

ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIED WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN KOREA AND JAPAN: IMPLICATIONS FROM LATENT CLASS ANALYSES*

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In this article, we compare attitudes towards married women's employment in Korea and Japan using 2002 ISSP and 2003 KGSS data. In particular, we use the method of latent class analysis to investigate the structure of the viewpoints about wives' economic activities. We find that Japanese women and men are more liberal in their attitudes toward married women's employment than their Korean counterparts. Then applying the method of latent class analysis, we find that Korean women and men can be classified as four and two groups respectively, in terms of their attitudes towards wives' economic activities, and that both Japanese women and men can be divided into three groups. These differences in the structure of attitudes towards wives' labor force participation may be due to a number of institutional differences in the labor force experiences of women, especially, the childcare system and gender discrimination.

Key Words: Korea, Japan, wives' employment, gender attitude

INTRODUCTION

After World War II, labor participation rates among married women have been on a dramatic increase all over the world. Rising economic activities among wives naturally have led to the breakdown of the traditional gender division of labor. In response to these changes in gender roles at work and home, some fundamental changes in attitudes have occurred with respect to the nature of gender roles. Overall, people tend to accept women's economic participation and men's involvement in family responsibilities.

The literature indicates that cultural viewpoints about gender roles can affect various aspects of married women's lives, including taking up paid jobs outside the home through everyday discourse and practices (Duncan, 1995; Jones and Brayfield, 1997), and so many researchers examine how people think about the gender division of labor at the local and national levels.

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Considerable research has been done on sex-role attitudes among Western industrialized societies (Alwin, Braun and Scott, 1992; Crompton and Harris, 1997; Scott, 1990; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun, 2001) and concludes that there are apparent differences in public opinion about gender roles.

Surprisingly lacking, however, is systematic comparative research investigating differences and similarities in gender role attitudes among East Asian countries. This lack of research is, at least in part, because researchers tend to believe that people in East Asian countries similarly stick to the traditional gender division of labor due to strong Confucian traditions. However studies (Cameron, Dowling and Worswick, 2001) report that East Asian countries differ in women's experiences of employment and other social and cultural factors that may affect formation of viewpoints about gender-related activities, suggesting that there may be some differences in the attitudes toward gender roles.

In this article, we compare attitudes towards married women's employment in Korea and Japan. Women and men in each country are influenced by different historical and social experiences and consequently may form different interests and beliefs linked with gender roles (Crompton and Harris, 1997; Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun, 2001). This study attempts to describe how Korean and Japanese women and men think about married women's employment. In particular, we go beyond the conventional comparison of means to investigation of structure of the viewpoints about wives' economic activities using latent structure analysis (Clogg, 1995). This technique allows us to identify important patterns of attitudes toward married women's employment in Korea and Japan.

This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we depict important aspects of wives' economic participation in Korea and Japan. Then we introduce the method of latent class analysis. After we describe data and variables used in the study, we compare basic socio-economic variables and responses to the five statements concerning married women's employment by gender and country. We then estimate and compare the best fitting latent class models for women and men in the two countries separately. We conclude with implications of findings.

MARRIED WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN KOREA AND JAPAN

In Korea and Japan, almost half of the women are in the labor force. In 2003, about 48.3% of Japanese women ages 15 years old or over were in the labor force (Statistics Bureau, 2004) while 48.9% of Korean women of the

same age range were employed (National Statistical Office, 2003). The patterns of female employment in Korea and Japan are similarly M-shaped, with women leaving the labor force during the years of childrearing and returning when children are older. In spite of these similarities, women, especially mothers in the two countries, have relatively different experiences about employment environments.

Korean female workers suffer from discriminations at the workplace (Lee, 1993). Usually Korean women and men are placed at different tasks; this justifies wage differentials on the basis of the nature of jobs and not human capital, and facilitates control of female workers in production settings (Lee, 1993). Consequently, women have to accept low wages and reduced opportunities for on-the-job training and promotion (Yoo, 2003). Mainly due to these unequal treatments, female workers accounted for just about 5.8% of "legislators, senior officials and managers" in 2003 (National Statistical Office, 2003), suggesting that most socially prestigious jobs are dominated by men (Yoo, 2003).

However, low job segregation in Japan is confirmed by numerous studies (Nakata and Takehiro, 2002; OECD, 1988; Reubens and Harrison, 1983; Roos, 1985; Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1991). The 1985 Equal Opportunities Act supports sexual equality in job opportunity and promotions (Lassegard, 1993), and so women have increasingly been promoted to management positions (Nakata and Takehiro, 2002). Moreover, since the Revision of the Labor Standards Law in 1999, less sexual harassment has been reported. Nowadays, many Japanese female workers work at skilled and non-skilled positions that were rarely open to women. Nakata and Takehiro (2002) note that "Japanese female workers seem to enjoy relatively less occupational segregation than similar workers in other countries" (527).

