

Global Risks and Cosmopolitan Citizens in East Asia: A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and Nuclear Power Plant

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This special section is aimed at commemorating Ulrich Beck's legacy of cosmopolitan sociology. Beck's 'methodological cosmopolitanism' sharply distinguished from 'methodological nationalism' is of profound significance over knowledge production in social science from the very assumptions of the world we investigate to the concrete methodological rules of theory construction, data collection, and interpretation. However, his theory is more structural than empirical, as a whole. Thus, this paper attempts to link his theory to social action by distinguishing push and pull factors in cosmopolitan change. This will be followed by an attempt to bring Beck's advocacy of global city as a cosmopolitan actor to a sociological theory of cosmopolitan citizens. A typology of citizens based on social identity will be proposed for this. With these two conceptual clarifications, this paper argues that Beck's cosmopolitan sociology can be fruitfully linked to an empirical theory of cosmopolitan actor. The paper will then examine the moral and ethical issues related to nuclear disaster, particularly nuclear power plant (NPP) and attempt to clarify how the eco-friendly cosmopolitan morality differs from the growth oriented techno-morality inscribed in the development of nuclear technology. The next step is to examine how these two types of morality interact each other in the case of the Fukushima disaster and NPP issues. The major outcomes of empirical analysis will then be presented. The data analysis supports Beck's concept of global city as cosmopolitan actor by demonstrating that Tokyo goes ahead of Seoul and Beijing in terms of strong cosmopolitan morality. Yet the analysis goes beyond Beck by showing that in all the three global cities in East Asia, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, it is Public Citizens (and then Popular Citizens) who are stronger in cosmopolitan morality than other groups. These findings show some salient characteristics of cosmopolitan citizens in East Asia and can be seen as a genuine contribution to Beck's cosmopolitan sociology.

Keywords: cosmopolitan risk community, cosmopolitan morality, techno-morality, action-theoretical approach, Fukushima disaster, public citizens, state citizens

The Aim of Special Section

This special section is aimed at commemorating Ulrich Beck's legacy of cosmopolitan sociology. Beck's 'methodological cosmopolitanism' is sharply distinguished from 'methodological nationalism' and is of profound significance over knowledge production in social science from the very assumptions of the world we investigate to the concrete methodological rules of theory construction, data collection, and interpretation. Cosmopolitan sociology sensitizes our attention to the problems of a nation-centered conventional perspective. Instead, it urges us to pay attention to the densely interlocking transnational movements of occurrences beyond national boundaries. This goes on not only over such public domains as world politics, global NGOs, global economy, commerce, sports and tourism, but also most of our intimate and private life as the family, foods, hobbies, bodies, beauties, and sexuality. To be sure, cosmopolitanism involves complex and diverse orientations depending on issues and perspectives related to bio-politics today (Chandler 2009; Gilbert 2013; Penz 2003; Wapner 1997). Yet Beck's methodological cosmopolitanism, though not yet fully established, suggests that the cosmopolitan paradigm shift is necessary and desirable for social science in general and sociology in particular.

Beck's idea of 'cosmopolitization' may sound to be similar to globalization. But these are not the same because the former breaks away from what we may call a global hegemony often and typically dressed up by the languages of Western universalism. Against this, Beck has defended cosmopolitan pluralities and supported the participation of the excluded radical others. In fact, Beck challenged against all forms of the Western hegemony, Euro-centrism, colonial presumptions as well as a specific form of dominant mentality like 'Germany as Europe.' Furthermore, Beck (2016) was particularly sympathetic to the East Asian pathway of modernity and its potentials. This is why Beck proposed an active dialogue with East Asian sociologists (Han 2015c). Indeed, among living sociologists of the world, nobody has accomplished the role of public intellectual, especially as the pioneer of cosmopolitan sociology, with greater commitment, devotion, and enthusiasm than Beck.

Among many new fields of inquiry inspired by Beck, this special section pays particular attention to the action-theoretical implications of Beck's cosmopolitan sociology. In this sense, the section is distinguished from the previous efforts. For instance, *Current Sociology*, an official journal of International Sociological Association, offered a special section in its January

issue of 2015 to examine diverse implications and potentialities of the concept of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ and ‘metamorphosis’ that Beck proposed in the Seoul International Workshop on climate change in July 2014 (Beck 2015; Han 2015b). *Theory, Culture, and Society* showed a special commemoration section in its annual volume of 2016 with the focus on Beck’s cosmopolitan legacy in Asia (Beck 2016; Han 2016; Han, Shim and Park 2016). Compared with these, this special section is deliberately distinctive by its action-theoretical perspective and empirical researches to upgrade Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology.

To reveal the processes, this section has been explored, planned, and prepared by two commemorative workshops for Beck held in Seoul National University in 2017, the first held in March with the topic of ‘Who are Cosmopolitan Actors? Migration and Risk Governance,’ and the second held in June with the topic of ‘Cosmopolitan Morality and War Memory.’ All presented papers went through several stages of revision along the instructions by the editor of this section. Special efforts have been made to clarify and improve the contribution of each paper to the legacy of Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology. Finally, five papers were selected to be included in *Development and Society*.¹

Cosmopolitan Actor with respect to the 2011 Fukushima Disaster and Nuclear Power Plant

As the organizer of this special section, I start from the recognition that sociology has been deeply interested in the question of agency, that is, the subject of social change. To develop Beck’s cosmopolitan inquiry further, it is then essential to ask: who are the cosmopolitan actors today? To answer to this question, this paper draws attention to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of Japan and the issue of nuclear power plant, because this issue touches upon one of the key problems of global risks that Beck (1992, 1999, 2009) emphasized from the beginning and the need for cosmopolitan morality for its solution. This eco-friendly cosmopolitan morality is deeply contrasted to growth-oriented technocratic morality. Cosmopolitan actor can be empirically identified by asking who goes distinctively ahead of others in

¹ I appreciate the help from my assistant at Seoul National University, Sae-Seul Park, who is now a PhD Student in Organizational Behavior & Theory at Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business in the United States.

terms of this cosmopolitan morality. For this purpose, I will use the 2012 survey data of the citizens of Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo and examine the questions related to the concrete issues of Fukushima nuclear disasters and nuclear power plant.

