutions to carry out preparatory work concerning the convening of people's congresses and other necessary preparations.”

In 1952, from August 29 to September 3, the Yanbian People's Congress was held in Yanji City, and after a six-day meeting, the People's Government of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region was finally established. Chu served as chairman of the People's Government, while Dong Yukun and Choi Chae served as vice-chairmen. The newly established Yanbian replaced the existing Yanbian Office (Association for CCP History of Yanbian 1989, pp. 36-38). One of the cornerstone projects of the Yanbian was focused on education. The Yanbian Education Publication changed the term *Hangeul* to *Joseoneo* in September 1952. In October 1953, the Department of Education of the Central Committee of the CCP ordered that, the Korean Geography curriculum in Korean junior middle schools had to be integrated into the World Geography curriculum, and contents about the Koreans living in China had to be integrated into the Chinese History curriculum. Additionally, information about Korean Peninsula (specifically about the DPRK) had to be integrated into the World History curriculum (ACCPHY 1989, pp. 603-604).

Yanbian became an autonomous region with the same geographic scope as Gando Province or the Yanbian office. From the very beginning of the establishment of the Yanbian, Chu proposed to integrate several neighboring counties into Yanbian. Since 1955, people like Chu had begun to demand the expansion of the Yanbian area in earnest. At first, they regarded Jiaohe, Dunhua, and Chaingbai of Jilin Province as areas that could be integrated, and later wanted to expand the scope of this to the Mudanjiang area. In 1956, the suggested scope expanded to include most areas of Dongning, Ning'an (in Heilongjiang Province), Jiaohe, Wusong, and Changbai (in Jilin Province). At that time, the Koreans in the Northeast of China seemed to be dissatisfied with the national discrimination under the CCP regime. The dissatisfaction of the Koreans was revealed explosively in the course of the rectification movement that began in 1957. The CCP allowed people outside and inside the CCP to be honest about their views on the regime and the ruling Party. In Yanbian, complaints were raised about the Han nationalism of the Han Chinese cadres and its effect on Korean people, the fact that the Yanbian could not fully exercise autonomy, the neglect of education about Korean culture and ethnicity, the low percentage of Korean workers in state – run

enterprises, and the lack of Korean engineers. Outside Yanbian, complaints about the failure to enforce national (ethnic) equality policies were raised (*Yeonbeonilbo* 1957; Lee 1997, p. 101; Seo 1957). In this way the enlargement of the Yanbian area secured its legitimacy. The contradictions between a higher Korean population and limited means of production, and the ethnic conflict between Korean and Han, which were caused by limited autonomy, could be solved through the strengthening of autonomy and the expansion of the autonomous region.

China, however, started a very radical anti – rightist movement and industrialization began to be expressed through the Great Leap Forward. In 1958, only Dunhua was incorporated into Yanbian (ACCPHY 1989, p. 136), and all of Chu's efforts were rejected. But no one would have expected this to be the beginning of misery. In 1966, "Bombard the Headquarters," a Big - Character Poster written by Mao, announced the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In the same year, Pyongyang denounced Beijing as being overly dogmatic, and Beijing's Red Guards criticized Pyongyang. In 1967, Pyongyang again criticized the Red Guards, who disrespected their authority, and Beijing also had a big - character poster criticizing Kim, Il - Sung. The Chinese and Korean communists had helped each other in the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, and formed strong relationships. In the early 1960s, some bilateral treaties between the two regimes also strengthened socio-economic relations, but as the relationships between the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea changed, the relationship between China and North Korea deteriorated beyond imagination. In Yanbian, this diplomatic conflict grew into an expression of ideological violence.

The mad craze of the Red Guards swept into Yanbian. It is not clear how much of this madness was Mao's command and how much was the desire of the Red Guards themselves. They artificially determined who would be rightists. In 1967, Yanbian's Red Guards began criticizing Chu as a local nationalist, and the so - called Yanbian Korean nationalists centering on Chu began to be defined as rightist. In 1968, Chu was labeled a separatist who prevented the unification of China. The leftists also attributed many crimes to Chu. In 1968, Chu was forced to reform-through-labor (*laogai*) on a farm in Hebei Province, and died in July 1972.¹¹ The Korean officials of the Yanbian administration had to spend years of hardship due to the rough and violent socialist nationalism of Mainland China. The Yanbian Koreans were forced to experience very radical and violent proletarianization with a rejected

¹¹ About Chu, please see Klein and Clark (1971, pp. 254-256).

ethnicity, and as a result, at the end of the Cultural Revolution Yanbian became a seriously hardened community to the left, losing many elites including politicians, scholars, writers, and corporate executives. The Korean elites of Yanbian who survived were loyal to the far - left of the CCP. But did they anticipate the socioeconomic right - turn (reform and opening) by the central state? Although they were familiar with the class struggle in the local authority, they were totally ignorant about economy, production, and welfare (Park 2018).

