

Varieties of Politically Moderate Groups in South Korea: Social Identity, Morality, and Political Attitude*

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Morality is an appraisal of what is right and what is not. Sociological perspective sees such morality as a product of group identity. In this regard, morality is a useful tool for identifying groups that share different beliefs about right and wrong. Recent studies have found that the root cause of social conflict is based on moral differences related to political attitudes and behaviors. This study focuses on the political moderates that previous studies regarded as lacking ideological or political orientation. However, we found that they are multiple groups composed of groups based on different moral values. We also clarified the differences in political positions according to morality. First, we classified the morality groups in South Korea into five latent groups. In addition to traditional liberals (altruistic individuals) and conservatives (paternalistic), moderates are divided into three moral groups: moral idealists, selfish individuals, and amoral individuals. The moral idealists group emphasizes both moral values that are important to conservatives and liberals. The selfish individuals group is weak in most moral values, and the amoral individuals group does not care about any moral value. In contrast to liberals and conservatives who are consistently aligned left and right in their political positions, the moral qualities of moderates have been found to be complex and dualistic. The fact that moderates are pluralistic in terms of grouping and moral values complicates the conflicts of social and political issues rather than the mere confrontation between conservatism and liberalism.

Keywords: morality, ideological orientation, moderate, political attitude, policy, latent class analysis

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Introduction

In recent years, social groups have been widely divided, and their conflicts have expanded on various social issues due to different positions or a lack of understanding. The key variable explaining such conflicts was ideological orientation. Particularly in European society, in which the class, ideological orientation, and political attitudes are clearly arranged and consistent, it has been believed that ideology depicts the structure of social cleavages. However, in the mid-20th century, many sociologists and political scientists declared the end of ideology (Apter 1964; Aron 1962; Bell 1960; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse et al. 1961). It seems that the influence of ideological orientation is gradually declining in conflicts among social groups and in politics. On one hand, the issues of security, economic growth, and welfare, which seemed to clearly distinguish liberals and conservatives, have become agreed issues. On the other hand ideology is regarded as a belief system in which the functionally connected value orientations and attitudes are structured. Under conditions that ordinary people's political attitudes are neatly organized according to their ideological orientation, we can expect that ideology will decide the policy preferences and the party support of the public. However, the majority of people do not have such a firm belief system for politics (Converse 1964). Therefore the ideological orientation in politics seems to be no longer valid.

Recently, psychologists paid attention to ideological orientation as a variant of the belief system (Jost 2006, p. 652). They analyzed ideological orientation in terms of the moral foundation that distinguishes liberals and conservatives (Haidt and Graham 2007, p. 107). In other words, psychologists believe that judgment of right and wrong on political issues is based on intuition and faith rather than reality or objectivity. The results of psychological research have been confirmed that political attitudes such as support for certain social issues are expressed in accordance with morality in the U.S. and South Korea (Koleva et al. 2012; Seok, Jang, and Ryu 2015).

If that is the case, is the analytical framework based on moral foundation useful for explaining the political characteristics of moderates? A common problem in the politics in most countries of the world is that many people are deviating from the existing party system represented by the ideologies of liberals and conservatives. Until now, moderates were regarded as lacking political knowledge or simply indifferent. In addition, they were regarded as a single group. However, these groups are not only large in number but also

encompass diverse groups of individuals who vary in age, education, and social class.

The purpose of this study is to argue that morality is a criterion of political attitudes and behaviors. In addition, we reveal that moderates consist of multiple groups rather than a single group by classifying them on the basis of morality, and then compare the differences in their political attitudes and preferences. This study shows that there has been little success in attracting individuals who are indifferent to politics to the centralized convergence strategy in existing politics. Furthermore, this study would be useful to establish a policy direction to induce the political interests and behaviors of moderates.

Theoretical Background

Connection between Morality and Group Identity

George Lakoff stated that voting, a major political act, does not necessarily follow one's own interests. He argues that people vote according to their identity, which means voting for value. Thus, people vote for the person with whom they want to identify (Lakoff 2004, p. 19). Lakoff used three key words in his argument: identity, value, and identification. The connection between identity and value should be examined in more detail. Hitlin (2003) showed that by conceptualizing values as the core of personal identity, we can understand the cohesion experienced by people with various social identities. If value constitutes the core of personal identity, morality is the standard of identity formation (Stets and Carter 2011).

As Lakoff stated, many political scientists argue that voters elect representatives who do not represent themselves. It seems like a contradiction, but it is not unexplainable if we understand the process of identification. For example, Choi Hyeon-sook, who published the book *The Birth of Hal Bae (An Old Man)* in 2016 in Korea, said that poor old people internalized the values and views of the rich as their own identity. By doing so, they make political choices that betray their own class.¹ This description reminds us of the following phrase by Paulo Freire (1998) in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*:

¹ Lee, Jinsoon. 2016. "Why *Hal Bae* Became Kkondae in South Korea." Hankyoreh, November 18 2017. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/770993.html#csidx7fcd5655204be823f2da5b29db3

[A]t a certain point in their existential experience the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressors and their way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to follow them. (p. 44)

For Aristotle, studying the problem of morality was part of studying politics. For him, politics was, of course, a science about the ancient city state, the polis. Thus, Aristotle's political science is about the state, as well as the politics that we currently practice. According to Aristotle's position that a human being as a civilized existence is possible only within the polis, political science is a science for the concept of society for us living in modern times (Aristotle 1962: see translator's notes on p. 4 and p. 302). Similar to Aristotle, Durkheim (1961) stated that humans are humans because they live within a society. For Durkheim, morality is something found in humans living within a society. Therefore, to him, society was a very moral phenomenon organized by a sense of solidarity.

