

Commercial Motor Drivers, Transport Unions and Electoral Violence in Ibadan, Nigeria*

AYOKUNLE OLUMUYIWA OMOBOWALE | UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN
OLATOKUNBO ORITSHWEHINMI FAYIGA | UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

Democratization process in Southwestern Nigeria presents a unique case of politicking involving transport unions in patronage politics in the electoral process. With members drawn predominantly from the lower class, transport unions are strategic partners to politicians and political patrons who utilize commercial drivers as foot-soldiers during election periods. Hence, every government in power takes special interest in the leadership of the transport unions as the unions somewhat play vital roles in who gets to power and the maintenance of social order. This paper is specially focused on the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) and governance in Southwestern Nigeria. Empirical data were collected through secondary sources, in-depth interviews and key informant interviews with drivers and politicians in Ibadan, Nigeria. The data collected were contextually and content analysed.

Keywords: commercial motor drivers, transport unions, electoral violence, NURTW, Nigeria

*Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nordic Africa Days 2014 Conference: Misbehaving States and Behaving Citizens? Questions of Governance in African States (26-27 September 2014) and the Big Man politics: The Micro-Level Dynamics of Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa Workshop (22-24 October 2015), both hosted by the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. We appreciate Dr Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Dr Jesper Bjarnesen; the participants at the Conference and Workshop mentioned above, and the anonymous reviewers whose comments have been most beneficial to the successful completion of this paper.

Introduction

Nigeria's post-independence democratization process has always been frost with violence. Starting with the operation *wetie* (wet him) violence perpetrated by party thugs, which followed the 1964 elections in Southwestern Nigeria, there is hardly a general election or electoral process that has not been violently contested (Dixon 1991, pp. 57-58; Elaigwu 1988, p. 174)¹. Indeed, party thugs have often been blamed for electoral violence; however, it is important to note that transport unions strategically partner with politicians to perpetrate contemporary electoral violence (Mizuoka and Shimono 2013, p. 254; Nolte 2004, pp. 61-63; Okpara 1988, p. 327). This is related to Ikelegbe's (2001, p. 1) submission on "perverse manifestation of civil society organizations" in electoral violence in Nigeria. One of such civil organizations is the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW).

The NURTW is a trade association of road transport workers in Nigeria. It comprises working class transport drivers. The NURTW was formed in 1978, and it somewhat emerged as a successor to the Nigerian Road Transport Union, which had earlier been formed in 1934 (Oladipo 2012, pp. 230-235). The establishment of the NURTW as the umbrella body of transport workers (particularly drivers) made a major turning point in the political relevance of these working class mass that ordinarily might not have caught the attention of political elite². Membership is compulsory for all commercial drivers. With a broken down public transport system, the drivers under the auspices of the NURTW provide the critical responsibility of commercial intra and inter-city transportation of the larger spectrum of the Nigerian society. Even though the NURTW is not a publicly owned institution, but an organization of individual drivers and commercial vehicle owners, the critical importance of its transportation services is not in doubt. The NURTW thus provides a critical responsibility which impacts the majority who exist at the base. Also the mass membership of the NURTW,

¹ *Wetie* literally means wet him. It was a protest slogan among supporters of aggrieved defeated candidates especially during the 1963, 1978 and 1983 General Elections, who advanced to mob opponents and vandalize their properties. *Wetie* depicts the act of spraying victims and their properties with petrol and setting them ablaze.

² A rival body called the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) is supposedly a union of commercial vehicle owners. It however does not command the patronage, respect, relevance and potential and real violence capability as the NURTW. The RTEAN is however allowed to control a few motor parks, while the NURTW controls most of the motor parks in Southwestern Nigeria.

comprising principally the underprivileged and vulnerable, who have been toughened by the rough conditions of the street, which they are regularly exposed to day and night, present a critical mass who could easily be called upon to foment electoral violence. Whereas it is important to note that not all members of the NURTW get engaged in electoral violence, that the critical personnel used for electoral violence is sourced from the NURTW puts the union in political spotlight. (Omobowale 2008, pp. 85-90).

This paper therefore examines the relevance of the NURTW to electoral and democratization process in Ibadan, Nigeria. The study area, Ibadan was a pre-colonial military city-state, whose political influence extended over a large spectrum of Yorubaland (Adeboye 2007, pp. 190-198; Falola 1991, pp. 93-94; Awe 1973, p. 65). Ibadan became the colonial administrative headquarters of Western Nigeria in the 1940s. Ibadan was the seat of the regional government and it attracted the presence of prominent Southwestern Nigeria politicians such as Obafemi Awolowo and Adegoke Adelabu (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 425-431). Ibadan remained the capital city of Southwestern Nigeria until the region was devolved into Oyo, Ogun and Ondo states in 1976. The city of Ibadan remains the administrative headquarters of Oyo state and it is important to note that Ibadan remains the traditional political headquarters of the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 427-428). The research specifically investigated (1) the structure of the transport union, (2) the network between political elite and the transport union leadership and (3) the relevance of the transport union to electoral violence. Empirical data were collected through secondary sources, in-depth interviews and key informant interviews with drivers and politicians in Ibadan, Nigeria. The data collected were contextually and content analyzed.

This paper has 8 subsections. The first section provides the background while the second section presents the literature and theoretical context. The third section presents the methodology, the fourth provides an ethnography of electoral violence in Ibadan while section five discusses the structure and exploitative exchange relations within the NURTW which somewhat ensures regular supply of potential "foot soldiers" (client violent-provocateurs). The sixth and seventh sections discuss the network between political elite and NURTW and the involvement of NURTW in electoral violence respectively. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.

Literature and Theoretical Context

Literature generally confirms the political relevance and instrumentality of trade and working class organizations to electoral, democratization and governance processes. The trend ranges from the contributions of trade unions to the advancement of democracy to the utilization of working class trade unions to perpetrate electoral and political violence and coercively subjugate the electorate. On the one hand, Robertson (2004, pp. 453-460) discussed the contribution of the trade unions to democratization process in newly democratic Eastern European countries, which organized and participated in mass demonstrations against unpopular government policies. Likewise, Eade (2004, pp. 72-80) particularly noted that OXFAM GB provided significant support for trade unions in Central America and South Africa due to the acknowledged contributions of trade unions in these territories in providing workable settlements to wars and political conflicts and in ameliorating the impact of such political imbroglio (see also Selwyn 2009, p. 189; Ratnam 2007, pp. 620-623; Spooner 2004, pp. 19-20; Dave 2002, p. 5).