Beck's theory is more or less structural as a whole. The question then is how to link his structural theory to a theory of social action. The action-theoretical approach is only implicit in Beck. Thus, this paper begins by attempting to find out a reasonable way of linking his theory to social action within his discourse. This will be done by distinguishing push and pull factors in cosmopolitan change. This will be followed by an attempt to bring Beck's advocacy of global city as a cosmopolitan actor to a sociological theory of cosmopolitan citizens. A typology of citizens based on social identity will be proposed for this. With these two conceptual clarifications, this paper argues that Beck's cosmopolitan sociology can be fruitfully linked to an empirical theory of cosmopolitan actor. The paper will then examine the moral and ethical issues related to nuclear disaster, particularly nuclear power plant (NPP) and attempt to clarify how cosmopolitan morality differs from the techno-ethics inscribed in the development of nuclear technology. The next step is to examine how these two types of morality, eco-friendly cosmopolitan morality and growth-oriented techno-morality, are interacting each other in the case of the Fukushima disaster and NPP issues. The major outcomes of empirical analysis will then be presented with respect to the relevance of Beck's theory. The data analysis supports Beck's concept of global city as cosmopolitan actor by demonstrating that Tokyo goes ahead of Seoul and Beijing in terms of strong cosmopolitan morality with respect to NPP issue. Yet the analysis also shows that in all the three global cities in East Asia, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, it is Public Citizens (and then Popular Citizens) who are stronger in cosmopolitan morality than other groups. These findings show some salient characteristics of cosmopolitan citizens in East Asia and can be seen as a genuine contribution to Beck's cosmopolitan sociology.

From Structural Theory to Action Theory

Beck's cosmopolitan sociology, as a structural theory, explains where the main driving force for cosmopolitan change comes from. Basically, he relies on his theory of global risk society. The catastrophic experience of risks, as such, works as a driving force for change. Furthermore, he defines cosmopolitan change to move towards a specific community that he calls

cosmopolitan community of risks. As a concept, cosmopolitan community of risks is indeed imaginative and challenging. The community in question is no longer national but global. The concept reveals the common destiny of humanity threatened by such new civilizational risks as climate change, nuclear radiation leakage, pandemic diseases, global economic crisis, genetically modified organism (GMO), international terrorism, and the growing socio-economic disparity. In this context, one can surely argue, as Beck does emphatically, that we should move forward a cosmopolitan cooperation and solidarity to protect earth from the side effects of new technology, to keep a proactive balanced relation between nature and humanity, and to secure the basic conditions for survival of humanity in the age of global risk society. It is relatively easy to spell out the common tasks and goals to be achieved though practice, real cooperation, is often difficult due to conflicting national interests. As others do, Beck (1999, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2009) pays attention to the cosmopolitan role of politicians, policy makers, NGO leaders, businessmen, experts and scientists as main actors of cosmopolitan cooperation. But what is the role of ordinary citizens in this regard? Beck speaks of global risks and cosmopolitan leaders, but offers no accounts of ordinary actors with their own dispositions, value orientations as well as practical capability of making decision and intervention. Neither a clearly formulated conceptual framework for social action nor a solid empirical research has been offered by Beck.

On the other hand, Beck clearly recognized the importance of an action-theoretical approach to his theory of risk society.

The social theory perspective developed so far must therefore be expanded and concretised in two further steps. First, it is necessary to conceptualise a subject-oriented and action-theoretical perspective of discontinuous societal change in which human beings appear not only as passive addressees of a semi-autonomous reflexive modernisation “from above” but are themselves the centre of attention as actors with their own interpretations, critiques, protests, interventions and plans. A further set of questions must also be put and developed: How is “reflexive modernisation” or “cosmopolitization” produced, which actors with which positions and power chances are involved, which political and cultural technologies [...] are deployed and which lines and dynamics of conflict emerge as a result? We so far mainly raised the question about new forms of society, but we also have to venture asking questions of new forms of belonging (Beck and Grande 2009, p. 23).

Later Beck (2015) suggested a more explicitly formulated conceptual framework that can be used fruitfully to develop an action-theoretical hypothesis.² However, this paper wants to stick to Beck's concept of cosmopolitan risk community and deal with cosmopolitan actor in this context. To go back to the starting point, in a research proposal he formulated in 2012, Beck made it clear that he wanted to develop the concept of cosmopolitan risk community as an extension of Benedict Anderson's concept of nation as an imagined community.

The key concept of cosmopolitan risk communities is extended from the famous work of Benedict Anderson (1983) on the rise of nation-states as 'imagined communities'. As Anderson has shown convincingly, the conscious recognition of the fact that one is living through similar experiences and events, and is affected in common with others, formed the original basis of nationalism as a powerful social force. Most citizens of nation-states will never meet face-to-face; nevertheless, they come to share freedoms and responsibilities, past memories and future destinies. Anderson reserved the notion of 'imagined communities' for national constructs. My concern in this project, however, is with the following question: how can we turn the concept of 'imagined cosmopolitan risk communities' into a strong explanatory tool for the social, economic and political consequences of climate change? (Beck 2012, p. 3)

The key point here is the role of shared imagination. People do not meet and talk to each other directly but share imaginations including desires, aspirations, and ideology as the common basis of community. Needless to say, there were many structural forces, conflicts, contradictions operating at the basis of the formation of nation state. But Beck takes from Anderson that these structural factors are not enough. There must be something more which link people together in emotion and feeling. Culture and institutions work for this, for instance. Nation protects citizens by the legal entitlement of citizenship and welfare institutions. Citizens' sense of belonging is nurtured by the common language, the mass media, history textbooks and cultural tradition. As a rule, community presupposes a boundary. Community protects the insider from risks and danger while excluding the outsiders. Now we are living not only in

² Shim's paper in this special section is a good example of this empirical research hinging on Beck's suggestion of three components of action transformation. Beck originally suggested it in his Seoul public lecture in 2014.

the age of nation state but in a global risk society. We face the new types of risks transcending the national borders, as exemplified by climate change, economic polarization, and pandemic diseases. These types of risks affect everyone around the globe. The long-term catastrophic effects of nuclear radiation leakage, for instance, escape the traditional framework of risk management. How to respond to such global risks we face requires cosmopolitan cooperation and governance. Beck (2000b, 2006, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) thus stood up to talk and defend the idea of cosmopolitan risk community as an imagined community.