Thus, in Durkheim's position, morality makes human society (group life) possible. This position regarding morality also appears in Haidt definition of moral system: "Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological *mechanisms that work together suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible* (Haidt 2012, p. 314, emphasis by authors of this study)." Generally, there is a structure in society that creates and sustains the pattern of relationships that individuals make. In this process, these structures allocate members of society here and there. As we traverse these social structures, we grow and develop, and in the process, these structures influence human moral thinking in various ways.

However, the society we experience is not 'society' as an abstract whole. What we experience first is meeting other people. These personal contacts continue and become patterned, and then form groups. So, at this point, we need to distinguish society as a group or an association of various people from society as an abstract whole. Family, school, religion, race, place of origin, and business firms are "structured diverse social life units" (Kim 2016, p. 180). As a group made up of personal contacts and the continuation of them, societies or groups form the basis of a social identity. Social identity is the perception or cognition that an individual holds as a member of the same social category through social comparison, or obtains as a result of identification (Hogg and Abrams 1988).

Two processes important to the formation of this social identity, self-categorization and social comparison, produce different results. First, the result of the self-categorization process is an emphasis on the similarity of the person in the same group as oneself and the emphasis on differences compared with a person who is not in the group. Second, the result of the social comparison process is to selectively emphasize the aspect of bringing positive results to the self in order to increase self-esteem by judging positively the group to which one belongs and negatively the group to which one does not belong (Hogg and Abrams 1988). This social category, however, is a component of a structured society and exists in a pair of contrasting ways that have resources such as power, prestige, and status unequally.

One example of such a pair is a racial category—white versus black. Thus, Fanon (1968, p. 52) pointed out that the colonized imitates the colonizer, and Freire (1998, p. 44) points out that the oppressed follows the oppressor class. This phenomenon is a moral act that appears as internalizing the value of the oppressor through the process of identification. Moreover, these social categories already exist in the social structure before individuals are born into the world (Hogg and Abrams 1988). Thus, a person is born in the world and then forms his or her identity and morality by internalizing the value of the social category or of the desired social category to which he or she belongs. Later, his or her social identity determines political attitudes and behaviors.

Haidt (2012, p. 314) and Collins (1992) sees that morality, which is an appraisal of what is right and what is not, is essentially collective. And Collins (1992) added that morality usually regulates relations among people not only because a group demands that members follow moral rules, but also because people want to feel they belong (Collins 1992, pp. 37-38). In the end, what is right is determined by the value of the social category of the group to which one belongs or the group to which one wishes to belong. Human beings belong to some form of social group, and we have social identity based on the group and have moral feelings. In short, there are various kinds of groups in society, so there are various kinds of moralities. This is why social conflicts arise.

Thus, morality defines what is right for groups of individuals, such as family, class, gender, generation, and religion. Under such circumstances, the moral value of an individual assists in securing a cohesive identity (Hitlin 2003), and human beings practice internalized moral values. Therefore, morality can be more useful to identify people's political attitudes and positions than other individual characteristics, such as social class, generation

(Miles and Vaisey 2015) or political ideology like liberal or conservative. To sum, our moral self exists only as a social self. Social groups, either a reality or an imagination, are the source and the outcome of human morality and are sites for such morality to be practiced (Bègue 2015, p. 17).

Morality and Ideological Orientation

Ideological orientation is inherently non-political, since it is a question of the value of freedom versus tradition, as well as change versus stability (Sowell 2007; Jost, Nosek and Gosling 2008). As most political scientists conceptualize ideology as a belief system of the individual, it plays a central role in organizing, motivating, and giving a meaning to political attitude and behavior (Converse 1964; Jost 2006). For example, liberals have beliefs in individual freedom and change, and thus have a political attitude that consistently supports income equality and redistribution of wealth. Conservatives, on the other hand, have a political attitude against these issues because they have beliefs in tradition and resistance to social change (Apter 1964; Bobbio 1996; Cunningham et al. 2004; Tedin 1987; Kerlinger 1984; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Thus, many political science studies have considered that ideological orientations of liberalism and conservatism are stable and coherently reflected in political attitudes.

However, in recent research, psychologists have argued that the political attitudes of liberals and conservatives are rooted in their differences in morality (Graham et al. 2009; Haidt and Graham 2007; Haidt et al. 2009). Because morality is an intuitive judgment of right and wrong on various issues, the difference of moralities by the ideological orientation leads to differences in political attitudes.² Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) found that liberals emphasize on individuality-based morality, such as care and fairness. Conservatives emphasize more on solidarity-based morality, such as loyalty, authority, and purity. Since liberals and conservatives have different moral bases, their political attitudes are sharply different from each other.