On the other hand, trade unions could also serve as handy “instruments” of violence in the hands of political patrons and gladiators. This has been clearly demonstrated in the research of Wu (2003, pp. 90-100) who detailed how the Taiwan’s dominant political party, the Kuomintang (KMT) utilized local groups to ensure electorate support and compliance. In like manner, Robles (2007, pp. 431-440) in his study on organized street violence in the Basque Country (in Spain), posits that street violence is usually perpetrated especially in places where particular political actors have political advantage to gain through violence. In a paper on political process in South Africa, Posel (2013, pp. 58-60) describes the African National Congress (ANC) youth wing as a race provocateur, deeply framed in the clientelistic politics of the Black majority rule in South Africa. In essence, the ANC Youth Wing; serves political interests through patronage and street protests aimed at retaining anti-White, pro-Black racist sentiments. On the contrary, Sitas (2004, pp. 831-834) rather sees an enduring post-apartheid comradeship across South African Black populations, unified by the common consciousness against economic inequality perpetrated through apartheid racist sentiments. Rizzo (2013, pp. 290-296) did an interesting work on “informalization and trade unionism” with a special focus on informal transport workers union in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Rizzo noted the power

equity between bus owners and workers, which was achieved through the workings of the transport workers union. Rizzo however did not discuss the political relevance of the transport union, limiting the discourse only to the political economy of transport workers organization in relation to capital. Unlike Rizzo's findings however, this research uncovers the exploitative relations within the structures of the NURTW and its violent political instrumentality in Nigeria's democratization and governance processes as subsequent sections reveal.

This research is theoretically guided by the idea of the Big Man politics (Daloz 2003, pp. 285-291; Sahlins 1963, pp. 285-293). Big man politics is system of clientelistic exchanges where the big man (as patron) provides goods for clients who give loyalty in return. Aside the broad base of clients, the big man also controls a dedicated structure of clients with a major duty of serving the big man as violence provocateurs to influence political (and electoral) processes (de Smedt 2009, pp. 581-582; Becker 2004, pp. 1-3; see also Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 426-430). A client violence-provocateur may have some primary career as cover, when duty demands; he deploys his violence capabilities and resources to the services of the big man (Omobowale 2008, pp. 85-91; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, p. 441). The NURTW presents such cover. The NURTW is primarily a trade union of transport workers; the union however also provides "foot soldiers" to political big men as thugs and violence provocateurs especially during electoral periods (Omobowale 2008, pp. 86-90).

Methodology

Qualitative data were collected between August 2010 and March 2011 at Ibadan, Nigeria through observation, key informant interview and in-depth interview. The data has been augmented and updated with secondary sources on political and electoral developments in Nigeria, published in periodicals between 2007 and 2014. The study is primarily focused on Ibadan, because of recurrent electoral violence in the city and Ibadan's notable position in the politics of Southwestern Nigeria, and the acknowledged violent nature of Ibadan branch of the NURTW and its association with notable political figures and patrons (big men) especially in order to foment electoral violence (Animasahun 2013, p. 130; Hoffman and Nolte 2013, pp. 25-30; Fourchard 2011, pp. 223-225; Omobowale 2008, p. 85-86; Human Rights Watch 2007, pp. 52-77; Animasahun 2007, pp. 128-135). Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

were conducted with 2 local government executives, 2 local government administrators, 2 politicians (without official portfolios) and 6 senior members of the NURTW. A total of 12 KIIs were conducted. In-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted with 4 drivers in each of the purposely selected NURTW parks (units) at Agodi Gate, Iwo Road, Molete, Olomi and Sango. These units were purposely selected because they are strategic units of the NURTW especially in terms of funds generation, power struggle and mobilization of political thugs (who are usually both drivers and touts (*agbero*)) for violent purposes. It is widely accepted among NURTW members that whoever controls the NURTW units in these places emerges as the overall boss of the transport union in Ibadan in particular and Oyo state in general. The study also conducted IDI with 2 drivers at the NURTW headquarters at Olomi Ibadan. A total 18 IDIs were conducted for the study. Data collected were subjected to content analysis.

Ethnography of Electoral Violence in Ibadan

Ibadan stands out as a major urban city in Nigeria with deep historical and political relevance. Ibadan started out in the 18th Century as a camp of social out-laws, and subsequently it emerged a military city-state holding vast territory across Yorubaland (Watson 2005, pp. 1-6; Falola 1984). Ibadan's historical warlike and conflict ridden nature is captured in its cultural appellation that: ...*ija'gbooro laarun Ibadan* (...civil disorder is the disease of Ibadan) (Watson 2005, p. 2). The city-state remained a strong military political structure with a vast empire until the signing of the Protectorate Treaty with the British government in 1893 (Omobowale 2006, p. 61; Falola 1984, pp. 4-10; 1981, pp. 109-111). The onset of colonialism introduced Ibadan to modern governance and values. Ibadan became a major economic and political centre attracting huge migration from across Nigeria (especially Yorubaland) during the colonial period and beyond. Many of the contemporary migrants have settled outside the city-centre while Ibadan old-city (including communities such as Oje, Beere, Mapo, Popoyemoja, Oniyanrin, Oke-Sapati (Shepherds' Hill), Opo-yeosa, Beyerunka, Idi-kan, Olomi (the headquarters of the NURTW) among other areas situated on the south-east of Oyo State Agodi seat of government) are largely populated by the indigenous population. Ibadan old city communities are predominantly urban slums, with high crime rates, heinous gang activities and hotbeds of electoral violence (Oley 2006, pp. 276-280; Arimah and Adeagbo 2000, pp.

279-280).

The environmental context of Ibadan old-city, occupied by poor and vulnerable mass, presents a vibrant breeding ground for violence and patronage (Igwe 2012, pp. 51-54; Ogbogbo 2009, pp. 55-58). Such situation has subsisted since the 1950s, when Chief Adegoke Adelabu operated as a strong patron in Ibadan politics, and it is also on record that Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu sourced his clientelistic base and “foot-soldiers” predominantly from Ibadan old city and among NURTW members (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 434-437). It is thus important to note that the NURTW has a strong presence at Ibadan old city. Its headquarters at Olomi, stands as a symbolic formidable fortress for the leadership of the union, from where it exercises control over commercial transportation activities in Ibadan city in particular and Oyo State in general (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015, pp. 103-105 Omobowale 2008, pp. 85-87). The leadership of the NURTW is an authoritarian executive with binding influence over all members at the pain of punitive sanctions (including battery) against defaulting members (Bolaji 2009, pp. 176-180; Albert 2007, pp. 125-130). As shown later in this paper, the structure of the NURTW as an institution with control over a mass that is often used in electoral violence presents the union as a strategic partner to the political class. This paper submits that the instrumentalization of the NURTW in electoral violence is somewhat a function of the violence ethnography of Ibadan historically, structurally, and contemporarily.