Regarding childcare, Korean mothers lack the relevant support from the public sector and so the extended family system is the major source for parenthood support for Korean mothers (Hyun et al., 2002). Since the Gender Equal Employment Act of 1987 and the Infant Care Act of 1991, state and local governments have supported childcare services only for poor families and children in need (Byun, 1991). Most parents remain responsible for the care of their children under the age of 6 years old. Also, the number of public centers which are affordable to many working mothers is relatively low. Recently, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of private childcare centers due to deregulation and cheap and long-term loans since 1997. Finally, employers with more than 300 female workers are required to establish childcare centers at the workplace. The government supports those employers with direct subsidies, tax deductions and low-interest loans. In

2004, 41.8% of the companies with 300 or more women workers did not have childcare facilities at work. Given these situations, Won and Pascall argue that in Korea, “the state is still playing a residual role, legislation is not effectively implemented, and government is giving way to the private sector and to the family in responsibility for childcare” (270).

However, in order to encourage women to remain in the labor force because of prospects of labor shortage and weak economic situations, the Japanese government has implemented a series of policies to help mothers balance work and family life. In 1994, the Japanese government started the Angel Plan to create an environment conducive to childbirth and childrearing by loosening regulations and incentives for corporations to open day-care centers to provide affordable infant care centers, increasing options for working mothers with young children. In 1999, the government announced the New Angel Plan to enhance child care support services and reconcile family and work life. The focus of the Plan lies in enhancement of child care measures to support child-raising and work life. And in 2004, the New-New Angel Plan was implemented to support people in working and raising a family at the same time, and to reexamine their work patterns. For example, for this objective, this plan targets increasing the time men spend doing housework, decreasing men’s work time, and encouraging men to take-child care leave. As a result, childcare supply exceeds demand in Japan, even though some mothers in urban areas wait for a long time (Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, 1999). Also, parents are worried about poorer quality and child safety in some unlicensed family care homes and private centers; it is expected that quality in public as well as private day care centers will improve due to competition, as the number of day care centers is increasing (Allen, 2003).

Finally, Korean mothers have limited benefits of parental leave. Korean mothers can have two months of maternity leave under the Gender Equal Employment Act of 1987 and then, through the Labor Standard and Employment Insurance Acts since 2001, have an extension of 30 days, resulting in maternity leave of three months with full payment.

However Japanese women can have some weeks before birth and one-year after birth (Kammerman, 2000). During parental leave, they are paid for 14 weeks at 60% of their regular salary and unpaid thereafter. Moreover, the Maternity Allowance Additional Sum that passed in 1999 added a daily remuneration of 25% of a woman’s salary (Women’s Online Media, 2000) and women whose employers join the Health Insurance Society can get an additional “Childbirth and Childcare Lump Sum Grant.” Therefore, Allen (2003) concludes that “Japan seems to be responding to the needs of parents

with young children somewhat more effectively" (271).

METHOD: LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS

In this paper, we use latent class modeling in order to characterize categorical latent variables corresponding to ideal-types of attitudes toward married women's employment. Latent class analysis investigates whether any observed associations among categorical variables can be explained by underlying latent variables. In this statistical introduction, we assume five variables of attitudes toward married women's employment.

First, let A, B, C, D and E be observed categorical variables whose levels are indexed by i, j, k, l , and m respectively, and let X be the latent class variable. Suppose that $F^{ABCDE}ijklmt$ is the expected frequency for the (i, j, k, l, m) cell for the t^{th} latent class, and that F^{ABCDE}_{ijklm} is the expected frequency for the (i, j, k, l, m) cell obtained by summing expected frequencies over all latent classes. Then we can observe the frequency of the F^{ABCDE}_{ijklm} . The latent class model assumes that the variables of A, B, C, D and E are mutually independent given a latent variable X . Thus we can assume that the latent variable explains any relationships among the five variables. This latent class model can be written as:

$$\log(F^{ABCDE}_{ijklmt}) = \lambda + \lambda^A_i + \lambda^B_j + \lambda^C_k + \lambda^D_m + \lambda^E_l + \lambda^X_t + \lambda^{AX}_{jt} + \lambda^{BX}_{jt} \\ + \lambda^{CX}_{kt} + \lambda^{DX}_{lt} + \lambda^{EX}_{mt}$$

A model with only one latent class is the independence model and is the baseline model. Models with different numbers of latent classes can then be tested for goodness of fit based on observed cross-classifications of variables A, B, C, D and E against the set of corresponding observed frequencies. The tests compare the actual observed frequencies in the cross-classification with corresponding estimates of frequencies expected from each of the latent class models.