Likewise, in the "Moral Politics (2002)," Lakoff explained the difference between conservative and liberal morality with the metaphor of parenting that underpins moral development. For example, in the strict father model in

² Many philosophers and cognitive scientists view that the position of a particular event or phenomenon is determined by subjective beliefs or emotions rather than rationality (Humm, 2003; Oakhill, et al. 1989; Klauer, et al. 2000). In this regard, Haidt argued that the political attitudes of the pros and cons of social issues are a product of emotions, and in particular are closely related to morality as the criterion of right and wrong.

which authority and control dominate, the core moral values of conservatives, such as obedience, hierarchy, and temperance, are strengthened. In contrast, in the nurturant parent model in which open and friendly communication is achieved, moral values such as fairness, care, freedom, and equality are cultivated (Lakoff and Rockridge 2006, pp. 49-51). However, as two models are mutually restrictive, they have not been compromised. For this reason, ideological orientation has been located on a continuum from left to right in self-reported political position. Those who are between the right and left extremes are referred to as moderate, which means weak ideological orientations or a balanced attitude toward all political issues.

Both parenting models by Lakoff are only a cultural metaphor. In each culture, the family, community, and society may encourage and teach their own moral values. However, in reality, many people can adopt moral values in both parenting models instead of choosing one in their lifetime. Conservatives or liberals who use only one model, usually control all aspects of their political attitude but many people can take some mixture of these two models according to the context of political issues. This is why some people's political attitudes look inconsistent. For this reason, Lakoff (2004, p. XIII) argued moderates are made up of "biconceptuals."

Moderates as a Pluralistic Group

There are two contrasting arguments in the studies on moderates. According to Rabinowitz and Macdonald's directional model (1989), the intensity of the ideology increases with distance from the central point in the normal distribution of liberals and conservatives sides. The clearer the political ideology of the party is, the stronger the support of the voters (Lee 2018). Therefore, moderates are in a neutral zone without any political preference or ideological differentiation. This view is also reflected in Haidt's research (2012).

In contrast, Downs (1957) argued that it is important to obtain supports from the voters in the middle because they are the majority. In recent U.S. elections, the gap in the political positions between Republicans and Democrats is widening, and the number of nonpartisan voters is increasing. According to the Pew Research Center, the number of nonpartisan voters has risen sharply since 2008 and outstripped Democratic and Republican supporters (Kohut et al. 2012).³ This is the case in South Korea, too. After the

³ One of the most prominent features of party support in recent years is the considerable increase

democratization of 1987, the non-partisan voters have increased as the influence of the political party has decreased rapidly.⁴ The self-reported political position of these non-partisan voters is similar to that of conservative party supporters and liberal party supporters, but these voters are usually a mixture of the political attitudes of Conservative party supporters and Liberal party supporters (Chae 2013; Chung 2013; Dalton 2006, 2007; Weber and Federico 2013).

The increase in nonpartisan voters reveals the problem of current party politics which emphasizes the confrontation between the left and the right to secure the support of loyal voters. If the size of the supporters of both parties is similar, strengthening the differentiation of policies will increase the likelihood of winning the election (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Caesar and Busch 2005; Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Levendusky 2010; Wattenberg 1998). Nonpartisan voters become politically indifferent because their socioeconomic concerns have not been reflected in such a party system. Therefore, the group known as moderates can include all of the indifferent voters who lack political knowledge or who do not have party identification with the existing political party system. Dalton (2007, p. 4) referred them as “cognitively apartisan” and “politically apolitical,” respectively.

The important point of Dalton’s study is that it provided an implication that moderates are not a homogeneous group with similar political attitudes but a group with diverse political attitudes. However, his research is limited in predicting the attitudes and directions of each group on actual political issues because his research grouped moderates according to only the level of cognitive mobilization. This limitation implies that it is necessary to distinguish between groups according to the differences in fundamental values that constitute moderates. Furthermore, it is also necessary to understand and predict properly the differences in their political attitudes. Therefore, this study aims to classify potential groups according to the morality which is the basis of group identity. This study also examines the conceptual validity of political moderates known as one group with similar

in non-partisan voters. The level of non-partisan voters remained at the same level as Republican Party supporters in 2004. However, non-partisan voters increased from 32% in 2008 to 38% in 2012, which is the highest level since 1939 (Kohut et al. 2012).

⁴ In South Korea, non-partisan voters increased from 22.7% in 1993 to 45.4% in 2009, nearly double the number of conservative party voters (22.3%) and progressive party voters (24.3%). More than half of the non-partisans (50.7%) report themselves as moderate, but the rest of them as conservative or progressive. This suggests that the existing political parties are not well supported by voters with their ideological orientation (Gallup Korea 2013; Ryu 2012).

ideological orientations by comparing the characteristics and preferences of different moral groups.

Data and Method

Data

Data for this research were collected from January 2, 2015, to January 15, 2015 with online survey through Hankook Research which is the largest (based on total revenue and number of employees) marketing and public opinion research firm in Korea. A total of 2,340 respondents were surveyed. The data were sampled from Hankook Research master sample which has 350,000 households (1,053,762 persons). This master sample represents the region, gender, age, education, and income distribution in South Korea. However, due to the design of the online survey, the age of the respondents was ranged from 16 to 64 years old. The socio-demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1.