Starting from this observation, this paper attempts to distinguish explicitly two types of driving force of cosmopolitan change. As <Figure 1> shows, one is the push factor, another is the pull factor. The push factor is often 'negative,' forcing the actors to exit. It drives the actors to escape from the harsh reality they confront. In contrast, the pull factor is often 'active,' inviting the actors to hope, dream or vision towards an imagined better future (Han and Shim 2010, pp. 478-481; Beck and Grande 2010, pp. 432-434). To repeat, the push factor usually works behind the actors enforcing them to get out of the danger and risks threatening their life. Examples are the experienced or anticipated fear, anxiety, despair, frustration, deprivation, isolation, and catastrophe. Beck's theory of risk society offers good explanation with abundant examples for this driving force. However, the pull factor differs from the push factor since the former usually works in front of the actors providing motivation to move forward towards a better future. What is important for pulling is not simply anger and frustration but hope, aspiration, desire, ideology, and morality. In the case of nation, nationalism as a pull factor was strong and influential, as Beck correctly pointed out. We can then say that cosmopolitan change presupposes cosmopolitan ideology and outlook as a pull factor.

Cosmopolitan pull factor may work in some areas. An example is the area of human rights as global values. Yet human rights can be manipulated as political instruments in the global power politics. World government or cosmopolitan cooperation is still in the initial stage of formation, with far less binding effects than nationalism in the age of nation state. This is probably why Beck puts far more emphasis on the structural driving force, that is, push factor than pull factor. According to him, cosmopolitan change is, in fact, taking place far more broadly and deeply than commonly recognized, as a necessity caused by unavoidable forces. Whether we recognize it or not, independent of how we adjust ourselves to this trend, we are impelled to




FIG. 1.—Action-theoretical Model

follow it to survive.³

This argument, though forceful sometimes, fails to provide a good answer to the pull factor of cosmopolitan change. For instance, the idea of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Levy and Sznajder 2004, p. 145) means that certain values coming from philosophy have become “emotionally compelling in people’s everyday lives.” This is so because human rights against ‘Holocaust,’ for example, have been firmly institutionalized, shared, and practiced in politics and education. Cosmopolitan ideology can then become a political force. Though this is a good example of cosmopolitan morality in working, we need to formulate an action-theoretical perspective combining push and pull factors more systematically at the level of theory of action.

From Global City to Cosmopolitan Actor

Another key to Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology lies in his concept of global

³ Beck speaks of ‘cosmopolitan imperative’ such as “global imperatives, pressures, and constraints” Beck & Grande 2010, p. 413). “These new global risks have at least two consequences: firstly, they mix the ‘native’ with the ‘foreign’ and create an everyday global awareness; and secondly therefore, they create chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens, which alter the nature and dynamics of territorially defined governance systems” (417). Beck even stated later that we may need to “abandon the widespread assumption in the social sciences that community building is possible only on the basis of *positive* integration through shared values and norms. Instead, it supports the thesis that another form of community building is also possible, one which arises in the course of conflicts over *negative* values (crises, risks, threats of annihilation) – the thesis of emancipatory catastrophism” (Beck and Blok 2014, p. 5).

cities as a cosmopolitan actor. Beck originally formulated this idea in the Seoul workshop in July 2014 (Han 2015a) and proposed it during the dialogue with Mayor of Seoul, Park Wonsoo

“All of the common problems faced by East Asia have already come to light. Nations are interconnected...but they confront each other over historical problems. If they fail to give birth to the union of Asia, then there is no reason why (Asian) cities can't take over...Cities such as Seoul can move towards a model of 'United Cities,' rather than Nations. Cities are now becoming cosmopolitan and 'global' megacities are becoming ever-more cosmopolitized...this is a starting point for intercity cooperation.”

Beck then attempted to conceptualize this idea and offered it as a joint paper and presented in the Paris workshop in December, 2014

In the face of global and cosmopolitan risks states remain locked in the fiction of egoistic sovereignty and fail. Cities, however, are not locked into the fiction of the national container. On the contrary, historically they often held an autonomous position. Faced with global risks they are more open for cooperative cosmopolitan politics. As a consequence, the relationship between states and cities reverses. Cities turn into pioneers, which take up the challenge of cosmopolitan modernity as an experiment to find answers to the world at risk. Hence, the framing of cities as cosmopolitan actor sheds light on the metamorphosis of international relations and as well as international law-making (Beck and Blok 2014, p. 1).

Here the key points are global city as a cosmopolitan actor and the metamorphosis of global city as transformer of international politics. International treaty, commerce and diplomatic negotiation have been usually monopolized by nation state. However, cities, particularly global cities, have become more and more capable of an independent actor in formulating global policies, negotiating regional or international treaties, and pursuing inter-cities cooperation. Beck viewed these tendencies as an instance of the metamorphosis of international politics. To be sure, a global city shows complex relationships involving history, geography, political leadership and institutions, economic enterprises, international trade and relations. It is also possible to measure the extent of the cosmopolitan capacity of a city by the combination of accumulated indicators (Blok and Tschötschel 2015). Though the concrete relationship between state and cities may differ from one

country to another, there seem to be good reasons for Beck to treat global city as cosmopolitan actor.

However, I argue from an action-theoretical perspective that it is not enough to compare city by city as an aggregated variable. We need to go down to the grassroots level to find out the cosmopolitan citizens: who are they, how large they are, and how do they differ from other groups? In other word, the key question lies in the cosmopolitan capacities of citizens. It is from this perspective that this paper takes a bottom-up (citizens-oriented) approach to cosmopolitan change. We need to show salient characteristics of cosmopolitan citizens by empirical data rather than assuming a city as a cosmopolitan actor. The main question to be asked is why citizens see the problem as they do, and why they act in the specific way as they choose. We need to present citizens as concrete actors. We believe that Beck's idea of city as cosmopolitan actor can be meaningfully (and perhaps better) realized by focusing on citizens' morality and capacity. This strategy of research differs from a top-down approach which assumes city government or political elites to be the main actor. Distinguished from this, a bottom-up approach treats citizens as the main actor of cognitive assessment, moral reasoning, and participatory involvement.

The key question that we face then is how to construct and distinguish the types of citizens with good explanatory power. To make it short, in this paper, I want to distinguish citizens in terms of social identity as a social construction (Han 2009, 2010).⁴ Social identity is neither objective as income and occupation nor subjective as intention and consciousness. In contrast, it is social in the sense that it is shaped through social communication. Starting from this theoretical position, this paper takes a specific strategy of viewing social identity as a combined effect of two main variables: socio-economic status and socio-political position. The first variable, the socio-economic status, means whether one holds the identity of the middle class or not. The formation of this identity is subject to social construction because the public perception of the middle class varies from one period to another depending on many factors. When a country is growing economically, people tend to regard themselves as part of the increasing middle class while keeping a low threshold to it. When they face economic downturn, they tend to consider themselves being closer to the low class. The profile of the middle class is

⁴ The identity approach to social actor and social class as well has been extensively used in Korea based on the experience of social movement and democratization during the 1980s (Han 2009). This strategy has also been tested in China (Han 2010) and this approach has turned out to yield high explanatory power over many issues of socio-political significance.