When the best latent class model is selected, respondents belong to each latent class "probabilistically." In other words, respondents have a set of probabilities of belonging to all the latent classes. For example, if a model with three latent classes best fits the data, then each respondent has the three different probabilities, with the sum of these three probabilities equal to one.

DATA

The Japanese data come from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP), an international collaborative survey questioning respondents about their attitudes towards marriage, work, children, divorce, and family life. The original Japanese sample consists of 1,132 sixteen years old or older Japanese. Respondents were selected based on a two-stage stratified random sample method and interviewed in person. The response rate was 62.8%. The Korean data come from the 2003 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS). The KGSS includes information from 1,315 eighteen years old or older Koreans. Korean respondents were also interviewed in person, and the final response rate was 65.7%. We analyze the information from 1,289 Koreans (723 women and 566 men) and 919 Japanese (512 women and 407 men) who are 18 years old or older and provide all the responses under study.

VARIABLES

Korean and Japanese respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following 5 questions: (1) A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work, (2) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works, (3) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job, (4) A job is alright, but what most women really wants is a home and children, and (5) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.

The possible responses are "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," "strongly disagree," and "can't choose." The latent class analysis can handle, in principle, any number of categories for a variable. However, application of the method to several ordered categories is likely to produce latent classes with mixed response patterns that "are relatively unstable because the latent variable's states become more continuous in nature" (Yamaguchi, 2000: 1714). Therefore, we choose to dichotomize the responses and so get latent attitudes with more clear-cut characteristics. We transform these five-point responses into the dichotomous variables representing "non-conservative" and "conservative." Regarding (1), we combine "strongly agree," "agree," and "neither agree nor disagree" as the non-conservative and "disagree" and "strongly disagree" as the conservative categories. Concerning (2) to (5), we collapse "strongly disagree," "disagree," and "neither agree nor disagree" as the non-conservative and "agree" and "strongly agree" as the conservative categories. We omit the cases where respondents answered "can't choose" to any of the five responses from the

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES: KOREA AND JAPAN

	Korea		Japan	
	Women: A	Men: B	Women: C	Men: D
Age	43.3	45.8	50.7	50.2
Marital Status				
Single	22.0	26.5	11.3	17.9
Married	65.6	68.7	75.1	76.7
Divorced	1.8	2.3	3.1	3.2
Widowed	10.7	2.5	10.4	2.2
Education				
Less than High School	23.7	20.5	21.9	20.2
High School	34.9	29.5	49.2	40.1
Two-Year College	11.9	9.0	18.2	7.4
Four-Year College or More	18.9	27.4	7.8	30.0
In School	10.7	13.6	2.8	2.5
N	723	566	512	407

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

analysis.

ANALYSIS

Comparison of Background Variables by Gender and Country

We compare three background variables that can affect gender role attitudes — age, marital status, and education — by gender and country.

There is little difference between average ages of men and women in each country. However, there is more distinctive variation in the comparison of the two countries by gender in the age of the respondents, even though only the difference between Korean and Japanese women are statistically significant ($p < .01$). On average, Japanese females are 7 years older than Korean females and Japanese men are 5 years older than Korean men.

In both countries, women are much more likely to be widowed than are men. About 10% of 18 years old or older women in Korea and Japan are widowed, while only 2% of men live without their female spouses. These differences may partially reflect gender differences in longevity. For both women and men, Koreans are more likely to be single than are Japanese. About one out of four Korean adults (22.0% and 26.5% for women and men respectively) have never been married, while roughly one out of ten Japanese women (11.3%) and two out of five Japanese men (17.9%) are sin-

gle. The flip side of this difference is that Japanese are more likely to be married than Koreans. Table 1 demonstrates that 65.6% and 68.7 % of Korean women and men are married, while 75.1% and 76.6% of Japanese females and males are married.

Education levels also differ by country and/or gender. In both countries, men show higher education attainment levels than women. For example, about three out of ten Korean (27.4%) and Japanese (30.0%) men have four-year college diplomas, while only two (18.9%) and one (7.8%) out of ten Korean and Japanese women finish four-year colleges. Comparisons of the two countries indicate that Koreans are more educated than Japanese for both women and men. While similar portions of Korean and Japanese men enter post-high school institutes, many more Japanese men (40.1%) finish their formal education as high school graduates than Korean men (29.5%). This difference is much more evident for women. The rate of finishing four-year colleges for Korean women (18.9%) is twice as high as for Japanese women (7.8%).