Measurement

a. Morality

We grouped the respondents in the sample according to 30 items by questions about morality. These items were taken from Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ-30, July 2008) by Graham, Haidt, and Nosek. MFQ measured the degree how relevant each item is to them when making moral judgments from 1 (not at all important) to 6 (extremely important).⁵ These items were divided into distinct dimensions, such as Care, Fairness, Royalty, Authority, and Purity.⁶ MFQ was originally developed to describe moral differences across cultures (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt and Joseph 2004), and has been shown to be suitable for the studies applied to South Korean society (Kim et al. 2012; Lee and Cho 2014; Seok et al. 2015).

⁵ MoralFoundations.org. 2017. "Moral Foundation Questionnaire." Accessed November 11, 2017. <http://www.moralfoundations.org/questionnaires>.

⁶ According to Haidt's study (2012), the moral foundation consists of five opposing pairs of care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. He distinguishes these moral foundations in two categories: caring and fairness are 'individuality foundation', and loyalty, authority and purity are 'binding foundation'.

TABLE 1
THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

		Frequency	Percent(%)
Gender	Male	1,201	51.3
	Female	1,139	48.7
Age	Teens	176	7.5
	20–29	416	17.8
	30–39	481	20.6
	40–49	567	24.2
	50–59	532	22.7
	60–69	168	7.2
Education	Below middle school graduate	68	2.9
	High school graduate	640	27.4
	College graduate	358	15.3
	University graduate	1014	43.3
	Higher than graduate school	260	11.1
Monthly household income*	No income	286	12.2
	Less than ₩1,000,000	234	10.0
	₩1,000,000 ~ ₩1,999,999	473	20.2
	₩2,000,000 ~ ₩2,999,999	443	18.9
	₩3,000,000 ~ ₩3,999,999	377	16.1
	₩4,000,000 ~ ₩4,999,999	206	8.8
	₩5,000,000 ~ ₩5,999,999	159	6.8
	₩6,000,000 ~ ₩6,999,999	61	2.6
	₩7,000,000 ~ ₩7,999,999	36	1.5
	₩8,000,000 ~ ₩8,999,999	16	0.7
₩9,000,000 ~ ₩9,999,999	29	1.2	
More than ₩10,000,000	20	0.9	
Subjective socioeconomic status	Low	436	18.6
	Low Middle	669	28.6
	Middle	902	38.5
	Middle High	284	12.1
	High	49	2.1

Note.—1 dollar (USD) = approximately 1,091 Won (KRW).

b. Ideological Orientation

Traditionally, the measure of ideological orientation has been used as the sum of many political attitudes questions on social issues, based on Likert scale (Bartels 2005; Brody and Lawless 2003; Heath et al. 1994; Layman and Carsey

2002). However, we consider that the moderate has a complex political attitude. Therefore we examined the moderate through political attitudes in terms of consistency and complexity, not the simple sum of political attitudes for the conflicting issues between liberals and conservatives. For the purpose of comparison, we also measured ideological orientation through self-reported political position from very liberal (1) to very conservative (10).

In this study, political attitudes were measured by 5 items adopted from World Values Survey: “Incomes should be made more equal vs. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort”, “Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”, “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people vs. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas”, “People can only get rich at the expense of others vs. Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone”, “Free meals at school should be provided for all children vs. Free meals at school should be provided selectively for poor children”.⁷ These items were measured from 1 (liberal) to 10 (conservative).

c. Policy Preference

In order to clarify the difference in the political attitudes among morality groups, this study examined the policy preference for conflict resolution methods. The policy preference of resolving social conflicts is closely related to justice because it is based on an understanding of normative and moral expectations of members of society. McCold and Wachtel (2003) divided justice: punitive justice, permissive justice, and restorative justice. The punitive justice is retributive method with high control and low support. Two questions about punitive justice: “We must strictly control the corruption of the privileged.” and “We must establish a strong rule of law and order.” The permissive justice is a rehabilitative method that provides support than control. Three questions about permissive justice: “We must have a protective measure for the weak and vulnerable of our society.”, “We must extend social welfare.”, and “We must raise taxes in order to improve the welfare of the whole society.” The restorative justice is a collaborative problem-solving method that provides opportunities for mutual understanding and self-development. Three questions about restorative justice: “Equal opportunities

⁷ In this study, this item was added as a controversial issue in Korean society regarding welfare provision for everyone or for the disadvantaged only. The school meals provision for all students is a line dividing the political attitudes of Koreans (Lee, Cho and Lee 2017; Nam and Lee 2013).

should be given to all,” “Mutual respect must be achieved by recognizing the differences.”, and “We should strengthen the value of empathy and coexistence.” These items were measured from 1 (highly disagree) to 4 (highly agree).

Latent Class Analysis

Usually, the concepts of social science are not directly measured. When concepts cannot be measured, we measure them indirectly through observable indicators. Latent variables are measures that cannot be directly observed through variables (Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2009).

Latent class analysis is a factor analysis technique that can be used to find latent patterns in which observational variables are measured as nominal or categorical (Lee 2005). The basic latent class analysis is based on two types of categorical variables (observational variables and potential variables), latent classes, and their conditional probabilities. If we analyze latent classes with one latent variable (X) and three observed categorical variables A, B, and C, the probability of the potential population and the conditional probability can be expressed as follows:

$$\pi_{ijk}^{ABCX} = \pi_i^X \pi^{A|X} \pi_{jt}^{B|X} \pi_{kt}^{C|X}$$

The probability of the latent class represents the chances of belonging to a specific latent class, and the conditional probability represents the probability of belonging to a specific category based on each observed variable. In addition, it can show the probability that the respondents belong to each potential class through the distribution of each potential class in the categorical variables. Therefore, this study classified the groups through potential class analysis using 30 items of morality.