FIG. 2.—Construction of Social Identities

shaped by the force of social construction.

The second socio-political variable refers to the relationship between citizens and the state. In East Asia, the state has operated as the principal pace keeper of modernization. The trajectories of economic development, class formation, and political institutionalization have all been shaped to a great extent by the leading role of the authoritarian state and the political elites who have controlled it. This process of state-centered development has brought about two contradictory consequences. One is the remarkable success in economic growth. Another is the dark side of complex risk society. For this reason, it has become an open question how citizens see the state. Some may continue to follow it while others turn away from it. Thus the key point is whether citizens hold a government-first attitude or a citizen-first attitude, when they view important public policies affecting their life.

The combination of these two axes offers four types of citizens with distinguishable identities, as <Figure 2> and <Table 1> show. They are “Public Citizens,” “State Citizens,” “Popular Citizens,” and “Welfare Citizens.” The first ‘Public Citizen’ refers to those who embrace the middle class identity and the citizens-first position.⁵ An important point is that in East

⁵ The identity terms have changed, though. Originally, the public citizens were named the ‘middling grassroots’ meaning that they are the grassroots (people-oriented) segment of the rapidly emerging middle class (Han 1997, 2001). Thus, the classification of the types of citizens suggested here reflects an evolutionary transformation of conceptual strategy of action research in the process

Asia, particularly in China and Korea, the concept of 'public' has been long recognized as distinguished from the concept of 'bureaucratic,' that is state power. For this reason, there has been many intellectual disputes with the moral claim to defend public interest against state power often giving rise to the national conscience resisting against the misuse of power by emperor (king), the bureaucratic corruption as well as the invasion of foreign armies. They have led public opinion by raising national issues such as justice, independence, liberation, and people's rights. Sometimes, public interests were articulated in a sharp distinction from state interests narrowly defined by bureaucrats and power-holder. Based on this tradition still alive with appealing force in East Asia (Han 2002), it is possible to extend the concept of public intellectual to the concept of public citizens and even further to 'Public Sociology' (Burawoy 2005).

The second 'State Citizen' refers to those who combine the middle class identity and the government-first position. More often than not, they represent the mainstream of the society, shaping official discourses in support for government policies while prioritizing stability to change. For this reason, in China, they are often described as "Stabilizer" as the main beneficiary of economic development in a close affiliation with state power. I want to call them "State Citizens" aptly capturing their deep mentality of placing the state at the center of historical change.

The third 'Popular Citizen' refers to those who combine the low class identity and the citizens-first position. They are less benefited from economic development than the middle class and more capable of demonstrating a bottom-up challenge to the status quo. They are more inclined to act collectively than Public Citizens who prefer discursive deliberation and testing. They understand themselves as an active subject for social transformation rather than being dependent on the authority of the state.

The last 'Welfare Citizen' refers to those who combine the low class identity and government-first position. They are usually poor with high sense of insecurity and anxiety, but with low trust on social movement. Their life, in fact, depends on the welfare provisions by the government. In this sense, they tend to continue to place the state at the center of all national development and, therefore, they tend to follow and support government decisions.

This typology of citizens will be used in this paper to examine which type of actors are more cosmopolitan measured by their responses to the

of social change during the last 30 years.

TABLE 1
A TYPOLOGY OF CITIZENS

		<i>Socio-political Position</i>	
		Citizen-oriented	Government-oriented
<i>Socio-economic</i>	Middle Class	Public Citizens	State Citizens
<i>Status</i>	Low Class	Popular Citizens	Welfare Citizens

questions related to the 2011 Fukushima disaster and the issue of nuclear power plant. This paper takes Beck's concept of global city as cosmopolitan actor and goes further to identify cosmopolitan citizens by empirical indicators.

The Historical Context of the Fukushima Disaster

The Fukushima nuclear radiation disaster on March 11, 2011 is the second largest nuclear power plant accident after the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. As the first severe accident of a nuclear power station on the coast, a catastrophic disaster was triggered by a large earthquake and tsunami. Because the uncontrolled situation of the melted-down reactors continued for long, scientists and the public at large were deeply worried about serious contamination of seawater and damages to the ecosystem (Perro 2011; Lee 2014; Kang 2014; Kim and Kim 2013). It sparked off not only hot global worries but also deep concern about the future of nuclear energy and power plant (Funabashi 2012; Hasegawa 2012). It was shocking that a large amount of radioactive materials was released due to meltdown and explosions and that many people, around 150 000, left home to be evacuated by government order or by their own choice (Hasegawa 2012). Thus, it became an explosive political and social movement issue (Kushida 2012; Hamanshi 2012; Suzuki 2014).

Although the disaster was set off by natural disasters (earthquake followed by tsunami), the Fukushima disaster itself is a manmade calamity, as can be seen in the technological and systematic failures that led to the disaster (Funabashi 2012). This accident was a human disaster for which the related electric company and the national government were responsible. A series of "underestimates," such as that of the height of a possible tsunami, contributed to this catastrophic disaster. A lot of confusing and misleading

information, along with the deliberate concealment of information and delay in information disclosure occurred. The so-called “Atomic Circle,” a closed relationship between politicians, government, academics, industry and the media, operated behind this accident (Hasegawa 2012).

According to the Japanese Police Agency the number of the missing and the dead after the 3.11 accident amounted to 18,000. With 7,197 people died, and 10,905 missing. And many of the missing are believed to have died (*E-News Today*, March 20, 2011). The official number of the dead of this earthquake is the greatest since the war, outnumbering the number of the dead in Kobe earthquake of 1995 (6,434 people). And the Japanese government estimated the direct damage as 16,900 billion Yen (about 226 billion US \$) without including the damage from the nuclear power plant accident. And the people evacuated from the site of disaster suffered from refuge life and from such aftermath as depression, alcoholism, and suicide increase (Kang 2014; Lee 2014).