In 1984, the National People's Congress of China enacted the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy* (2001 Amendment). According to this law, the YPC enacted the *Regulation on the Autonomy of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture* (2002 Amendment). In 1985, 35 years after the Outline was established in 1950, Korean local authority (re) emerged in the form of law. This local authority was institutionalized through the Cold War period. Yanbian, where class liquidation was heavily promoted, had to meet the post-Cold War era.

The issue of Gando autonomy posed by Korean nationalist, which was suppressed during the Manchukuo period, turned into a contested issue between Korean and Chinese communists after the collapse of Japanese imperialism. From the standpoint of Beijing (or Yan'an), Gando was absolutely the territory of China, and on the contrary, from the standpoint of Pyongyang, Gando should be considered Korean territory since Koreans were residing there. To win the sovereignty over the area, the nationalism of Korean and Chinese socialists began to compete. However, this competition did not expand into conflict. Rather, it was sutured by a special political situation - the Cold War. If Koreans helped the CCP during the Civil War, the CCP repaid the debt by supporting the regime in Pyongyang during the Korean War. Due to the necessity of the Cold War, Korean and Chinese socialist nationalists were compromisingly organized as a local authority called the Yanbian. As the region bordering the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, Yanbian had to have a system optimized for the Cold War. Therefore, when capitalism (or liberalism) became a common enemy, the communist camp had to compromisingly suppress and manage the conflicts of nationalism between regimes within their ranks. Thus, Yanbian was based on the uncomfortable coexistence of Korean and Chinese socialist nationalism. Therefore, when the Cold War was maintained and the nationalism of the communist country collided on a large scale, Yanbian remained intact but the Yanbian Koreans were seriously suppressed. From the 1980s, the Yanbian people were faced with both post - Socialism and post -

Cold War effects. When the two conditions (ideology and nationalism) changed, how would the local authority of Yanbian be restructured?

Ideological Right Turn, Partial Opening and Decentralization of Local Authority

In the 1980s, Yanbian was able to experience (relatively) active economic liberalization in line with China's reform and opening policy. Yanbian resumed border trade with North Korea and Russia. China's southeastern coastal cities, which were opened by a series of treaties after the Opium War, were reborn as Open Cities by the CCP. In the Northeast region, Dalian (Dalini in Russian), which was named by the Russian emperor and was known as Kantosyu by the Japanese, was the biggest beneficiary.

However, other Northeast regions were surrounded by Russia and North Korea, so they had to face reform and openness without an "open door". The Chinese government sought economic vitality by creating a new open area in the vast Northeast region to solve regional inequalities caused by excessive distribution of economic resources in the Southeast coastal area. Since the selection of the open area was based on memories of the past, the opening of the eastern part of the Northeast was naturally carried out in Yanbian - Hunchun, which was a link between Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Far East Russia and Manchuria in the early and mid - 20th century.

North Hamkyung Province in North Korea and Primorsky Krai in Russia wrap around China, so Chinese territory was not able to be adjacent to the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan). The geographical problem was a fatal limit to the opening of Northeast China. Perhaps for this reason, China has actively cooperated with neighboring countries to develop this area.


The Conference on Northeast Asian Economic and Technical Cooperation was held in Changchun in July 1990. At this conference the Chinese representative presented *The Tumen River: A Development Concept for the Golden Triangle*. The name "Golden Triangle" was first mentioned at this conference. In July 1991, in Ulaanbaatar, the UNDP announced to support the development of the Tumen River area at the Conference of the UNDP's Northeast Asia Sub-regional Programme, and the UNDP presented its *Vision for the Development of the Tumen River Area* in October of the same year. This was a blue print for undertaking infrastructure development over 20 years using \$30 billion, in order to turn the region into the Hong Kong of Northeast Asia. The Programme Management Committee (PMC), consisting

of government representatives from the ROK, the DPRK, China, Russia, and Mongolia was established.¹² At the PMC meetings, with regard to the area to be the focus of development, it was initially proposed that, in addition to constructing a new international city in the smaller triangular area linking Hunchun, Rajin-Sonbong and Posiet and calling it the Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ, see figure 1), the Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA, see figure 2) would link the larger triangular area (10,000 square kilometers) of Yanji, Chongjin and Vladivostok, in order to support TREZ. The larger triangular area was later expanded to include Nakhodka. Currently, TREDA is defined as encompassing the Yanbian (China), Rajin-Sonbong (DPRK) and southern Primorsky Territory (Russia). The Tumen Region was considered to be part of TREDA and the eastern part of Mongolia (Hisako 2004, p. 4).¹³