Results

Varieties of Morality Groups

Table 2 shows the results of the selection based on the number of latent classes for the items of morality. The Akaike information criterion (AIC), the BIC, and the ABIC, which are fitness indices, show a gradual decrease as the number of classes increase. As the information fitness index decreases, the

TABLE 2
SELECTION OF THE LATENT CLASSES


Class	AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)	BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)	ABIC (Adjusted BIC)	Entropy	LRT (Likelihood- ratio test)	ALRT (Approximate likelihood- ratio test)
2	78778.22	79152.49	78945.97	0.926	13446.031 (.000)	13393.714 (.000)
3	75388.78	75953.05	75641.69	0.894	3455.449 (.000)	3442.004 (.000)
4	73003.53	73757.81	73341.6	0.905	2451.250 (.000)	2441.713 (.000)
5	72072.9	73017.2	72496.1	0.901	996.632 (.000)	992.754 (.000)
6	71559.71	72694.02	72068.11	0.868	579.181 (0.094)	576.927 (0.095)

TABLE 3
COMPOSITION OF THE LATENT CLASSES

Class	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	57.6%	42.4%				
3	36.2%	43.8%	20.0%			
4	26.3%	37.8%	18.9%	17.2%		
5	23.5%	36.5%	9.5%	19.7%	10.7%	
6	15.9%	15.7%	16.9%	19.9%	16.1%	15.4%

fitness of the model increases. As the number of latent classes increases, the fitness of the latent class increases. When the number of latent classes reaches 6, the LRT (Likelihood-ratio test) and ALRT (Approximate likelihood-ratio test) results are not statistically significant (Table 2). Thus, it can be confirmed that the latent classes can be divided into five statistically significant groups. If the latent classes were identified as five, the probability of respondents belonging to each class was as follows: 23.5% in class 1, 36.5% in class 2, 9.5% in class 3, 19.7% in class 4, and 10.7% in class 5 (Table 3).

Latent classes can be identified through conditional probabilities for the



Note.—The first two dimensions, care and fairness, correspond to the moral dimension of individuality. The loyalty, authority, and purity dimensions correspond to the moral dimension of solidarity.

FIG. 1.—Latent Class Analysis: Five Morality Groups

TABLE 4
GROUPING ACCORDING TO MORAL BASES AT THE SOLIDARITY AND
INDIVIDUALITY LEVELS

Low		Solidarity		Non solidarity& individuality
		High		
Individuality	Low	Selfish individuals (class 4)	Paternalistic (class 3)	Amoral individuals (class 5)
	High	Altruistic individuals (class 2)	Moral idealists (class 1)	

responses of the 30 items of morality. First, we classified each item as very important (=1) and the remainder (=0), and then calculated the probability for each item. For example, for a given item, the probability of a class can be classified as a latent class based on the difference in probability. It shows the five different morality groups that are distinguished through latent class analysis.

The results of the latent class analysis using conditional probability illustrate the distinct characteristics of the morality groups (Fig. 1).⁸ In solidarity-based (binding foundations in Haidt’s term) morality (loyalty, authority and purity), class1 and class3 showed high, while class 2 and class 4 showed low. In individuality-based (individualizing foundations in Haidt’s term) morality (care and fairness), class 1 was the highest among all groups, while class 3 was very low in fairness. In class 2 and class 4 with low solidarity-based morality, class 2 had a high of both care and fairness, while class 4 showed fairly low in fairness. Finally, class 5 showed low level in all moralities.

In short, there were five groups with different moral bases in South Korea. These groups can be named according to the dimensions of solidarity and individuality, as shown in Table 4.

The paternalistic group (class 3) and the altruistic individuals group (class 2) are in line with the dominant morality types of Lakoff’s the strict father model and the nurturant parent model, and also in line with Haidt’s Oriental collectivist cultures and Western individualist cultures. The paternalistic group (class 3) has a high solidarity-based morality such as loyalty, authority and purity but has relatively low individuality-based morality. In contrast, the altruistic individuals group (class 2) has a high

⁸ Figure 1 shows the representative items that reveal the characteristics of the group.

individuality-based morality such as care and fairness but a low solidarity-based morality.

Moral idealists group (class 1) was similar to paternalistic individuals group in solidarity-based morality and to the altruistic individuals group in individuality-based morality. The selfish individuals group (class 4) had very low level of moral bases, except for caring and the amoral individuals group (class 5) was very weak on all moral bases.⁹

Different Backgrounds of Morality Groups

Before examining the political attitudes of moral groups, we compare the differences among the morality groups' characteristics. We examine the social backgrounds of the latent groups and compare awareness of their own ideological orientation. When the demographic characteristics of the morality groups were compared, the differences in age ($F=48.208$, $p<.001$), income ($F=6.429$, $p<.001$) and self-reported political position ($F=5.232$, $p<.001$) were statistically significant, while differences in educational attainment were not statistically significant (Table 5).