Thus, Ibadan remains a strategic town in Nigeria’s electoral politics. The strategic importance of Ibadan was prominently noticed during the early 1960s. Ibadan erupted into electoral violence in 1962 following the victory of Obafemi Awolowo’s former stalwart, Samuel Ladoke Akintola; who had become an arch rival and associate of the Hausa Fulani dominated federal government led by Tafawa Balewa. Popularly called *operation wetie e* (spray with petrol and lit), the ensuing violence resulted in massive loss of life and property (Omotola 2010, p. 535). The 1962 electoral violence in Ibadan as well as Igbo Progorm in Northern Nigeria between 1965 and 1966 led to the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970 (Omobowale, Oni and Ugbem 2012, pp. 195-200; Omobowale 2009, p. 2482; Ukiwo 2009, pp. 9-10). Again, widespread electoral violence occurred in Ibadan and other parts of Southwestern Nigeria in 1983 following the electoral loss of populist United Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by Obafemi Awolowo to the conservative National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by Sheu Shagari at the federal elections and in some Southwestern States stronghold of the UPN. The 1983 electoral

violence followed the pattern of the 1960s *operation wetie*. It involved snatching of ballot boxes, mob actions, petrol bombs, and widespread mayhem (Lewis 2003, pp. 131-136; Apter 1987, pp. 279-285). The 1983 elections was generally opined defaulted leading thereby to a military putsch in 1983 (Dare 1997, pp. 23-25). The military remained in power till 1999 when Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military Head of State (1976-1979), once again took over power as civilian president. Subsequently, Ibadan has experienced the re-emergence of the NURTW as a strong force in electoral politics and violence. The next section reviews the structure of the NURTW.

NURTW: Structure and Exploitative Relations

The structural arrangement of an organization, to a large extent would determine how the organization may ensure the loyalty of its members as well as the instrumentality of each member in the fulfillment of organizational goals. The NURTW is not built on free association as such. Every commercial driver must belong and pay dues to the NURTW. It is a coercive-pyramidal structure, headed by the president at the national headquarters at Abuja. State chairmen are at the helms of affairs at the state level, while unit chairmen administer the diverse branches in the local motor parks. At each level of the structure, the administrative head (president or chairman) is assisted by executive members including Deputy Chairman (or vice president as the case may be), General Secretary, Treasurer, Financial secretary and Zonal Representatives. The constitution of the NURTW stipulates these positions as elective; with "strict" tenures (National Union of Road Transport Workers 2008, pp. 5-10). Against the stated pyramidal structure of the NURTW, with a national president at the helms of affairs, in reality, real powers reside in the state chairmen. The chairmen attain their positions not just by free and fair elections, but by their dexterity in violence, command of large mass of touts and drivers and by support provided by big men serving as state officials. It is an autocratic command structure sustained by threat and actual utilization of violence to subdue opposition (Ademowo 2016, pp. 197-201; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015, pp. 110-114; Albert 2007, pp. 125-130). The other members of the state NURTW executive serve as mere appendages of the personality of the state chairman, unto whose benevolence they hold their positions. Virtually all the commercial drivers who were interviewed acknowledged the powers of the state chairman by describing him as the one who "rules" or "controls" the activities of the union. A key informant states

that “The chairman is the controller of all activities that take place in the union, the units and the garages...” (KII/Iwo Road Park/6 January 2011).

The NURTW generates its funds through the dues it collects from commercial drivers. In the intra-city transport route or corridor, the NURTW has a network of uniformed, but ‘roughly clad’ vendors (touts) popularly called *agbero*. The fearsome and rough appearance of the *agbero* (vendor) symbolically presents a ruthless agent who must ensure daily payment of dues by each driver and compliance with the instructions of the leadership of the NURTW without fail. An *agbero* (vendor) has a primary responsibility to call passengers to board vehicles and collect union dues (charges) from drivers. More often than not, however, the *agbero* primarily collects dues from drivers by every mean possible, even by coercion, while drivers, of course, loudly announce vacancy for passengers in their vehicles. Every intra-city commercial driver must pay stipulated dues ranging from ₦20 to ₦50 (\$0.13 to \$0.3) at some major bus stops along a transport corridor. An intra-city driver may have to pay this 2 to 4 times (usually each time he stops for passengers to board or disembark at a major bus stop) before he reaches the end of the transport corridor. Each corridor is usually about 4 to 5 kilometers long. Refusal to pay attracts punitive actions ranging from vehicular damage to bodily harm. Payment is thus extracted by compulsion and not by heartfelt will. Inter-city drivers pay a due equivalent to the transport fare of a passenger (depending on the route, it could range from ₦200 (\$1.3) to ₦5000 (\$31.3) or more).

These amounts are seemingly negligible. However, even though it is difficult to have the data on the actual number of commercial cars and buses plying Ibadan city, the obvious huge number of commercial vehicles, plying both major and minor roads in the city indicate that the amount generated daily will be huge³. As at the time of this research, a key informant claimed that: “The chairman of the National Union of Road Transport Workers [NURTW] gets up to five million naira [₦5,000,000⁴ i.e. \$31,250] daily from the different units under him” (KII/Moleta Park/17 December 2010a). The chairman reportedly “shares” the daily proceeds with other executives, the national headquarters, security agents (to forestall police harassment and provide “protection” when laws are infringed), local politicians and some government officials. The sharing of the proceeds is in tune with the

³ Many of the commercial vehicles are damaged and largely not roadworthy.

⁴ A recent newspaper report puts the current figure at ₦7,000,000 (\$43,750) daily.

NURTW's guiding slogan "eat alone, die alone."⁵ The chairman would not "pocket" all the funds. By sharing, he secures his big man position and power within the NURTW structure and the state political network. Thus, the flow of funds builds a network of people with vested interests within and outside the basic structure of the NURTW. The funds that are generated from commercial drivers by the NURTW also provides enormous wealth to NURTW leaders who display their wealth through acquisition of state of the art vehicles, expansive buildings, and retinue of hangers-on, who receive daily livelihood from the NURTW leader(s); provide protection and serve as the nucleus of the human machinery that provides violence services when needed.