In China, Hunchun entered a new era of opening and rapid economic growth in 1985, when its border crossing with the Russian Far East (RFE) was (re)opened. In 1988, Hunchun was upgraded from a county to a municipality and allowed by Jilin province to build a special economic zone. In 1992, Hunchun was officially designated as an open border city and allowed to set up China's first Border Economic Cooperation Zone (BECZ). Proposed for 88 square kilometers and planned for 24 square kilometers, the Hunchun BECZ received infrastructure investment totaling \$150 million from the central government. In April 2000, the central government approved the establishment of the Hunchun Export Processing Zone (HEPZ), one of only 15 in China. In February 2001, the central government approved the Hunchun China-Russia Free Market and Trade Zone (HCRFMTZ). The zone offered financial incentives and procedural convenience, including visa-free


¹² The first PMC meeting took place in February 1992 in Seoul, thereafter, the PMC met six times, in Beijing (October 1992), Pyongyang (May 1993), Moscow (July 1994), Beijing (May 1995) and New York (December 1995). Meetings of working groups dealing with such issues as legal systems, finance, infrastructure, communications, investment and the environment were also held during this period (Hisako 2004, pp. 2-4).

¹³ The DPRK government designated the Rajin - Sonbong area (Rason City, with 621 square kilometers) as a Free Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ) in 1991. According to materials from the DPRK, Kim Il Sung came up with the idea of creating a free economic and trade zone in Rajin-Sonbong in February 1989. In regard to Russia, the establishment of an economic development zone in Primorsky Territory began in 1986, when Mikhail Gorbachev, then leader of the Soviet Union, announced his intention to establish a special economic zone during a visit to Nakhodka. Boris Yeltsin, then Chairman of the Russian Supreme Council, visited Nakhodka in 1989. In November 1990, the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (FEZ) was established (4,611 square kilometers). (Hisako 2004, pp. 7-9) For TRADP, see further researches by Peverelli (2009), Hughes (2000), Hisako (2004), Cho (2012), Freeman (2008, 2010), Blanchard (2000).



Source.—UN Mission Report, recited from Burns (1994: 47)

FIG. 1.—Border Cities of Tumen River Area



Source.—UN Mission Report, recited from Burns (1994: 47)

FIG. 2.—Tumen River Delta Area

entry for Russian traders and duty-free export of Russian goods taken out of the zone by Chinese Traders. (Chen 2005)

On June 11, 1994, the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth People's Congress of Jilin Province adopted the *Regulations of the Administration of Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Zone* (hereafter Regulations). Article 4 of the Regulations indicates that the cooperative zone encourages Chinese and foreign investors to set up an export processing industry, high-tech industry and corresponding tertiary industry in the cooperative zone to develop an export-oriented economy. In addition, the Regulations established a Management Committee, which, on behalf of the Hunchun Government, exercised unified leadership and management over

TABLE 2
PASSENGER AND CARGO VOLUMES CROSSING THE BORDER BETWEEN HUNCHUN
(QUANHE) AND THE DPRK (WONJONG)
 (Unit: cargo: tones; passengers: people)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Cargo (tons)								
China -> DPRK	15,032	58,777	38,205	108,493	144,111	147,209	106,000	100,016
DPRK -> China	8,741	11,204	3,182	8,291	15,734	15,184	23,568	24,283
Passengers	11,992	71,371	99,436	143,301	127,349	162,089	181,624	154,362

Source.—Hunchun Customs Bureau, recited from Hisako (2004:12-13).

TABLE 3
PASSENGER AND CARGO VOLUMES CROSSING THE BORDER BETWEEN HUNCHUN
AND KRASKINO

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Cargo (tons)								
China -> Russia	4,139	13,205	12,901	19,165	32,650	37,138	25,479	29,715
Russia -> China	3,007	1,055	1,703	1,789	7,137	13,033	22,100	32,375
Total	7,143	15,358	14,604	20,954	39,787	50,171	47,579	62,090
Passengers								
China -> Russia	2,166	2,596	5,875	20,862	72,724	107,111	67,142	108,214
Russia -> China	2,357	2,669	5,696	20,429	73,457	108,288	67,477	107,800
Total	4,523	5,265	11,571	41,291	146,181	215,999	134,619	216,014

Source.—Hunchun Customs Bureau, recited from Hisako (2004: 14)

the economic and administrative affairs of the Cooperative Zone. The Committee was given this authority from the government of Jilin Province to Hunchun City. With active and positive support from the central and provincial government, Hunchun was able to open a special economic trade zone and establish vigorous economic relationships with Russia (See Table 2), North Korea (See Table 3), South Korea and Japan.