The relations between atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and the construction of nuclear power plants deserve attention too. Despite the Hiroshima nightmare, nuclear budget was passed in the lower house in 1954, de-facto authorizing the official development of nuclear research and industry. Nuclear Committee was formed in the Cabinet in 1957 and Ministry of Science and Technology was established in 1957 as a political push towards nuclear industry. An ironical consensus since 1960s was that nuclear energy can be used to promote peace. Yet the fact is that the atom bombs disaster in 1945 resulted in huge innocent victims, and the 2011 Fukushima catastrophe brought about huge sufferings via radiation exposure and environment contamination. Sensitized by danger of atom bomb, Japan pledged not to make a mistake again in the monument in Hiroshima. But Japan has deliberately chosen the road to build nuclear power. Why has Japan taken the pathway towards nuclearization of the country?

Nomiya (2012, 2013) offers an explanation why and how the Japanese discourses on nuclear issue has been transformed from a negative to a positive frame. In late 1940s, the social construction of nuclear issue was framed by fear and untouchable, but it began to change from the mid-1950s by reinterpreting nuclear research as a legitimate and justifiable policy. Nuclear development began to be seen as a source of happiness, comfortable life, and progress. Tour programs to nuclear power plant began to be organized in 1969 with ten thousand visitors every month. Uranium and radium was presented as healthy materials as exemplified by such advertisements as uranium vegetables, uranium drink, uranium bath, radium

hot spring, and radium wine, etc. However, the 2011 Fukushima disaster destroyed this mentality, forcing the public to reconsider the hidden connection of atom bomb and nuclear energy from the perspective of global risks.

Beck's Theory of Global Risks and Cosmopolitan Morality

The 2011 Fukushima catastrophe offers a good example to investigate the influence and relevance of Beck's theory of global risks as well as cosmopolitan morality. Beck gained recognition in Japan with the translation of his book *Risk Society* (Ito and Suzuki 2009) backed up by the increasing social awareness about environmental risks in Japan. Later on, his concept of individualization became increasingly popular since the early 2000s. Beck became particularly prominent in the Japanese public with his interview on May 13, 2011 with the *Asahi Shimbun* which was titled as "Truth of the Nuclear Accident." He urged Japanese citizens to get involved to prevent industry and professionals from monopolizing decisions.

We can raise the issue of cosmopolitan actor in this context. How can we define cosmopolitan actor in the case of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster? The conventional approach is rather reactive by and large. It pays attention to the humanitarian concern over the pains and sacrifices caused by disasters. Wherever such disaster takes place, and however remote victims live, we are linked by a cosmopolitan solidarity if, and to the extent to which we help victims and respond to their urgent needs. Examples are joining in a civic campaign designed to offer relief fund or voluntary emergency service. In the case of the Fukushima disaster, considerable citizens of Seoul and Beijing joined in humanitarian activities of a cosmopolitan kind.

However, this paper is interested in the proactive dimension of cosmopolitan morality. Proactive means that citizens are not only reactive to the disaster by helping the victims, but attempt to prevent its reoccurrence by addressing to the root causes of the problem, namely nuclear power plant. In this respect, two contrasting approaches are conceivable with different foci and impacts. One is a technocratic approach to risk management. Backed up by the world view like Anthropocene and the progress in nuclear energy technology and geo-engineering, this approach argues that all man-made disasters like the Fukushima catastrophe can be reasonably diagnosed and managed by upgrading the capacity of technical prediction and control.

However, as Andrianov et al. (2015, p. 1004) demonstrate, the opinions

on nuclear power technology have become increasingly polarized, “with the public (including policy-makers) clustered at one extreme and the representatives of the nuclear sector clustered at the other”.

The majority of policy-makers, including those from nuclear countries, non-governmental ecological organizations, and some other social movements, believe that the conclusions and recommendations of nuclear specialists cannot be trusted and hence oppose nuclear power in both the immediate and medium-term futures.

In contrast, most representatives of the nuclear sector, whether involved in science or industry, strongly believe that nuclear power is both feasible and necessary. Specifically, they perceive nuclear power as the only solution to the problem of providing humanity with a sustainable energy supply, particularly given the various global and local ecological problems (Andrianov et al. 2015, p. 1004)

An important point that the development of nuclear technology involves ethical and moral dimensions, not just technic and science. Techno-ethic captured by codes of conduct has been extensively discussed to contribute to making engineers and technologists more socially responsible (Andrianov et al. 2015, p. 1003). Among five constraining factors to the large-scale development of nuclear technology, which include “safety, the threat of unauthorized nuclear material and technology proliferation, radioactive waste management, commercial efficiency, and limited natural nuclear fuel resources” (p. 1004), perhaps, the first three are more influential in shaping the public perception of global risks. In this context, professional organizations like American Nuclear Society (ANS) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have elaborated professional code of ethics to improve the contribution of nuclear technology to human welfare and preserving environment.

Professional behavior is assessed in terms of following values: community safety, health, and welfare; timely public notification of possible negative consequences of planned actions; support of those guided by similar principles of behavior; only providing services that ANS members have competence in; publicity; continuous professional development; fair treatment of customers; fair competition with the producers of similar goods; condemnation of bribery and unauthorized coercion; and openness to criticism (Code of Ethics of ANS). Finally, ANS members commit to

accept responsibility for their actions. The ANS Code of Ethics thus contains a promise to be motivated by a score of positive values, and refers to the ethics of responsibility as applied to human activities in the field of nuclear technologies (p. 1010)

Despite all these efforts to bring and improve code of ethics in the field of nuclear technology, it is true that these efforts represent technological approach combined with professional morality. According to that position, whatever the problem we might have, “the necessary solutions lie just over the scientific horizon. Human beings have an extraordinary capability for innovation,” and, therefore, we should not underestimate “its promise in the face of environmental challenges.” This outlook expressed in geo-engineering and Anthropocene (Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Hamilton 2014) recognizes the challenge of global risks to human survival. Conflict is unavoidable with respect to risk governance (Lidskog 2005; Krupa 2012; Stirling 2014). As Asayama (2015) points out, the expert often seeks ‘techno-fix’ to keep society unchanged preferring business-as-usual strategy rather than pursuing the renewal of modernity. The technocratic rationality is strong in calculating the costs and benefits. It is more concerned with perfecting means than defending ends themselves. So one can say that technological approach is void of meaning. Yet it is also deeply concerned with human safety and welfare. Perhaps, the best example of such techno-moral decision can be found in the experiment of Finland in building a system of spiraling underground tunnels to store nuclear waste. With four operating nuclear plants and a fifth under construction (World Nuclear News 2012), this experiment perhaps shows the technically most advanced way of taking responsibility for nuclear safety.