The huge sum that is daily generated from poor drivers is at the very "heart" of instability, power contest and violence in the NURTW. The state chairman has executive powers over the funds. He sustains his *bigmanship*, relevance, patronage and "foot soldiers" by using the funds to oil the wheels of patronage structure within the NURTW. Other members of the executive (at state, local and unit levels) only give a semblance of a functioning union "bureaucracy", but in actual fact the chairman acts as the "commander-in-chief" and the "chief controller" of all generated funds and thus findings from the field revealed that the Chairman decides who gets what and how much each person gets. Hence the position of the chairman is highly desired among senior members of the state executive, but only the most violent and whom powerful politicians and political office holders prefer clinches the position. This is especially the scenario in Oyo state within the past 15 years, and most especially in the present democratizing experiment. This is further discussed in the next section.

Political Elite and Transport Unions: The Network

It is well established in literature that African political elites, as big men are able to entrench and self-perpetuate themselves in power through a structure of mass clientele; irrespective of their performance and development achievements (Green, 2011, p. 421; Matti 2010, p. 492; Beck 2003, pp. 148-152). The mass clientele provide the supportive base, accentuating the

⁵ "Eat alone; die alone" is an actual slogan of the NURTW. It reflects group constructed value of compulsory giving of a fraction out of every driver's daily earning as park and route charges to take care of the leadership, park touts, and also make illicit transfers to the police and other security agencies to secure some form of "protection" for drivers, touts and the overall structure of the union.

patrons' dominance through loyalty, voting, informal advocacy and campaign, and even violence. In Nigeria, the NURTW is an example of an organized clientele of working class transport workers, in patronage relationship with political bigmen in contemporary democratic "experiment" in Nigeria. Confirming this; an interviewee states: "If we have a candidate running for a political post, we will give him our full support. The government is in charge of the transport union, and we give our full support to the government" (IDI/Molete Park/18 December 2010). Yet another interviewee states: "Our executive members in the union work with the government to bring about development in the union. The relationship between the union members and the government is very cordial...we always support politicians in any way we can because they always help us to secure leadership positions within the union when they win elections" (KII/Molete Park/17 December 2010b). Still another interviewee states "The NURTW continues to enjoy support from the present government and other politicians. NURTW represents the interest of politicians. Politicians have over the years believed that NURTW members are the people who could help them remain in power" (IDI/Iwo Road Park/17 December 2010). Further buttressing the claims of NURTW members above, a key informant who is also a political office holder states "...the leadership of the NURTW is very important...politicians always recognize these leaders and also use them for political campaigns" (KII/Political Appointee/Ibadan North Local Government Area/15 December 2010). The submissions above confirm the network between politicians and the NURTW within the last 3 decades.

Albert (2007, pp. 129-134) noted that the relationship between NURTW and politicians dates back to the acrimonious political relationship between the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), in preparation for democratic governance in Nigeria in 1979. At the initial stage, members of the NURTW somewhat formed part of the nucleus of the "violent wings" of both political parties. However, the UPN successfully outwitted the NPN in enlisting the support of the leadership of the then nascent Ibadan and Lagos chapters of NURTW. In Ibadan, Busari Adelakun; a prominent leader of the NURTW, supported the UPN's gubernatorial candidate, Chief Bola Ige to win at the polls. Adelakun was a prominent patron with a retinue of clients who were readily available for electoral violence. He was feared and highly courted by the Ibadan political class. The Lagos chapter of the NURTW under the leadership of Adebayo Ogundare (alias Bayo success), also ensured that the NURTW worked for the success of Lateef Jakande, the gubernatorial candidate of the UPN. By the early 1980s,

prominent and wealthy political leaders (especially Chief MKO Abiola (Lagos) and Chief Adisa Akinloye (Ibadan)) of the NPN with the active support of the NPN led Federal Government headed by President Sheu Shagari, secured the loyalty of Bayo success and Adelakun in Lagos and Ibadan respectively through clientelistic exchanges, involving financial and material support in exchange for NURTW's loyalty. This indeed changed the landscape of party politics and electoral violence in both Lagos and Ibadan. Both Bayo success and Adelakun, deployed their human violence machinery to intimidate UPN governments in Lagos and Oyo (Ibadan) states and also terrorized the electorate, while the Federal police⁶, under the control of the NPN provided protection from prosecution (Albert 2007, pp. 128-133). The violent political utilization of the NURTW at this stage was due to the impeding 1983 general elections.

At the end of the elections, Bola Ige lost in Oyo state while Jakande was barely able to win a second term. Of course, the political relevance of the NURTW and its leadership was no longer in doubt. Both Adelakun and Bayo success reigned as the transport lords with connections at the governance levels of the state. Nigeria's second republic was toppled through a military coup led by Generals Buhari and Idiagbon on 31 December 1983⁷. The new military leaders clamped all politicians who had held elective and appointive positions all over the country as well as Bayo success and Adelakun to prison. There was no need for the NURTW in military governance, and it thus reverted to its primary objective of the protection of welfare and interest of transport workers, but only as long as the military remained in power.

The political influence of the NURTW in governance was considerably reduced during the 15 year long military governance lasting from 1 January 1984 to 29 May 1999. Again the political bigmen redeveloped special interest in network with the NURTW as from the commencement of the present political dispensation in 1999. In Ibadan in particular, since 1999, Alhaji Latif Akinsola (*Tokyo*) has remained a notable NURTW leader who courts the patronage of political figures. *Tokyo* played a major role in the election of Mr.

⁶ The elite unit of the Nigeria Police, the Mobile Police gained notoriety among the population of Southwestern Nigeria at this period. The mobile police unit was sarcastically called *Kill and Go*; which is a description of the mobile police unit's brutality and extra-judicial killing of innocent citizens especially during the second republic (see Ojedokun 2014, pp. 41-45; Hills 2008, pp. 217-220).

⁷ The Government of General Buhari was toppled in a coup led by his Army Chief, Major General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985. Buhari was elected as the civilian president of Nigeria in March 2015 and he assumed the reins of leadership on 29 May 2015.

Lamidi Adesina of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) as the Governor of Oyo state in 1999 (Animasahun 2013, pp. 130-138). *Tokyo* remained a major ally of Governor Adesina during his reign. As the 2003 elections neared, Animasahun (pp. 130-137) also noted that Alhaji Adedibu, Ibadan's undisputed political patron (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 429-431) and prominent leader of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) reached out to a former NURTW chairman, Alhaji Wasiu Abubakar (*Tawa*) who was forced out by *Tokyo*. *Tawa's* assignment was to factionalize NURTW and support the emergence of the PDP's candidate, Senator Adewolu Ladoja as the governor of Oyo state. Adedibu had federal support to ensure that the candidate of the PDP wins. Hence, the consequent violence which erupted was routinely overlooked by the federal police. Lamidi Adesina lost the 2003 election, but *Tokyo*, an Ibadan native, was able to realign himself with Adedibu especially through his claim to Ibadan's primordial links (*Tawa* is a native of the neighboring town of Iwo) (Animasahun 2013, pp. 134-136). By yielding unalloyed loyalty to Adedibu, *Tokyo* retained his position while *Tawa* was sacrificed as a political pun. *Tawa* was eventually attacked and massively inflicted with machet cuts, when he would not relinquish his claim to the chairmanship of the Oyo State NURTW.