Since the late 1980s, the strong socialist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea had been competitively attempting to open up their neighboring regions in order to join the community of global capitalism (or neoliberalism). The region, which was politically, economically, militarily, and ideologically bordering the western liberal camp, was opened up with the

help of international organizations. One aspect of the post-Cold War in Northeast Asia was the *creation of the Golden Triangle*.¹⁴

As the regional development projects became stranded in complex factors and the Northeast region fell into a chronic economic slowdown, Chinese authorities were forced to develop their own areas. In 2003, the State Council issued the *Decision of the State Council on Establishing the Leading Group of the State Council for Revitalizing the Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China*. The main tasks of the Leading Group were as follows: (1) to organize and implement the guidelines, policies and instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on revitalizing the Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China (hereafter Old Industrial Bases), (2) consideration of the revitalization strategy, special planning, major issues and relevant laws and regulations for the Old Industrial Bases, (3) to study and consider major policy proposals for revitalizing the Old Industrial Bases, and coordinate the overall economic and social development of the Old Industrial Bases. The emergence of this leading group means that the Chinese government had begun to reconsider and plan the development of the whole northeast region at the national level. The group was headed by Wen Jiabao and vice-chaired by Huang Jv and Zeng Peiyan. The Chinese government then tried to develop the Northeast region through institutionalization. Of these systems, direct links to Yanbian and Hunchun were announced in 2009.

In 2009, the State Council promulgated *Some Opinions of the State Council on Further Implementing the Revitalization Strategy of Old Industrial Bases* and formally approved the *Outline of China's Tumen River Regional Cooperation and Development Plan: Chang-Ji-Tu as the Pioneer Zone for Development and Opening-up*. On the basis of these two major policies, in 2012, the State Council promulgated *Some Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Supporting the Construction of the International Cooperation Demonstration Zone (ICDZ) in the Tumen River Region of China (Hunchun)*. The Chinese government intended to strengthen the opening of

¹⁴ However, this proved to be a complex task. There were political and diplomatic factors such as Inter-Korean relations, North Korea – US relations, North Korea – Japan relations, and even North Korea – China relations, and economic factors such as the difficulty of financing capital and the Asian financial crisis. Also, it was difficult for the project to be promoted efficiently because the subject of the project was not clear. The UNDP also attempted to reset the existing PMC system to a committee and commission system (TRADP Consultative Commission 1995a, 1995b, 1996), and to establish a “corporation” as a local developer. Eventually, TRADP ended in 2005, and the development of this region was turned into the GTI (Greater Tumen Initiative) system (TRADPCC 2005).

Hunchun by installing ICDZ in addition to the existing BECZ at the national level.¹⁵

The Tumen River area became an international development cooperation area, and China made Hunchun a gateway to the region. However, the central government did not open the whole Yanbian, instead opting to open only an administrative district within Yanbian. The Yanbian authority had no voice in the opening process of Hunchun, they just appreciated the grace that the state and party gave. Thus, the characteristic of Yanbian's opening is the partial opening of local authority, and this can be seen as one aspect of integration of Yanbian into globalization.

On the other hands, as mentioned in the previous sentence, the Chinese government announced the Chang-Ji-Tu (CJT) development plan when the UNDP's project became unfeasible. The main scope of this plan includes the core area of Tumen River region, parts of Changchun (the Capital City of Jilin Province), parts of Jilin City (the second largest city of Jilin Province), and parts of Yanbian Prefecture (includes Dunhua, Antu, capital city Yanji, Longjing and Tumen), and it radiated to other regions of Liaoning Province, Heilongjiang Province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which participated in the international cooperation project of the Tumen River region, and also involves the related regions of neighboring counties such as Russia and North Korea.

There were three goals behind this plan: (1) (politically or diplomatically) to enhance China's comprehensive strength in Tumen River regional cooperation and promote cooperative development to a new level, (2) (economically) to enhance the level of international cooperation and opening-up in border areas and to form a new economic growth region in Northeast China, (3) (socially or culturally) to speed up economic and social development in border areas and to promote prosperity and long-term stability in border ethnic areas (State Council, 2009).¹⁶

In order to achieve this goal, the regions involved, such as Hunchun, Yanji-Longjing-Tumen (YLT), Changchun-Jilin, have been given specific

¹⁵ The ICDZ covers an area of about 90 square kilometers, including the International Industrial Cooperation Zone, the Border Trade Cooperation Zone, the China - DPRK Hunchun Economic Cooperation Zone and the Sino - Russian Hunchun Economic Cooperation Zone. Its purposes and functions were: first, to become an important platform for cooperation, development and opening up in Northeast Asia, second, to become an important comprehensive transportation hub in Northeast Asia, third, to become the business logistics center of Northeast Asia, forth, to become a new livable ecological city with a prosperous economy and beautiful environment (State Council 2012).

¹⁶ Researcher added the contents between parentheses.

tasks and functions. The state called for Hunchun to expand its role as a gateway, speed up the construction of the industrial parks of Russia, Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong, enhance the economic strength of the border economic cooperation zone, promote cooperation with infrastructure construction in adjacent border areas, and facilitate investment, trade, and personnel exchanges. The state called for the YLT to speed up its opening-up frontier function, promote the process of urban integration of the YLT, and strengthen the link transmission function between the hinterland of Changchun-Jilin and the Hunchun. The YLT would be built into an important logistics node and international industrial cooperation service base in the Tumen river region.