The paternalistic group (class 3) is on average at 46.1 years old (the oldest) and the amoral individuals group (class 5) is the youngest group (35.9 years old). The paternalistic group (class 3) has the highest income (3.57 out of 5) and the amoral individuals group (class 5) is the lowest (2.85). The altruistic individuals group (class 2) and the selfish individuals group (class 4) are the most liberal (4.22 out of 5), and the paternalistic group (class 3) is the most conservative (3.86).

In Figure 2, which summarizes Table 5 (mean centered variables), notable aspects are as follow. First, there are two groups that are older and economically stable. One is the paternalistic group and the other is the moral idealists group. The paternalistic group evaluates itself as the most conservative in self-reported political position, but the moral idealists group is located themselves in the middle of the ideological orientation.

Second, there are three different morality-based groups among those who are younger and have a low household income. They are the altruistic individuals group, the selfish individuals group and the amoral individuals

⁹ Classical scholars such as Hume and Adam Smith considered that individuals in their natural state are selfish beings and can control selfishness and pursue public interest through morality. In this study, two groups with low morality in LCA were identified. In order to distinguish their characteristics more clearly, class 4 was named as selfish individuals and class 5 was named as amoral individuals. Here, amoral is not immoral, but their moral bases are weak or absent.

TABLE 5
MORALITY GROUPS' SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS

		N	Mean	SD	F	Post-hoc.
Age	Moral idealists	549	44.9	12.741	48.208***	AI, S, A<M, P
	Altruistic individuals	855	38.14	12.818		
	Paternalistic	223	46.11	12.812		
	Selfish individuals	462	37.5	12.847		
	Amoral individuals	251	35.99	12.232		
Household income	Moral idealists	549	3.41	2.255	6.429***	AI, A, < M, P
	Altruistic individuals	855	2.97	2.254		
	Paternalistic	223	3.57	2.179		
	Selfish individuals	462	3.13	2.234		
	Amoral individuals	251	2.85	2.105		
Education	Moral idealists	549	3.37	1.065	1.37	n.s
	Altruistic individuals	855	3.34	1.091		
	Paternalistic	223	3.39	1.028		
	Selfish individuals	462	3.28	1.099		
	Amoral individuals	251	3.21	1.068		
Self-reported political position	Moral idealists	549	4.05	1.423	5.232***	P < A, S
	Altruistic individuals	855	4.22	1.241		
	Paternalistic	223	3.86	1.397		
	Selfish individuals	462	4.22	1.037		
	Amoral individuals	251	4.15	0.964		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

M (Moral idealists), A (Altruistic individuals), P (Paternalistic), S (Selfish individuals), AI (Amoral individuals)

Note.—The self-reported political position was subjectively evaluated with the ideological orientation continuum that was measured from 1 (very liberal) to 10 (very conservative).

group. The altruistic individuals group and the selfish individuals group are the most liberal in the self-reported political position. The amoral individuals group reported to be more progressive than the moral idealists group and the paternalistic group. But they seem to be a new group in terms of age and status as well as morality. But such a self-reported political position has been criticized because it does not reflect individuals' complexity of political attitudes. Therefore, this study examined the ideological orientation of different morality groups with political attitudes and preferences as an alternative measure to it.




FIG. 2.—Differences in Morality Groups' Socio-demographic Background

Is Morality Linked to Political Attitudes and Policy Preferences?

a. Morality Groups' Political Attitudes and Ideological Orientations

In each society, the left and the right confront each other sharply on various social issues. Table 6 shows the morality groups' political attitudes toward various social issues.

On the issue of government responsibility, the most contrasting groups are the paternalistic group (5.81) and the altruistic individuals group (4.60). On the issue of welfare, the paternalistic group (7.44) has the attitude that we should provide free school meals only to the poor, but the amoral individuals group (6.12) supports the universal free school meals policy the most.

Figure 3 shows that the political attitude of the paternalistic group has the highest score on almost all social issues like the attitudes of existing conservatives. Contrary to that, the political attitude of the altruistic individuals group closely resembles the political position of the existing liberals in that they consistently score below average in all issues. The moral idealists group and the selfish individuals group seem to be close to the political attitudes of conservatives and liberals, but cannot be assumed to have a consistent political attitude like the previous two groups. The moral idealists group takes conservative attitudes in the benefit of competition, selective welfare, and the issue of wealth accumulation but shows somewhat liberal attitudes in terms of income equality and the expansion of government responsibility.