Soon afterwards, Ladoja lost favour with Adedibu and President Obasanjo. Ladoja would no longer allow Adedibu unfettered access to state treasury. Ladoja declined to deliver about ₦15 million (\$115,000) monthly to Adedibu from the state treasury (Human Rights Watch 2007, pp. 52-65; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 442-444). Ladoja also unwittingly opposed Obasanjo's unconstitutional third term bid. The duo of Adedibu and Obasanjo had a common enemy in Ladoja. Under 'presidential protection', Adedibu deployed NURTW forces led by *Tokyo* against Ladoja and also influenced members of the Oyo State House of Assembly to start impeachment proceedings against him in December 2005. Ibadan was in a state of turmoil. Armed with dangerous weapons such as clubs, machetes, broken glass bottles and guns among other weapons, NURTW forces invaded both the seat of government at the State Secretariat and the State House of Assembly. Wielding sophisticated guns, cutlasses, knives, broken bottles, cudgels and petrol bombs, the hoodlums destroyed government property and harmed innocent citizens while the police only looked on. Ladoja was eventually impeached and replaced by his pro-Adedibu deputy, Alao Akala on 12 January 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2007, pp. 54-58; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 443-444). After a heated judicial process, Ladoja's impeachment was eventually overturned in September 2007. Of course,

Ladoja returned to power, but he was no match to the political machinery and coercive instrumentality under the control of Adedibu, and thus, Adedibu's candidate, Alao Akala won the 2007 gubernatorial election in Oyo state.

Alao Akala perfectly understood the predicament of his predecessor. To sustain himself in power, he ensured continual flow of funds to Adedibu and the leadership of the NURTW. Alao Akala was thus popularly acknowledged and referred to as *Oyato Governor* (Governor with a mark of difference) and *ATM* (Automated Teller Machine) (Tade 2011, pp. 110-116; Ojoawo 2008; 71 see also Ajala and Omobowale 2013, p. 150). The euphemisms *Oyato Governor* and *ATM* are symbolic descriptions of Governor Akala as a squanderer of state funds to finance Ibadan's patronage system and benefit party officials and cronies. Unlike Ladoja, Akala allowed Adedibu unfettered access to the state treasuries. Until Lamidi Adedibu's demise on 11 June 2008, Akala had no problem with the clientelist arrangement in Ibadan. Subsequently, Ibadan's clientelistic arrangement changed with diverse prominent political actors within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) wanting to clinch and/or inherit Adedibu's prestige. Two prominent but opposing political bases quickly emerged. One was led by Alao Akala while the opposing camp was led by Senator Folarin. As serving elected public officials, both Akala and Folarin had access to enormous state resources. Akala had plans to contest for a second term in 2011 while Senator Folarin wanted to contest the same election against Akala under the banner of the PDP. Adedibu was no longer around to decide the preferred candidate. Hence, attention shifted once again to NURTW. Folarin secured Latif Akinsola's (*Tokyo's*) support to the disappointment of Akala. As the incumbent governor and the bigman in charge of state economic, political and coercive resources, Akala subsequently orchestrated *Tokyo's* removal and replacement with Mr. Abdul Lateef Salako (alias *Eleweomo*), a former stalwart of *Tokyo*. Subsequent intra-party violence led to the gruesome murder of *Eleweomo* on 30 December 2010 (Ogunsola 2013, Sahara Reporters 2010). Akala clinched the PDP gubernatorial ticket, but lost the 2011 election to the candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Senator Abiola. Ajimobi. The NURTW remains very relevant still, even with the election of Governor Ajimobi. The present pro-Ajimobi leadership of the NURTW led by Alhaji Taofeek Oyerinde (alias *Fele*) has largely restricted the dominance of *Tokyo*, *Tokyo* remains a prominent leader of the NURTW nevertheless. He is continually courted by politicians who are interested in elective positions in Oyo state. In preparation for the 2015 general elections,

the authors observed some members of the NURTW who openly referred to themselves as ‘warriors’ waiting to ‘display’ their capabilities during the elections.⁸ The next section discusses the involvement of the NURTW in electoral violence.⁹

The NURTW and Electoral Violence

Electoral violence remains a major phenomenon in Nigeria’s democratic process. Popular and unpopular politicians alike deploy violence to secure and/or retain positions (Tade 2011, p.110; Omobowale 2008, pp. 85-86; Nolte 2004, p. 68). Irrespective of ideological leaning, it is common to see politicians guarded by a retinue of fierce looking individuals who are ever ready to foment violence at the command of their principals or when they view the principals’ interests threatened. These individuals are ever ready to go to any extent to do the bidding of their principals. Political thugs are on the one hand a coercive bulwark against perceived and real “dissenting” elements, and on the other hand, they are handy human tools at fomenting electoral violence. By and large, in Nigeria, a politician’s protection is not necessarily the preserve of the police and/or other security agencies, even when such is provided, protection is usually complemented with the services of hoodlum - hangers-on. The NURTW serves as a pool from where a complement of individuals with technical skills in violence is recruited for political reasons.

It is important to note that not all commercial drivers are recruited as political thugs. However, the leadership of the NURTW control a retinue of tout-members of NURTW (popularly called *agbero* in local parlance) and loyal commercial drivers who somewhat constitute local army who are drawn to support their preferred political aspirants (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015, p. 109; Bolaji 2009, pp. 177-179; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 441-442). The leadership of the NURTW consider it “a point of duty” to serve the purpose and the whims and caprices of politicians. As discussed above, Ibadan witnessed electoral violence especially in 2003, 2007

⁸ This information was derived from authors’ observation on the field while collecting data for this empirical study.