Lee, Ryong-Hee (Li, Longxi in Chinese), the leader of Yanbian Prefecture, was briefed on the integration project, however, the Yanbian people strongly opposed it. The Yanbianess thought the project would erase Yanbian Prefecture because China didn't have laws on Autonomous Cities. It was expected to replace the existing autonomous prefecture when a new YLT City was created. People thought that YKAP could be a general Yanbian City or a YLT City without autonomous power.

However, despite these controversies the YLT Communist Party Committee was created and a new "local authority of local authority" emerged. The Party Committee of the YLT adopted the Standing Committee system with eleven members under the leadership of Party Committee of Yanbian Prefecture. The Party Committee is composed of Party secretaries, standing deputy secretaries and mayors of three Cities, and heads of the Office of the Party Committee of the YLT. The YLT Party Committee could not interfere in the specific work of the Party Committees and governments of the three cities. However, the members of this party committee of the YLT were the main officials in the key cities of Yanbian. (See Working Rule of YLT Committee of CCP)

To take greater advantage of Hunchun, the hinterland had to be opened further. The central government intended to increase the "economic liberalization" of Yanbian while strengthening its political and economic links with the mainstream of Northeast China. In this process, the central government created a new local authority within its existing local authority. The newly - born local authority directly and indirectly connected the provincial and central government. This decentralization of local authority can be seen as another aspect of Yanbian's integration into globalization.

The Revival of Korean Nationalism and Deautonomization of Local Authority

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992, many South Koreans began visiting Yanbian to remember their history. Among the tourist attractions, Koreans recognize Mt. Baekdu as a national sanctuary.¹⁷ During the Inter-Korean Summit in Panmunjom in 2018, South Korean President Moon, Jae-In expressed his hope that "...though other people would go to Mt. Baekdu via China, I would go to Mt. Baekdu without going through China". Furthermore, its importance to both Koreas was demonstrated during the Pyongyang Summit when leaders from the North and South visited the symbolic mountain.

However, it is difficult to say if Mt. Baekdu is a meaningful area for the Han Chinese. It was only one of the northern parts that sometimes appeared in Louis Cha's martial arts novels. Mt. Baekdu was the main filming location of China's famous (Manchurian) historical drama *Fox Volant of the Snowy Mountain*,¹⁸ which started in 1991, and the inland Chinese who watched the drama began to pay attention to Changbai Mountain. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that South Koreans "pioneered" the tourism industry in Yanbian and Jilin Province through Mt. Baekdu. However, the South Koreans used to do things that worried Chinese authorities, such as taking out the *Taegeukgi* (The South Korean national flag) and shouting slogans when taking photos near the Sky Lake.¹⁹ The Chinese authorities regarded these actions by South Koreans as a challenge to the territorial sovereignty of China.

With these actions occurring with increasing frequency, the Chinese authorities felt the need to set up a new management agenda for the area. China reestablished an ancient history of the region in order to secure the legitimacy of administrative governance for Mt. Baekdu and surrounding areas. The so-called "Northeast History Project" began this way.²⁰ This history project was promoted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and

¹⁷ Koreans have visited many other places. Among them, Yongjeong (Longjing) was one of their favorite places. This is because it was the home of Yoon, Dong-Ju, a famous poet, the birthplace of Korean progressive Christianity, and one of the key areas of the Korean independence (Anti-Japanese) movement.

¹⁸ A *wuxia* novel by Louis Cha, it was first serialized in 1959 in *New Evening Post* in Hong Kong.

¹⁹ In addition, Korean capitals invested in Mt. Baekdu area and built many Resort Hotels.

²⁰ *dongbeibianjianglishiyuxianzhuangxilieyanjiugongcheng* in Chinese.

major research institutes in Northeast China starting in 2002. Officially, the project was carried out until 2007, but it unofficially continues to be studied at specific universities and research institutes. South Korean politicians and academics strongly complained about the Northeast History Project. The reasons were that the project interpreted *Gochosun*, *Goguryeo* and *Balhae* (Koreans regard these as part of Korean's ancient history and geographical territory) as local regimes of ancient China, and tried to prove that *Goguryeo* and *Chosun* had no historical connection. In response, South Korea launched the Goguryeo Research Foundation in 2004 and the Northeast Asian History Foundation was established in 2005, with the former being integrated into the latter.