This paper wants to explore a cosmopolitan eco-friendly morality within the context of nuclear radiation release epitomized by the Fukushima disaster. Deliberation is required because the production of nuclear waste, for instance, contributes to serious environmental degradation whose consequences extend into the future. Beck’s cosmopolitan morality is addressed to the concept of the otherness and difference. The otherness includes ecological nature, the future generation, and the excluded minorities. Cosmopolitan morality means the capacity of taking responsibility not just for those who live today and are visible, but also for those who will live on the globe and remain excluded and thus not visible. Cosmopolitan morality calls for ecological citizenship against the negative side effects of technological development (Chandler 2009; Penz 2003;

Wapner 1997). It also asks about what burdens we are willing to take on for the sake of future generations. This type of morality is less instrumental and more dialogically open, ecologically sensitive, and democratic (Gilbert 2013; Hashimoto 2015).

Based on this discussion, we can develop and apply two types of morality to the issue of nuclear power plant. One is the techno-morality based on scientific calculation, control and professional code of ethics. It hinges on the belief in the systemic competence in terms of the professional codes of conduct among experts and scientists. Indeed, the current Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe endorsed building more nuclear power plants even as Fukushima plants continued to release its radioactive contamination. He also asserted that the new nuclear reactors will be completely different from those at Fukushima on the basis of the belief in the type of technocratic rationality and morality. In contrast to this, the cosmopolitan morality raises the question, even in the case of Finland's experiment, whether and to what extent the deep geological repository may bring out great dangers to future generations (see Spector 2015), given the invisible nature of radioactive danger which is "neither tangible nor conscious of its own lethal doings." This moral position differs from the technocratic approach by its emphasis on environmental justice and the citizens' engagement in risk definition and governance rather than relying on the role of experts.

In addition, the technocratic morality expressed in the expert's code of conduct is deeply concerned with how to secure energy as an indispensable condition for economic growth. This reasoning supports the increase of the nuclear power plant. We can call it "growth-oriented techno-morality." In contrast, the cosmopolitan morality is concerned with ecological sustainability and future generation and is likely to lead to the decrease or the shutdown of nuclear power plant as part of the world disarmament goal. We can call it "Eco-friendly Cosmo-Morality."

Empirical Research

The empirical data used for this analysis is the citizens' survey data of Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo in 2012. The question we face is how to measure the extent of eco-friendly cosmopolitan morality and growth-oriented technocratic morality by the citizens' response to the issues of nuclear power plant (NPP). One axis of measurement is concerned about the safety of NPP. Another axis of measurement is about the policy option whether NPP should be increased

TABLE 2
FOUR TYPES OF PROACTIVE MORALITY

		Safety of Nuclear Power Plant	
		Agree	Disagree
The increase of Nuclear Power Plant	Agree	Growth-oriented strong Techno-morality	Growth-oriented moderate Techno-morality
	Disagree	Eco-friendly moderate Cosmo-morality	Eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality

or decreased.⁶ The combination of these two axes yields 4 moral positions, that is, growth-oriented strong Techno-morality, growth-oriented moderate Techno-morality, eco-friendly moderate Cosmo-morality, and eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality. We then examine how the types of citizens suggested in <Table 1> are related to the types of morality distinguished above.

Data analysis shows that growth-oriented strong techno-morality occupies 41.0 percentages of all the citizens from the three metropolitan cities in East Asia. Yet the internal difference is conspicuous. It occupies as much as 76.9 percentages in Beijing whereas it does only 12.7 percentages in Tokyo. In turn, eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality occupies 37.6 percentages of the citizens of three capital cities. It occupies as much as 68.5 percentages in Tokyo whereas it is only about 5.7 percentages in Beijing. The citizens of Beijing and Tokyo are so remarkably contrasting from each other that social support to the nuclear power plant construction is incomparably strong in Beijing while it is almost negligible in Tokyo. Beijing citizens tend to accept both the safety and construction of nuclear power plant by absolute majority. These figures significant differ from Seoul and Tokyo as well, as can be seen in <Table 3>. By and large, if we see three cities as a whole, the size of strong

⁶ The citizens survey was conducted in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo about one year after the Fukushima disaster. The public concern about the future of nuclear power plant was acute. In this context, two questions were chosen to measure the extent of the public trust on the technocratic management. One question was “How do you think about the safety of the NPP operating in our country?” and another was “How do you think about the opinion that NPP should be increased in our country?” Those who consider NPP “very safe” or “more or less safe” and agree with the opinion either “strongly” or “relatively” can be interpreted to endorse techno-professional solution and the morality built into it. On the contrary, those who consider NPP “very risky” or “more or less risky” and disagree with the opinion either “strongly” or “relatively” can be interpreted as supporting other development than NPP which is more concerned with ecology than growth. This paper interprets this outlook implies, at least, a cosmo-morality which differs from a techno-morality significantly.

TABLE 3
FOUR TYPES OF PROACTIVE MORALITY BY THREE CITIES (%)

Types of morality	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo	Total	Chi-square
Strong Techno-morality	32.4	76.9	12.7	41.0	588.023***
Moderate Techno-morality	9.8	4.1	5.4	6.4	
Moderate Cosmo-morality	18.9	13.3	13.3	15.1	
Strong Cosmo-morality	38.9	5.7	68.5	37.6	




FIG. 3.—Four Types of Proactive Morality by three Cities (%)

techno-morality and strong Cosmo-morality is about the same. But their distribution into the three cities are conspicuously different. Based on this analysis, we can say that the capacity of Tokyo as cosmopolitan actor is the greatest in Tokyo, the middle in Seoul, and the lowest in Beijing.

Furthermore, a close relationship between the types of proactive morality and the types of citizens has been found. In Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo alike, the State Citizens go ahead of Public Citizens significantly in accepting the safety and the construction of nuclear power plant. Popular Citizens show the same tendency compared with Welfare Citizens in whichever cities they live. <Table 4> demonstrates that State Citizens and Welfare Citizens are equipped with growth-oriented strong techno-morality, whereas Public Citizens and Popular Citizens possess eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality. This shows that together with cities, social identities have an important explanatory power over the issue of nuclear energy plant and

TABLE 4
TYPES OF PROACTIVE MORALITY BY SOCIAL IDENTITIES (%)

Types of morality	Public Citizens	Popular Citizens	State Citizens	Welfare Citizens	total	Chi-square
Strong Techno-morality	26.8	34.1	63.3	72.4	42.0(639)	
Moderate Techno-morality	6.0	8.9	5.2	4.1	6.3(96)	232.032 ***
Moderate Cosmo-morality	17.0	15.4	14.9	11.1	15.4(234)	
Strong Cosmo-morality	50.2	41.6	16.6	12.4	36.3(553)	

the possibility of cosmopolitan transformation.