⁹ The 2015 general elections recorded less violence in Ibadan due to the massive deployment of heavily armed military personnel who took over the job of policing from the regular police. There were some skirmishes especially in Ibadan old city, notwithstanding, but they were quickly curtailed by the military.

and 2011; during and after the preparation of general elections of those years. Ibadan's indefatigable political patron Alhaji Adedibu who to a large extent controlled the leadership structure of the NURTW was able to deploy NURTW forces in support of his preferred candidates (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, p. 441). Using the structures of the NURTW, Adedibu established himself as the dominant patron in Ibadan, determining who got elected in gubernatorial seat and other political positions in Ibadan in particular and Oyo state in general (Human Rights Watch 2007, pp. 54-58; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, pp. 42-43). The modus operandi of the NURTW involved pre and post-election intimidation of political opponents and voters alike, snatching of ballot boxes and reiteration of its "terror" potentials to the mass public all in support of its preferred candidate. Hence, during the 2003 election, the NURTW worked with Alhaji Adedibu to ensure Senator Ladoja's electoral victory. When Ladoja would not heed Adedibu's dictates, again, 2006, the NURTW came in handy at cause violent conflict which practically shut down Ibadan city while the police only looked on. Again, in 2007, the NURTW deployed its forces to support Alao Akala. NURTW forces were actively involved in the ensuing violence which pervaded Ibadan during the 2007 election which eventually produced Alao Akala, the candidate of the PDP, and Adedibu's preference as the governor of Oyo state (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015, p. 108; Bolaji 2009, pp. 179-188). Following the demise of Adedibu, Akala, trying to retain control over the NURTW, orchestrated the removal of *Tokyo* in preference of a preferred client; *Eleweomo*. Ibadan witnessed a most violent period preceding the 2011 elections. The internal wrangling within the NURTW eventually led to the gruesome murder of *Eleweomo* in December 2010. Interestingly, despite the open display of violence, NURTW's preferred candidate lost the election. Senator Ajimobi who emerged the winner has somewhat tried to weaken the influence of the NURTW. Notwithstanding, the union remains a major factor in elections and governance in Ibadan in particular and Oyo State in general.

Confirming the relevance of the union, an official of the NURTW that: "They [Politicians] use the buses of the transport union [NURTW] during elections. The union members come out en mass to vote for the candidates of their choice. We make sure our candidates win in the elections. We always give our candidates full support" (IDI/Molete Park/18 December 2010). Indeed NURTW provides full support for the candidate that wins the loyalty of its leadership. NURTW vehicles (usually buses) provide unrivalled menacing forces round the city of Ibadan to publicly announce its support for

a particular candidate and/or party. Parked with union members, (armed with light weapons such as knives, cutlasses, axes and guns, and always ready to attack dissenters), NURTW buses menacingly drive round town and also convey party loyalists to campaign grounds.¹⁰ The buses are driven recklessly without regard for other road users while law enforcement officers only look on. This reckless auto display on the road is somewhat a symbolic indication of the readiness to violently support preferred candidates with reckless coercion. The reckless display and menace of NURTW members prior to the election day drives in; the consciousness of the likelihood of a violent electoral process among the electorate with the potentiality of causing electorate apathy. Even when an individual has gone ahead to vote, he/she is conscious of the likelihood of violence, and may want to subsequently keep away from the polling booth as much as possible.

Interviewees generally agree that NURTW members engage in electoral violence. A member of the NURTW stated thus: “The NURTW is used as an instrument in the hands of politicians to remain in power. Any party that the NURTW supports, it gives it [the party] full support even to the extent of violence” (IDI/Olomi Park/9 December 2010). A key informant cogently affirmed thus: “...The NURTW is an association recognized by the government to...supply data on transportation and movement...some political parties... [rather] use them to terrorize the people [electorate]” (KII/Politician/15December 2010). Again another interviewee succinctly submitted that: “The leadership of the NURTW has come under the influence of politicians and they use them to cause violence in order to gain their goals” (IDI/Iwo Road Park/22 December 2010). Simply put, in Nigeria’s awkward democratizing system, the NURTW provides politicians with illegitimate coercive force to secure and retain power. The NURTW thus provides a retinue of thugs who are ever ready to violently influence the electoral process to ensure the victory of their principals and patrons at the polls, while they are protected from the arms of law. The will of the people is thus subverted while the leadership of the NURTW would have its interest protected by the politicians it has supported to clinch power. The political

¹⁰ Election periods in Nigeria are often violence prone because of the “do-or-die” culture which pervades the political scene. Irrespective of the ideological stance of a politician and/or political party, private protection (and informal coercive forces) are secured through the services of hoodlums. This is an extant political culture which has remained over the 5 decades of Nigeria’s self-governance and is somewhat accepted as social reality and within the realm of the acceptable. The NURTW provides a ready source of political thugs for the political party and politicians which wins its support (Akanmu et al 2015; Albert 2007).

class and the NURTW form an intricate network within the local contrived democratization process, sustaining bigmen-patrons and politicians in power through illegitimate coercive utilization of the NURTW forces. The NURTW provides violence instrumentality as support for Big Man's structures of politicians to secure and sustain power by influencing the electoral process. The capability of the NURTW leadership and client-hoodlums at violently influencing the political process remains in public consciousness.

Conclusion

Electoral process in Southwestern Nigeria presents a unique case of politicking, which involves politicians and transport unions in patronage politics and electoral violence. As big men, politicians utilise the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) as a strategic base in its clientelistic structure to perpetuate electoral violence, keep opposing views and individuals in check and consolidate power at all costs. The activities of the NURTW, beyond commuter transportation, into electoral violence are in short manifestations of big man politics in Ibadan, Nigeria. In short, in the last 30 years, the NURTW has proved not to be just a trade union of transport workers. The NURTW does the bidding of manipulative and corrupt political class, playing a major debilitating role in perpetuating electoral violence in Ibadan. The leadership and members of the NURTW serve political big men as "field soldiers" ever ready to be deployed to perpetuate electoral violence. The NURTW, though primarily a transport union, contributes to the flawed electoral and governance process in Southwestern Nigeria. Unless the NURTW is checked, it would remain a tool in the hands of corrupt politicians and patrons to pervert the electoral process in Nigeria. The inner structure of the NURTW as presently constituted serves the selfish interests of union executives and the political class. The NURTW should be reformed, to restrict its activities to commuter transportation and drivers welfare, and it should be immune to the influences of big man politics in order for Nigeria's democratization process to advance.