The globalization of Yanbian, which began in the early 1990s, collided with Korean nationalism (such as the problems of history and territory).²¹ Before the mid - 2000s, Mt. Baekdu was distributed in the administrative areas such as Yanbian, the Changbai Korean Autonomous County, Baishan City, and each authority operated this mountain in its administrative area. There were two Korean autonomous regions at the location of Mt. Baekdu, the South Koreans' tour course started in Yanji (Yanji Airport-Erdaobaihe Town of Antu County-North Mt. Baekdu). The major administration for the mountain is the Yanbian local government, and the mountain is closer to Yanji than Changchun (about 550 km from Changchun, and about 210 km from Yanji). This alone was enough reason to reset the administrative authority over Mt. Baekdu during a diplomatically sensitive period.

The emergence of the Changbai Mountain Protection Development Management Committee (hereafter Changbai Mountain Committee) was closely related to this background. This committee was established by the Jilin government in 2005 and became an official administrative body in 2006. As a dispatched agency of the provincial government the Changbai Mountain Committee as a Prefectural or City - level government (the same as the Yanbian government) represented the provincial government to exercise unified leadership and management over the economic and social administrative affairs and natural resources such as forests, grasslands, waterways, mountains, and land and mineral deposits in accordance with the law. The Changbai Mountain Committee takes part of the functions and powers of the economic, social, and administrative affairs authorized and entrusted by the provincial government. The three economic management zones of Chixi (West Sky Lake), Chibei (North Sky Lake), and Chi'nan (South

²¹ See also Park (2017).

Sky Lake) under the Changbai Mountain Committee have administrative functions and powers comparable to those of the County - level government (Administrative System of Changbai Mountain Committee <http://www.changbaishan.gov.cn/gk/gltz/>).

The Changbai Mountain Committee is responsible for the construction and maintenance of facilities, transportation, transportation fee collection and other industry management work. In accordance with state laws and regulations and the authorization and entrustment of the provincial government, the Changbai Mountain Committee has the same functions as the Prefectural or City – level government in terms of administrative punishment, administrative license, administrative litigation, administrative reconsideration and administrative adjudication. The provincial government may adopt the method of “one case, one discussion” to solve specific matters in planning, protection, development and management (Administration Authority of Changbai Mountain Committee, <http://www.changbaishan.gov.cn/gk/glzq/>).

The administrative area of the Changbai Mountain Committee is divided into three areas: nature reserves, planning management areas, and planning guidance areas. Among them, the planning management area includes nature reserves, with a total area of 3,278 square kilometers. The boundary between Chibei and Chixi is the boundary between former Antu County and Fusong County.²² The boundary between Chixi and Chi'nan is the boundary between former Donggang Town and the former Manjiang Town.²³ The boundary between the former Manjiang Town and the former Donggang Town is the boundary between Chi'nan and Chixi (Planning Management Area of Changbai Mountain Committee, http://www.changbaishan.gov.cn/gk/dlwz/201612/t20161229_20571.html).²⁴

²² Including the former Erdaobaihe Town, Peace Tourism Holiday Theme Function Zone, Ginseng Flower Fitness and Leisure Theme Function Zone, 1,000 – meter land on both sides of tourist highway and 1,000 – meter land inside and outside of Chibei Economic Management Zone of Tourist Highway around Changbai Mountain. The total area is about 1,162 square kilometers, of which the area outside the nature reserve is about 292 square kilometers.

²³ Including the former Donggang Town, Wolong International Conference Theme Function Zone, Chixi Transportation Hub Theme Function Zone, the former Donggang Town 30 square kilometers of land to the southeast, the west slope uphill highway and downhill highway, and the inner and outer 1,000 meters of land in the Chixi of the Tourist Highway around Changbai Mountain. The total area is about 739 square kilometers, of which the area outside the nature reserve is about 473 square kilometers.

²⁴ Including the Swan Ice and Snow Tourism Theme Function Zone, the 1,000-meter land within and outside the Chi'nan of the Tourist Highway around Changbai Mountain, and the area under unified management according to the planning needs. The total area is about 1,377 square

There are three economic management zones, 17 government departments, 8 central and provincial units, 16 public institutions and 2 enterprise units under the jurisdiction of the Changbai Mountain Committee. The government departments include: the Party and Mass Work Department, the Party and Mass Work Office, the Supervision Bureau, the Political and Legal Committee, the Party Committee of Government, the Economic Development Bureau, the Environment and Resources Protection Bureau, the Housing and Urban and Rural Construction Bureau, the Transportation Bureau, the Tourism Administration Bureau, the Social Administration Office, the Finance Bureau, the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, the Land and Resources Bureau, the Investment Promotion Bureau, the Education Bureau, and the Auditing Bureau. The 8 units directly under the Central and Provincial government include: the Public Security Bureau, the Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Local Taxation Bureau, the National Taxation Bureau, the Food and Drug Administration, the Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau, the Social Insurance Administration, and the Judicial Bureau. Enterprises and institutions include: the Development and Construction (Group) Co., Ltd., the Tourism Co., Ltd., the Nature Conservation Management Center, the Administrative Service Center, the Comprehensive Law Enforcement Branch, the Office Affairs Management Center, the Academy of Sciences, the Cultural Communication Center, the Beijing Office, the Changchun Office, the Highway Management Department and Transportation Management Department, the Changbai Mountain Eco-environmental Monitoring Station, the Medical Insurance Agency Center, the Forest Fire Protection Command Office, the Lottery Management Center, the Reception Office, and the Information Center (Organizations of Changbai Mountain Committee, <http://www.changbaishan.gov.cn/gk/nsjg/>)