TABLE 6
POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF MORALITY GROUPS

		N	Mean	SD	F	Post-hoc
1=Income equality 10=Differential income	Moral idealists	549	5.94	2.797	2.797*	M, A, S, AI < P
	Altruistic individuals	855	5.74	2.583		
	Paternalistic	223	6.37	2.7		
	Selfish individuals	462	5.95	2.314		
	Amoral individuals	251	5.85	2.214		
1=Government responsibility 10=Individual responsibility	Moral idealists	549	5.04	2.985	10.302***	A < M, S, AI < P
	Altruistic individuals	855	4.6	2.621		
	Paternalistic	223	5.81	2.936		
	Selfish individuals	462	5.06	2.335		
	Amoral individuals	251	5.1	2.086		
1=Competition bad 10=Competition good	Moral idealists	549	7.56	2.095	18.796***	A, S, AI < M, P
	Altruistic individuals	855	7.09	1.942		
	Paternalistic	223	7.51	2.15		
	Selfish individuals	462	6.9	1.768		
	Amoral individuals	251	6.41	1.818		
1=Universal welfare 10=Selective welfare	Moral idealists	549	6.87	3.362	7.742***	AI < M, A, S, AI < P
	Altruistic individuals	855	6.41	3.223		
	Paternalistic	223	7.44	2.932		
	Selfish individuals	462	6.53	2.779		
	Amoral individuals	251	6.12	2.205		
1=Restriction of wealth accumulation 10=Extensibility of wealth accumulation	Moral idealists	549	6.01	2.629	8.771***	A, S < M, P
	Altruistic individuals	855	5.35	2.41		
	Paternalistic	223	6.1	2.449		
	Selfish individuals	462	5.53	2.141		
	Amoral individuals	251	5.64	1.837		

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

M (Moral idealists), A (Altruistic individuals), P (Paternalistic), S (Selfish individuals), AI (Amoral individuals)

Note.—The items of political attitudes were measured from 1 (liberal) to 10 (conservative).

The political attitudes of selfish individuals group considerably share those of the altruistic individuals group, but they are distinctively conservative in income equality and government responsibility. The amoral individuals group is opposed to the conservative political attitudes such as the benefit of competition and selective welfare than the altruistic individuals groups (or




FIG. 3.—Political Attitudes of the Morality Groups

liberal). But they show a relatively positive belief in individual’s responsibility for life and wealth accumulation that conservatives support. These results can be interpreted as evidence that this group has a complex political attitude. To sum up, groups that rely on either solidarity-based morality or individuality-based morality show consistently conservative or liberal attitudes in political issues. However, groups that are high in both or weak in both show mixed political attitudes.

b. Policy Preference for Conflict Resolution Methods by Morality Groups

The morality groups’ policy preferences corresponding to each conflict resolution method in justice dimensions are shown in Table 7. The policy preference for conflict resolution methods varies statistically significant among the morality groups. The moral idealists group shows the highest level of agreement on all policies based on punitive, permissive, and restorative justice. The paternalistic and altruistic individuals groups also show a high degree of agreement on the need for all policies, but the selfish individuals group and amoral individuals group show a low level of support. In particular, the amoral individual group shows a consistently low level of support. Although the amoral group has the lowest level of consensus on the need for all policies compared to the other groups, this group has the highest agreement on the necessity of tax increases for welfare.

Figure 4 shows that groups with a strong moral basis (such as the moral

TABLE 7

POLICY PREFERENCE FOR CONFLICT RESOLVING METHODS BY MORALITY GROUPS

			N	Mean	SD	F	Post-hoc.
Punitive justice	Punish the corruption of the privileged	Moral idealists	549	3.87	0.395	109.097***	AI, S < M, A, P
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.9	0.323		
		Paternalistic	223	3.83	0.385		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.72	0.561		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.25	0.717		
	Establish the rule of law and order	Moral idealists	549	3.88	0.359	123.483***	AI < S < P < M, A
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.86	0.362		
		Paternalistic	223	3.77	0.432		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.69	0.535		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.18	0.709		
Permissive justice	Protect the vulnerable	Moral idealists	549	3.5	0.566	40.390***	AI < S < A, P < M
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.31	0.584		
		Paternalistic	223	3.34	0.578		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.16	0.533		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.01	0.597		
	Extend social welfare	Moral idealists	549	3.44	0.647	18.444***	AI < S < A, P < M
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.32	0.676		
		Paternalistic	223	3.3	0.702		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.2	0.654		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.05	0.656		
Raise taxes for social welfare	Moral idealists	549	2.53	0.893	6.294***	S < M, AI	
	Altruistic individuals	855	2.38	0.856			
	Paternalistic	223	2.44	0.857			
	Selfish individuals	462	2.31	0.8			
	Amoral individuals	251	2.54	0.77			
Restorative justice	Provide equal opportunities	Moral idealists	549	3.55	0.567	44.593***	AI < S < A, P < M
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.42	0.559		
		Paternalistic	223	3.44	0.506		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.24	0.558		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.04	0.602		
	Recognizing the differences	Moral idealists	549	3.62	0.538	49.753***	AI < S < P, A < M
		Altruistic individuals	855	3.51	0.547		
		Paternalistic	223	3.44	0.557		
		Selfish individuals	462	3.32	0.538		
		Amoral individuals	251	3.08	0.636		
Strengthen the value of empathy	Moral idealists	549	3.65	0.491	62.992***	AI < S < P, A < M	
	Altruistic individuals	855	3.51	0.553			
	Paternalistic	223	3.49	0.519			
	Selfish individuals	462	3.32	0.568			
	Amoral individuals	251	3.05	0.581			

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

M (Moral idealists), A (Altruistic individuals), P (Paternalistic), S (Selfish individuals), AI (Amoral individuals)

Note.—The policy preference of resolving social conflicts were measured from 1 (highly disagree) to 4 (highly agree).