We can confirm here that regardless of cities, Public Citizens and Popular Citizens possess far greater Cosmo-morality than State Citizens and Welfare Citizens. On the other hand, regardless of cities, State Citizens and Welfare Citizens possess far greater Techno-morality than Public Citizens and Popular Citizens. Difference by social identities is most remarkable in Seoul. For instance, eco-friendly Cosmo-morality is incomparably high among Public Citizens (44.4 percentages) and Popular Citizens (51.7 percentages) compared with State Citizens (16.7 percentages) and Welfare Citizens (15.8 percentages). Difference by social identities in Beijing and Tokyo is also significant but not as remarkable as in Seoul.

The implications of these findings are as follows. First, Tokyo goes ahead of Seoul and Beijing in terms of cosmopolitan capacity of city as cosmopolitan actor. Second, the Public Citizens are far more capable of acting as a cosmopolitan actor than the State Citizens. Third, in the same way, Popular Citizens are more capable of acting as a cosmopolitan actor than the Welfare Citizens throughout East Asia cutting across national boundaries. Fourth, with respect to the role of the Public Citizens and Popular Citizens, Seoul goes ahead of Tokyo and Beijing. Fourth, in Seoul, eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality is found to be most influential in the cohort groups of the 30's and the 40's, whereas the younger generation like the 20's is more inclined toward moderate Cosmo-morality. In contrast, the cohort groups of the 50's and above are equipped with growth-oriented strong Techno-morality.

The characteristics of Tokyo citizens in terms of cohort groups look quite different. The young generation like the 20's appears to be significantly more inclined to strong or moderate Techno-morality, which is very different from Seoul. The old generation like the 50's and above tends to support eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality. The cohort groups of the 30's and 40's are inclined to moderate Cosmo-morality.

Finally, the result of ordinal logistic regression analysis reveals the following tendencies. This analysis attempts to test the eco-friendly strong Cosmo-morality against the growth-oriented strong techno-morality in terms of the independent variables suggested in <table 5>. In the case of independent variables with ordinal scale, table specifies which category is chosen as reference.

The outcomes are as follows:

- 1) As to gender, the eco-friendly Cosmo-morality is twice stronger among female than men: This is pretty reliable.
- 2) As to age, cohort groups have no independent influence on the Cosmo-morality.
- 3) As to education, it has been proven that the level of education has no independent influence on this issue.
- 4) As to the status of employment, as compared with unemployed and no job, those with regular job and irregular job show far stronger Cosmo-morality (more than three times). Yet reliability is relatively low.
- 5) As to occupation, compared with the manual workers and others, the listed categories of occupation such as professional, managers, the white collars, sales, services, etc. show far less Cosmo-morality. Yet reliability is relatively low.
- 6) As to social identities, Public Citizens and Popular Citizens are far stronger than their counterparts in holding eco-friendly Cosmo-morality. This outcome is very reliable.
- 7) As to push factor-1, it has been proven that the higher the perceived danger of transnational risks is, the slightly stronger Cosmo-morality is. This outcome is very reliable.
- 8) As to push factor-2, the perceived danger of risks in the future compared with the present has no independent influence on the issue.
- 9) As to pull factor-1, those with unconditional care show twice stronger eco-friendly Cosmo-morality, compared with those with retributive justice. This result is pretty reliable.⁷

⁷ Unconditional care means the sympathetic attitude to the Japanese victims of atom bombs

TABLE 5
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Independent variable		Dependent variable			
		Eco-friendly Cosmo-morality			
		β	S.E	Wald	OR
Gender (female as reference)		-0.65	0.21	9.43**	0.52
Age		0.07	0.08	0.73	1.07
Education	graduate school(ref.)				
	High school and below	-0.22	0.40	0.32	0.80
	Professional college	0.45	0.41	1.20	1.57
	University	0.38	0.35	1.14	1.46
Employment	Unemployment & etc.(ref.)				
	Regular job	1.37	0.60	5.30*	3.95
	Irregular job	1.31	0.59	5.00*	3.71
Occupation	worker(ref.)				
	Managerial-professional	-1.31	0.63	4.33*	0.27
	White-collar, technical job	-1.47	0.61	5.76*	0.23
	Sales, services	-1.47	0.58	6.34*	0.23
Social Identities	Welfare Citizens (ref.)				
	Public Citizens	1.33	0.33	16.04***	3.79
	State Citizens	-0.09	0.40	0.06	0.91
	Popular Citizens	1.42	0.34	17.55***	4.13
Push factor-1	perceived risk index	0.04	0.01	50.20***	1.04
Push factor-2	Perceived future risk	0.08	0.10	0.75	1.09
Pull factor-1	Retributive justice (ref.)				
	Unconditional care	0.60	0.23	6.94**	1.82
	Contextualized care	-0.29	0.36	0.66	0.75
	Soft-line justice	-0.66	0.29	5.23*	0.52
Pull factor-2	No future participation (ref.)				
	Participation confirmed	0.00	0.36	0.00	1.00
	Future participation likely	-0.03	0.34	0.01	0.97
-2LL			695.395		
Model chi-square			258.942***		
Accuracy (%)			78.9%		

Note: *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001

regardless whether Japan fully recognizes the crime of its past imperial aggression or not.

- 10) As to pull factor-2, the variable of participation has no independent influence on the issue.