(Submitted: August 15, 2017; Revised: October 30, 2017; Accepted: October 30, 2017)

References

- Adebanwi, Wale. 2005. "The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(3): 339-365.
- Adeboye, Olufunke. 2007. "Iku Ya Jesin": Politically Motivated Suicide, Social Honor, and Chieftaincy Politics in Early Colonial Ibadan." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 4(2): 189-225.
- Ademowo, Adeyemi Johnson. 2016. "They are Poor and Violent": Stereotypes and the Ibadan Urban Motor Park Space." *Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology/ Етноантрополошки проблеми* 6(1): 197-220.
- Agbibo, Daniel Egiegba. 2013. "Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria." *Journal of Black Studies* 44(1): 3-30.
- Ajala, Aderemi Suleiman and Mofeyisara Oluwatoyin. Omobowale 2013. "Paraga: Socioeconomic Context of the Production and Utilization of Alcoholic Herbal Remedy in Ibadan, Nigeria." *Anthropos* 108: 149-162.
- Akanmu, Esther Olusola, Francis Oluyemi Fagbohun and Oluwatobi Diadem Adenipekun. 2015. "Electioneering Violence and Life Insecurity In Ibadan City, Oyo State, Nigeria (1999-2011)." *International Journal of Arts & Sciences* 8(1): 103.
- Albert, I.O. (2007) "Between the State and Transporter Unions: NURTW and Politics of Managing Public Motor Parks in Ibadan and Lagos, Nigeria." Pp. 125-138, in *Gouverner les villes d'Afrique, Etat Gouvernement Local et acteurs Prives*, edited by Laurent Fourchard (ed.) Karthala et CEAN.
- Amadife, Egbunam. 1999. "Liberalization and Democratization in Nigeria: The International and Domestic Challenge." *Journal of Black Studies* 29 (5): 619-645.
- Animasahun, Gbemisola. 2013. *Godfatherism in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: The Pyramid of Violence and Political Insecurity in Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria* IFRA Nigeria E-papers No 27, 29 March 2013.
- Animasahun, Rotimi. 2007. "Measured effect of Emotional Intelligence education in the remediation of aggressive behaviours among the members of The NURTW in Ibadan Metropolis." *Ife Psychologia* 15 (1): 128-140.
- Apter, Andrew. 1987. "Things Fell Apart? Yoruba Responses to the 1983 Elections in Ondo State, Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25(03): 489-503.
- Arimah, Ben and Demola Adeagbo. 2000. "Compliance with Urban Development and Planning Regulations in Ibadan, Nigeria." *Habitat International* 24(3): 279-294.
- Arowosegbe, Jeremiah. 2009. "Violence and National Development in Nigeria: The Political Economy of Youth Restiveness in the Niger Delta." *Review of African Political Economy* 36(122): 575-594.
- Awe, Bolanle. 1973. "Militarism and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Country: The Ibadan Example." *The Journal of African History* 14(1):

65-77.

- Balogun, M.J. 1997. "Enduring Clientelism, Governance Reform and Leadership Capacity: A Review of the Democratization Process in Nigeria." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 15(2): 237-260.
- Beck, Linda. 2003. "Democratization and the Hidden Public: The Impact of Patronage Networks on Senegalese Women." *Comparative Politics* 35(2): 147-169.
- Becker, Felicitas. 2004. "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in Southeast Tanzania." *The Journal of African History* 45(1): 1-22.
- Bolaji, Kehinde. 2009. "The Culture of Violence and the Scramble for Political Power in Oyo State, Nigeria (1999-2006)." *Ife Psychologia* 17(1): 176-193.
- Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 2003. "Big Men" in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources." *Comparative Sociology* 2(1): 285-303.
- Dare, Leo. 1997. "Political Instability and Displacement in Nigeria." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 32(1-2): 22.
- Dave, Alana. 2002. "Globalising Solidarity." *International Union Rights* 9(3): 5
- de Smedt, Johan. 2009. "'No Raila, No Peace!' Big Man Politics and Election Violence at the Kibera Grassroots." *African Affairs* 108(433): 581-598.
- Dixon, P. J. 1991. "'Uneasy Lies the Head': Politics, Economics, and the Continuity of Belief among Yoruba of Nigeria." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33(1): 56-85.
- Eade, Deborah. (2004) "International NGOs and Unions in the South: Worlds apart or allies in the Struggle?." *Development in Practice* 14(1&2): 71-84.
- Elaigwu, J. Isawa. 1988. "Nigerian Federalism under Civilian and Military Regimes." *Publius* 18(1): 173-188
- Elaigwu, J.Isawa and Habu Galadima 2003. "The Shadow of Sharia over Nigerian Federalism." *Publius* 33(3): 123-144.
- Falola, Toyin. 1981. "Power Drift in the Political System of Southwestern Nigeria in the 19th Century." *ODU* 21: 109-127.
- _____. 1984. *The Political Economy of a Pre-Colonial African State Ibadan, 1830-1900*. Ile ife: University of Ife Press, Ltd.
- _____. 1991. "Kemi Morgan and the Second Reconstruction of Ibadan History." *History in Africa* 18: 93-112.
- Fourchard, Laurent. 2011. "Between World History and State formation: New Perspectives on Africa's Cities." *The Journal of African History* 52(2): 223-248.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1980. "Development of Crisis and Crisis of Development: Living in the Real World." *Economic and Political Weekly* 15(5/7): 229-231+233+235+237-239+241+243-244.
- Green, Elliott. 2011. "Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda" *Comparative Politics*, 43(4): 421-438.
- Higazi, Adam. 2008. "Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria." *Africa* 78(1): 107-135.

- Hills, Alice. 2008. "The Dialectics of Police Reform in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46(2): 215-234.
- Hoffman, Leena and Insa Nolte. 2013. "The Roots of Neopatrimonialism: Opposition Politics and Popular Consent in Southwest Nigeria", pp. 25-52, in *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: critical Interpretations* edited by Wale Adebani and Ebenezer Obadare Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Human Rights Watch. 2007. *Criminal Politics: Violence, "Godfathers" and Corruption in Nigeria* Vol. 19 No. 16(A) October 2007
- Igwe, Dickson. 2012. "Perception of Electoral Violence and Democratization in Ibadan, Oyo State, Southwestern Nigeria." *Democracy and Security* 8(1): 51-71.
- Ikelegbe, Augustine. 2001. "The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(1): 1-24.
- _____. 2005. "State, Ethnic Militias, and Conflict in Nigeria" *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, 39(3): 490-516.
- Lewis, Peter. 2003. "Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime." *Journal of Democracy* 14(3): 131-144.
- Matti, Stephanie. 2010. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo? Corruption, Patronage, and Competitive Authoritarianism in the DRC." *Africa Today* 56 (4): 42-61.
- Mizuoka, Fujio and Kohei Shimono. 2013. "Capitalist Regulation And Rescaling Of Public Transport Governance: A Case Of Nigeria." *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics* 54 (2): 251-277.
- National Union of Road Transport Workers. 2008. *Constitution and Rules and Regulations* Abuja: National Union of Road Transport Workers
- Nolte, Insa. 2004. "Identity and Violence: the Politics of Youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(1): 61-89.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. 2004. "Citizenship, Political Violence, and Democratization in Africa." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 10(4): 403-409.
- Obi, Cyril I. 2007. "Democratising Nigerian Politics: Transcending the Shadows of Militarism." *Review of African Political Economy* 34(112): 379-384.
- Ogbogbo, C.B.N. 2009. "Historicizing the Legal Framework for Elections In Nigeria." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 18: 42-60.
- Ogunsola, Oladele. 2013. "Situating Folarin, NURTW and 2015 Oyo Politics" *Daily Independent* 1January 2013. Retrieved July 5, 2014 (<http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/01/situating-folarin-nurtw-and-2015-oyo-politics/>)
- Ojedokun, Usman Adekunle. 2014. "Contributing Factors to Police Homicide in Nigeria." *Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles* 87: 41-48.
- Ojie, A.E. 2006. "Democracy, Ethnicity, and the Problem of Extrajudicial Killing in Nigeria" *Journal of Black Studies* 36(4): 546-569.
- Ojo, Emmanuel O. 2009. "Guarding the "Guardians": A Prognosis of Panacea for Evolving Stable Civil—Military Relations in Nigeria." *Armed Forces & Society*