Economic liberalism naturally accompanied the revival of Korean nationalism. The Korean socialist nationalism began to emerge in conjunction with Korean liberal nationalism. China inevitably had to respond to this situation. Its reaction was to separate certain territories, which are regarded as symbols of Korean nationalism from Yanbian and then reset them to a new local authority. This deautonomization of local authority can be seen as the other aspect of Yanbian's integration into globalization.

kilometers, of which 548 square kilometers are used outside the nature reserve.

Conclusion

The year 2019 is the 100th anniversary of Korean's March First Independence Movement and China's May Fourth Movement. The modernity of the two countries was launched by anti-Japanese sentiment and resistance to the unequal class structure of the existing feudal systems of Korea and China. The shouting in Seoul and Qingdao (also in Beijing) was the expression of public anger about the refracted modernity of the two countries. Two weeks after the March First Independent Movement, anti – Japanese protests took place in Manchuria and the Maritime Province. On March 13^t, Koreans in Gando Yongjeong, picked up *Taegeuki* and responded to the demonstration in Seoul. The Koreans under Japanese rule were united by nationalism from Busan in the South to Manchuria in the North.

Shortly afterwards, however, Manchuria was also placed under Japanese colonial rule. Manchukuo, which claimed to be a modern nation state, was not very modern. The Japanese authority did not revolutionarily reform the existing unequal rural class structure, but coexisted with the existing distribution industry linking agriculture and commerce. Moreover, the state – led industrialization of Manchukuo was not promoted in Korean residences. Therefore, Koreans could not benefit from modernization, but rather, they had to endure the discrimination of the existing class structure and the unequal socioeconomic opportunities provided by the authority. The complex social structure simultaneously brought class enemies (the Han Chinese landlords) and enemies of the nation (the Japanese imperialists) into being.

The Koreans in Gando were organized by the Korean intellectual and economic elites. The elites demanded Korean autonomy in order to overcome this discrimination. However, the Japanese were not friendly. Additionally, the CCP, which the Soviet Union fostered, did not give much favor to the Korean autonomy based on nationalist elites. The resistance of Korean nationalist during the Japanese occupation was not received hospitably from both the Soviet Chinese political elites and Japanese colonialists. However, Japanese rule persisted, and the class structure of Korean society was divided into massive numbers of proletariats and very few intellectual – economic elites. The communist elements of the Koreans were *embedded* within the Japanese colonial rule. The Korean Communists emerged in Manchuria, and they joined forces with Chinese revolutionaries. The Chinese revolutionaries also resisted both the Republic of China, which represented the old order,

and Japanese colonialism. In terms of the strategic needs of the revolution, the CCP argued that each ethnicity under the rule of the RC should be separate and independent. They also argued for the necessity of self-determination or the independence of Gando in order to seek solidarity with the Korean revolutionaries. Under the Manchukuo regime, the knowledge-economic elite-led Korean autonomy issues evolved into the issues led by Korean proletariats, and gained the support of Chinese Soviet revolutionaries. Gando Province, founded in 1934, was maintained until 1945 with such contradictions.

When the Japanese imperialists were defeated, the issue of Korean autonomy became a real problem to be solved by Korean and Chinese leftists. With the disappearance of the common enemy, the nationalisms of Koreans and the Chinese were reorganized through controversy over the rule of the Gando territory. From the viewpoint of the Koreans, Gando and Manchuria, in which the Koreans lived, had to be considered Korean sovereignty. From the Chinese point of view, this was a totally unreasonable idea. The Koreans' claims may have been very insistent because many Koreans participated in the Chinese revolution and helped the CCP's victory. But this demand had been softened by the intervention of Beijing in the Korean War. Yanbian was established in September 1952, when discussions on the Armistice Agreement were in full swing. Beijing made Yanbian a local authority (autonomy) of China, and Pyongyang acknowledged it. However, the ethnic conflicts between Koreans and Chinese continued in the 1950s. Korean dissatisfaction became the basis for Korean elites to expand the geo-political area of Yanbian. The Korean elites of Yanbian acted as if they were representatives of the entire Korean population of Manchuria. With nationalism in Pyongyang and Beijing at odds, the Korean nationalism of Yanbian (or Manchuria) began to form in relation to the Han Chinese in the same region. When friendship among the revolutionary comrades in the Communist bloc began to crack, and Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang denounced each other, Yanbian's left-wing nationalism had to reorganize in a conflict between Pyongyang and Beijing. Korean elites were forced to reset their identity as the proletarianized Chinese. Since the Cold War had been maintained and the nationalism within it collided, Yanbian was maintained and the Korean nationalism within it was liquidated.