Discussion

The above findings yield the following observations:

- 1) Beck's concept of global city as cosmopolitan actor can be supported in the cases of Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo by significantly different degree. Related to the nuclear radiation disaster epitomized by the Fukushima catastrophe, Tokyo goes in the forefront, Seoul in the middle, and Beijing in the behind of cosmopolitan transformation. Thus, the capacity of these global cities as cosmopolitan actor may vary.
- 2) Cosmopolitan actor has something crucial to do with social identities used in this study. Independent of cities, Public Citizens and Popular Citizens are found to possess far greater eco-friendly Cosmo-morality than their counterparts and, hence, far greater potential for cosmopolitan act and solidarity. These finding may contribute to Beck's theory of cosmopolitan community in terms of action-theoretical empirical analysis.
- 3) These findings also lead us to ask about social identities in more detail since ordinal logistic regression analysis clearly showed that the independent influence of social identities is clear with high reliability. First of all, the size of social identities varies significantly depending on cities. Public Citizens are the largest in Tokyo occupying as much as 65.2 percentages of city population, with Seoul in the middle (43.0 percentages) followed by Beijing (22.1 percentages). This can be interpreted as related to the stage of reflexive modernization. In contrast, State Citizens are the largest in Beijing occupying 26.8 percentages, with Seoul in the middle (16.4 percentages) followed by Tokyo (12.9 percentages).
- 4) The demographic profile of social identities also deserve attention. Overall, Public Citizens tend to increase as age becomes younger and the level of education becomes higher. Yet the situation seems to vary from one city to another. This tendency is most distinctive in Seoul with respect to age and in Beijing with respect to education. In Beijing, Public Citizens and Popular Citizens are found more among regular jobs whereas Welfare Citizens are found more among irregular or part jobs.
- 5) More interesting is the fact that throughout Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo

Public Citizens and Popular Citizens, particularly the latter, show a consistent and clear-cut tendency of expressing frustration, and thus becoming more critical of the various aspects of social injustice built into the systems of status quo. The formative process of this identity is not uniform, though. In Korea, the identity of Public Citizens grew sharply during the 1980's when the country went through the process of political democratization. In China, too, considerable attention has been drawn to the role of the middle class along the process of economic development. Yet it remains to be seen what role they will play in shaping the future of China.

Concluding Remarks on the Special Section

Beck's cosmopolitan sociology is full of new vision and imagination. This paper has attempted to put his concept of cosmopolitan actor into empirical testing by way of introducing an action-theoretical perspective and the concept of cosmopolitan morality distinguished from growth-oriented techno-morality. This paper has attempted to bring Beck's concept of global city as cosmopolitan actor into an empirical research to identify the citizens who can be properly called cosmopolitan.

Nevertheless, this paper leaves a few key questions for further research. First, it remains to be investigated how different types of morality are interacting each other in the process of cosmopolitan change and community formation. A more careful and rigorous conceptualization and data analysis is required to shed a new light on this important area of study. Second, based on the analysis and demographic profiles of social identities investigated in this paper, further efforts are necessary to grasp the process and mechanism of cosmopolitan transformation in terms of human actors more fully in East Asia.

Granted that, I would like to conclude with a few final observations about where East Asia stands today. The majority of the citizens of the three capital cities (67.9 percentages) agree that East Asia represents the region in the world where a catch-up modernization has taken place most successfully. These citizens are as large as 84.2 percentages in Seoul, 61.1 percentages in Beijing, and 59.4 percentages in Tokyo. On the other hand, the absolute majority of the citizens of the three cities also think that as a consequence of rapid development they face today complex risks and side-effects of rapid development threatening their everyday life. As a whole, this opinion

occupies as much as 88.8 percentages. This figure is particularly high in Seoul (93.0 percentages). Overall, the public perception of risk society is very high and distinctive in East Asia. Furthermore, concerning the future of East Asia, the absolute majority of citizens of the three capital cities (91.5 percentages) replied that they agree with the statement "East Asia should pursue its own model of development from now on rather than following the West."

This strongly suggests that East Asian citizens began to recover their identity while being confronted with complex risks and dangers as unintended consequences of rush-to modernization. Recovering identity may help open a new space for dialogue and it is an inspiring question how East Asia would develop their own vision of cosmopolitan solidarity and transformation backed up by their own tradition and leading dialogue with the West as initiated by Beck.

Having said so, as the organizer of this commemorative special section for Beck, I want to make a brief overview of the papers included in this section. Needless to say, the term cosmopolitan has diverse and complex meanings. International politics on human rights, transitional justice and war memories, migration and immigration, and cosmopolitan morality and culture are all important issues for cosmopolitan study. This section pays particular attention to three distinctive cosmopolitan changes from the action-theoretical sociological perspective.

The first is the commitment to and defense of pluralities. Cosmopolitan approach means reconstituting the suppressed or marginalized voices against the taken-for-granted, often hegemonic or dominant mainstreams of the society. All the papers included in this section share this common denominator of cosmopolitan orientation. Roulleau-Berger's analysis of migrants and immigrants in the European context reveals clearly the main issues of misrecognition and discrimination from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism. The paper by Soh and Connolly attempts with sympathetic attention to reconstruct the voices of the defectors from North Korea through the analysis of the concerned international human rights groups. The concept of 'oppositional' memory work and permanent war in the Korean peninsula is highly suggestive. Oh deals with the particular war memory of atom bombs experienced by Korean. The majority of war memory as victim in Japan has been selectively constructed with the focus on the experiences of women, particularly mother, and children as non-combatant innocent citizens. Oh's paper is significant because it reconstitutes the Korean memory of atom bombs as hitherto marginalized one, but not in a way raising national concern and anger but by paying attention the

cosmopolitan solidarity between the Korean victims and the Japanese civil groups. Finally, Shim demonstrates with succinct clarity a deep biographical analysis to show how the Korean ‘comfort women’ (sex slavery), despite their mounting sufferings and pains, have been able to transform their anthropological shock to cosmopolitan morality. This represents a reconstruction of excluded marginal voices as a globally appealing cosmopolitan morality.

The second denominator is the cathartic dimension of cosmopolitan change. Cosmopolitan here is not simply descriptive or analytic. Cosmopolitan study releases the change of mind, attitude, or way of thinking as captured by the ‘internalization’ of others, as an essential characteristic of cosmopolitan change. By recognizing others from their points of view, one learns not only how others think and act as they do but also change one’s own assumptions and presuppositions long held habitually. This implication of cosmopolitan is present in all the papers included in this special section, though the extent of its explicit realization may vary from one to another. The cosmopolitan significance in this sense has been most visibly demonstrated by Shim’s paper.

Finally, one urgent task for Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology is to expand cosmopolitan imagination beyond anthropocentric towards anthropo-cosmic worldview. All brands of humanism associated with the anthropocentric world politics or global civil society are primarily concerned about the expansion of human communication and interaction beyond the territorial boundaries of nation states. However, when we seek cosmopolitan actor within the context of cosmopolitan community of global risks, attention should be stretched further to anthropo-cosmic worldview. In this sense, cosmopolitan sociology moves further to embrace ecologically sensitive cosmopolitan morality. Also, not only those who are living now on the globe but also the next generations who will live on the globe need to be considered. Searching for cosmopolitan citizens in the case of the 2011 Fukushima disaster and nuclear power plant may be revealing in this context.

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