- 35(4): 688-708.
- Ojoawo, Toyin. 2008. *Paraga in Ibadan: A New Trend in Yoruba Herbal Medicine*. An MA Degree Dissertation in Medical Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Okpara, Enoch E. 1988. "The role of touts in passenger transport in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 26(2): 327-335.
- Oladipo, Olubomehin. 2012. "The Nigerian Motor Transporters since the 1920s." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 2(12): 230-237.
- Olley, B.O. 2006. "Social and Health Behaviors in Youth of the Streets Of Ibadan, Nigeria." *Child Abuse Neglect* 30(3): 271-282.
- Omobowale, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa and Akinpelu Olanrewaju Olutayo. 2007. "Chief Lamidi Adedibu and Patronage Politics in Nigeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(3): 425-446.
- Omobowale, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa. 2006. *Political Clientelism and Rural Development in Selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria*. A PhD Thesis in the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria
- _____. 2008. "The Political Instrumentalization of Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic." *The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology* 6: 85-103.
- _____. 2009. "Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century." Pp. 2482-2484, in *International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*, edited by Immanuel Ness. Oxford: Willey-Blackwell Publishing.
- Omobowale, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa and Akinpelu Olanrewaju Olutayo. 2010. "Political Clientelism and Rural Development in South-Western Nigeria." *Africa* 80(3): 453-472.
- Omobowale, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa, Adesoji Oni and Comfort Erima Ugbem. 2012. "A Chronological Explanation of Violence in Nigeria." Pp. 195-212 in *Violence and Abuse in Society: Understanding a Global Crisis*, edited by Angela Browne-Miller Vol 1: Fundamentals, Effects, and Extremes. California: Praeger.
- Omotola, Shola. 2010. "Elections and Democratic Transition In Nigeria Under The Fourth Republic." *African Affairs* 109(437): 535-553.
- Posel, Deborah. 2013. "The ANC Youth League and The Politicization Of Race." *Thesis Eleven* 115(1): 58-76.
- Ratnam, C.S. Venkata. 2007. "Trade Unions and Wider Society." *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, 42(4): 620-651.
- Rizzo, Matteo. 2013. "Informalisation and the End Of Trade Unionism As We Knew It? Dissenting Remarks from a Tanzanian Case Study." *Review of African Political Economy* 40(136): 290-308.
- Robertson, Graeme B. 2004. "Leading Labor: Unions, Politics, and Protest in New Democracies." *Comparative Politics* 36(3): 253-272.
- Robles, Luis de la Calle. 2007. "Fighting for Local Control: Street Violence in the Basque Country." *International Studies Quarterly* 51(2): 431-455.
- Sahara Reporters. 2010. "The Oyo State Killing Fields Claims NURTW Chairman,

- Eleweomo” *Sahara Reporters* 30 December 2013. Retrieved July 5 2014 (<http://saharareporters.com/2010/12/30/oyo-state-killing-fields-claims-nurtw-chairman-eweomo>).
- Sahlins, Marshall D. 1963. “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5(3): 285-303
- Selwyn, Ben. 2009. “Trade Unions and Women’s Empowerment In North-East Brazil.” *Gender and Development* 17(2): 189-201.
- Shaxson, Nicholas. 2007. “Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse.” *International Affairs* 83(6):1123-1140.
- Sitas, Ari. 2004. “Thirty Years since the Durban Strikes: Black Working-Class Leadership and the South African Transition.” *Current Sociology*, 52(5): 830-849.
- Smith, Daniel Jordan. 2004. “The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence, and Political Imagination in Nigeria.” *Cultural Anthropology* 19(3): 429-455.
- _____. 2010. “Corruption, NGOs, and Development in Nigeria.” *Third World Quarterly* 31(2): 243-258.
- Spooner, Dave. 2004. “Trade Unions and NGOs: The Need for Cooperation.” *Development in Practice* 14 (1/2): 19-33.
- Tade, Oludayo. 2011. “Dynastic Struggle and the Peoples Democratic Party in the Post-Adedibu Era in Oyo State, Nigeria.” *Ibadan Journal of the Social Sciences* 9(2): 108-123.
- Ukiwo, U. 2009. “Violence, Identity Mobilization and The Reimagining Of Biafra.” *African Development*. 34(1): 9–30.
- Umukoro, N. 2014. “Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria” *Journal of Developing Societies*, 30 (1): 1-24.
- Watson, Ruth. 2005. *Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan: Ija Igboro Larun Ibadan* Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Wu. Chung-li. 2003. “Local Factions and the Kuomintang in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3(1): 89-111.

AYOKUNLE OLUMUYIWA OMOBOWALE holds a PhD in Sociology. He has won the University of Ibadan Postgraduate School Award for scholarly publication, 2007, IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa) Research Fellowship 2009, American Council of Learned Societies-African Humanities Programme Post-Doctoral Fellowship 2010 and African Studies Association (USA) Presidential Award 2014. He teaches Sociology at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Dr Omobowale was also a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for African Studies, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA in November 2014. He served on the Board of Editors of *International Encyclopaedia of Revolution and Protest* (2009) and he is the author of *The Tokunbo Phenomenon* and *the Second-hand Economy in Nigeria* (2013). [*E-mail:*

ao.omobowale@gmail.com]

OLATOKUNBO ORITSHEWEHINMI FAYIGA holds Master of Art Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. She has special interests in political and electoral systems in Africa, gender and politics, and peace and conflict management in the workplace. [E-mail: toksfayiga@gmail.com]