FIG. 4.—Policy Preference for Conflict Resolving Methods by Morality Groups

idealist, paternalistic and altruistic individual groups) have a high level of agreement about the law and order principle, as well as the policy for permissiveness and restoration as the solution for social conflicts. However, the groups with weak moral bases, such as the selfish individuals and amoral individuals groups, show a low level of agreement on most of the conflict resolution methods. The paternalistic and altruistic individuals groups have clearly confronted each other in terms of political attitudes as conservatives and liberals, but these two groups show almost identical policy preferences in the conflict resolution methods.

Conclusion

The key question for this study was to examine what kind of morality political moderates are based on and what direction toward political attitudes and preferences they have in South Korea. Recent psychological and political studies show that morality is a strong predictor variable of political attitudes and positions. The differences between liberals and conservatives are rooted in different morals. The groups’ political attitudes are consistently aligned left and right depending on the moralities that they rely on. However, many people take complex positions rather than form a clear political attitude about social liberal or existing social order. These people are often called

TABLE 8
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS OF THE MORALITY GROUPS

		Paternalistic	Altruistic individuals	Moral idealists	Selfish individuals	Amoral individuals
Morality	Solidarity	Loyalty Authority Purity	-	Loyalty Authority Purity	-	-
	Individuality	Care	Care Fairness	Care Fairness	Care	-
Political attitudes	Income equality	Disagree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
	Government support	Disagree	Agree	Partially disagree	Partially disagree	Partially disagree
	Competition bad	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Agree
	Universal welfare	Disagree	Agree	Partially disagree	Agree	Agree
	Restriction of wealth	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Agree
Ideological orientations	Conservative	Liberals	Politically biconceptualists (Moderates)			

politically moderate or non-partisan. At this point, this study showed that the political moderates in South Korea were not a single group with a midpoint political attitude or no political preferences. Thus, we argue that the moderates are composed of several groups based on moralities different from the existing liberals and conservatives. In other words, from a question about ‘whether moderates constitute a real group’ that many scholars raised in the past, this study proceeds to a question about ‘whether moderates are a single group.’

We summarized our analyses in Table 8. First, we found five latent groups based on moralities: the moral idealists group, the altruistic individuals group, the paternalistic group, the selfish individuals group and the amoral individuals group. Second, political attitudes of the altruistic individuals group coincide with liberalism. The paternalistic group is similar to the political attitudes of conservatives. Political moderates, which Lakoff called politically biconceptuals, include very different groups with different moral bases. The moral idealists group, the selfish individuals group and the moral

individuals group show mixed political attitudes.

In conclusion, political moderates in South Korea are a multidimensional group composed of moral idealists with high morality, selfish individuals with low morality, and amoral individuals. They are based on different moralities from liberalism and conservatism, and therefore their political attitudes for social issues also differ from those of traditional political parties. More importantly, they are the majority in terms of proportion, that is, 53.9 percent in our sample (the moral idealists group 23.5%, the selfish individuals group 19.7%, and the amoral individuals group 10.7%). The proportion is bigger than existing election survey (refer to footnote 4).

Let us focus on the selfish individuals group and amoral individuals group occupying 30.4 percent of our sample. According to Woolcock (1998, p. 172), "Amoral individualism exists where there is neither familial nor generalized trust, where narrow self-interest permeates all social and economic activity, and where members are isolated from all forms of cohesive social networks." This implies that they are weak in integration with society and usually support policies which benefit them directly regardless ideological orientation. This phenomenon of amorality in South Korea tells us that the communitarian foundation in Korean society is weakening today. This is, as we discussed earlier, because morality is internalized by people when there exist a group or community to which they belong or wish to belong.

Another finding is that the higher the intensity of morality, the greater the degree of agreement on the policy preference for conflict resolution methods. We divided the conflict resolution methods into three (punitive, permissive, restorative). Morality groups show high support for all three conflict resolution methods when morality is high, rather than showing individual preferences for resolutions to social conflicts. Even though the altruistic individuals group and the paternalistic group show a high level of agreement on all conflict resolution methods, there are some differences. For example, an altruistic individual group has a higher degree of agreement than the paternalistic group in rule of law, penalties for the corrupt privileged, and recognition of differences. However paternalistic group has a higher degree of agreement than the altruistic individuals group for the tax increase for welfare. In short, it seems clear that morality is an important determinant for the conflict resolution methods. However, it was not enough to show the direction of how a certain moral foundation determines the preference for a method.

An important topic of future research is to analyze the pros and cons of moral groups on the issues of many recent cultural wars, homosexuality,

abortion, euthanasia, refugees, religion, drugs, terrorism and gun possession etc. Through these analyses, we can reveal how moral groups express their preference according to the moral foundation. The current party politics in South Korea, which is largely polarized, is limited to include diverse demands from qualitatively different moral and political groups. When the moral idealists were dissatisfied with and the selfish or amoral individuals were indifferent to existing politics, political parties in South Korea did not pay a meaningful attention to them. The reason is in part that the way to attract their political interest is not simple. It requires not only the development of new policies but also the restoration of communitarian base in Korean society.

Another topic to be studied in the future is a more detailed exploration for the context in which morality or ideological orientations are formed. We have previously discussed the possibility of emerging groups of new morality following the economic development of Korean society and the transition to the neo-liberal system after the foreign currency crisis in 1997. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze what kind of morality groups individuals are incorporated according to the group (family, school, religion, race, place of origin, and business firms, etc.) that provides their moral motives. Future studies need to address these issues.

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