Will it be the revenge of history? The Chinese far-left was forced to integrate into the world capitalist order. Yanbian was no exception. They had to reintroduce the right-wing elements that they had physically removed a few years ago. The biological Korean elites began to wander. They had

political power to enact destruction but no socio - economic knowledge of construction. Chinese pragmatism legitimized the idea that the left - wing could be the right - wing. On the other hand, China had to establish a new relationship simultaneously with the nationalistically confronted North Korea and the ideologically confronted South Korea. The emergence of North and South Korea encouraged the Korean nationalism (ethnicity) of Yanbian (or Northeast China). Elite (conservative) nationalism, which was suppressed by Japanese imperialism, and the leftist nationalism, which was suppressed by the CCP were simultaneously amplified. In a complex process the globalization of China reorganized Yanbian's ideology and nationalism.

Yanbian, had to change its structure of authority in the post - Cold War era. Firstly, Yanbian played the role of a gateway to Northeast China by central state. Compared to other administrative districts, Hunchun County was uniquely opened by the central state and became a national - level open area. This partial opening of the local authority is one aspect of China's neoliberal integration. Secondly, central state tried to expand Yanbian's economic liberalization. The central state organized a new local authority within the political and economic center of the existing Korean local authority. The decentralization of local authority is another aspect of China's neoliberal integration. Thirdly, the emergence of Korean nationalism was a sensitive problem to China. However, the pragmatist China had not been able to oppress nationalism blatantly as in the past. Therefore, the government (provincial) separated the material and symbolic origins of Korean nationalism from Yanbian and reorganized it as a new local authority, and managed it directly. This deautonomization of local authority is the other aspect of China's neoliberal integration. The fact that the Korean local authority has not been completely dismantled seems like proof that the Cold War has not completely finished.

In summary, Yanbian as a Korean local authority was a system comprised of competitive communist nationalists whose organization was made necessary by the Cold War. This local authority was maintained through an inverse relationship of ideology (reinforcement) and Korean nationalism (weakening). Therefore, the local authority inevitably experienced systematic reorganization by the central and provincial state in the post - Cold War period which was accompanied by the simultaneous rise of liberalism and Korean nationalism. The concrete reflection of this reorganization was the fragmentation of local authority that manifested in partial opening, decentralization, and deautonomization. This fragmentation can be seen as one characteristic of the process of China's neoliberal

integration, and the *fragmented integration of local authority* can be regarded as an aspect of the Asianization of Northeast China.

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ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (or Region)	Yanbian	Yeonbeonjosenjokjacizu
Gando Police Office of Korean Resident-General	Gando Police Office	Joseontonggambugandoilbonpaculso
Gando Convention		Gandoyeobyak
Japanese Consulate General in Gando		Gandoilbonyeongsagwan
National People's Party	NPP	Jungguggungmindang
Chinese Soviet Republic	CSR	Junghwasobietgonghwagug
Chinese Communist Party	CCP	Jungguggongsandang
Kingly Way		Wangdonagto
Harmony of the Five Ethnic Groups		Wojoghwahab
Republic of China	RC	Junghwamingug
Japanese Government General of Korea	JGGK	Joseoncongdogbu
East Jilin Manchurian Committee of CCP	Jilin Committee	Jungguggongsandangmanjuseongwiwonheo
Provisional Government of Gando Province	Provisional Government	Gandoseongimsijeongbu
Alliance of Workers, Farmers, and Youth	Alliance	Nonongceongyeonmaeng
Northeast Allied Anti-Japanese Army	Allied Army	Dongbughangilyeongun
Grand People's Democratic Alliance of Yanbian	Grand Alliance	Yeonbeoninminminzudaedongmaeng
Fifth Branch of the Korean Volunteer Army	Korean Volunteer Army	Joseonuiyonggunjeojidae
Northeast Committee of CCP	Northeast Committee	Jungguggongsandangdongbugwiwonheo
Northeast Bureau of the CCP	Northeast Bureau	Jungguggongsandangdongbuggug
Jilin Provincial Committee		Gillimseongwiwonheo
Yanbian Branch (committee) of CCP	Yanbian Branch	Yeonbeonjiwi
Yanbian (Prefectural) Commissioner's Office	Yanbian Office	Yeonbeonjeonwongongseo
Northeastern College of Military and Politics	Northeast College	Dongbuggunjeongdaehag
Chaoyangchuan Teaching Team	CTT	Joyangchengyododae
Eastern Jilin College of Military and Politics	Eastern Jilin College	Gildonggunjeongdaehag
Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China	Old Industrial Bases	Dongbugnogonggeopgiji

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