Comparison of Attitudes toward Married Women's Employment

We compare the dichotomous responses of the five statements about married women's employment by country and gender.

On the whole, the views of Korean women and men about married women's employment seem to be ambivalent. The majority of them believe that a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (76.4% and 71.9% for women and men) and that what women really want is a home and children (66.4% and 62.2% for women and men). At the same time, three out of four Koreans agree that a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (76.4% and 70.5% for women and men) and that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (79.8% and 82.9% for women and men). More than six out of ten Koreans believe that all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (66.4% and 62.2% for women and men). It seems that Korean women and men do not oppose married women's employment, but concern themselves with possible negative effects of wives' economic activities on family lives.

Korean men and women differ with regard to whether women really want a home and children and whether pre-school children are fine if their mothers work. More Korean men (46.6%) than women (38.2%) believe that family life is the most important to women. Surprisingly, more women (76.4%) than men (70.5%) feel that little children will suffer when their

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF THE RESPONSES TO THE FIVE STATEMENTS: KOREA AND JAPAN

	Korea		Japan		t-test			
	Women: A	Men: B	Women: C	Men: D	A:B	C:D	A:C	B:D
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work								
Non-Conservative	76.4	71.9	88.3	85.8			**	**
Conservative	23.7	28.1	11.7	14.3				
2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works								
Non-Conservative	23.7	29.5	69.5	67.8	*		**	**
Conservative	76.4	70.5	30.5	32.2				
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job								
Non-Conservative	33.6	37.8	66.8	67.3			**	**
Conservative	66.4	62.2	33.2	32.7				
4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children								
Non-Conservative	61.8	53.4	51.6	58.5	**	*	**	
Conservative	38.2	46.6	48.4	41.5				
5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay								
Non-Conservative	20.2	17.1	29.5	31.9			**	**
Conservative	79.8	82.9	70.5	68.1				
N	723	566	512	407				

mothers work outside the home.

Relative to Korean respondents, Japanese women and men show more liberal attitudes toward married women's employment. The majority of Japanese women and men believe that wives' work does not affect their children and home negatively. They think that even though wives work, they can have warm and secure relationships with their children (88.3% and 85.8% for women and men), pre-school children do not suffer (69.5% and 67.8% for women and men) and family life will be fine (66.8% and 67.3% for women and men). Also more than half of them disagree that what women really want is a home and children (51.6% and 58.5% for women and men). However they agree that home management can be as fulfilling as paid

work for wives (70.5% and 68.1% for women and men).

Japanese women and men differ little regarding married women's employment, except one statement about what women really want. In this item, men are more liberal than women; more men than women disagree that what most women really want is a home and children.

Comparison of the two countries by gender indicates that regardless of gender, Japanese are much more liberal than Koreans toward married women's employment. For women, Japanese female respondents are more likely to answer liberally than their Korean counterparts in all questions, except for the one statement about what women want. Especially, the differences with regard to the effect of mother's employment on their family members (2 and 3) are impressive: while about seven out of ten Korean women believe that mother's employment has negative effects on children and family, seven out of ten Japanese women think that it does not.

The same is true of the male respondents of both countries. In all five statements, Japanese men show more liberal patterns than Korean men (even though there is not statistical difference in the responses to the 4th statement). Again, both groups evidently differ regarding how a mother's paid work affects family life (2 and 3). Like the women, Japanese men believe that married women's jobs do not have negative consequences for other family members, while Korean men are concerned that if the mother works, children and other family members may suffer.

The results of comparison by gender and country are consistent with implications from several social situations that working wives face in Korea and Japan. As previously described, Korean mothers do not have reliable options, except the extended family system to get some help with the care of their children, while the majority of Japanese mothers enjoy the benefit of various private and public childcare centers. Reflecting these differences in childcare facilities, Japanese women and men are much more likely to feel that pre-school children and family members do not suffer if their mothers work outside the home than their Korean counterparts.

Korean and Japanese viewpoints about the value of being housewives or workers are also consistent with different levels of discrimination at the workplace in Korea and Japan. Empirical studies suggest that Japanese wives experience lower gender discrimination at job entry and promotion than Korean married women. Reflecting these trends in the two countries, Japanese women and men are more likely to believe that women can experience fulfillment as paid workers than are Korean males and females.

LATENT CLASS MODELS

In this section, we assess whether and how many latent classes fit the data. In order to select the best fitting model, we use the likelihood ratio chi-square statistics.

For Korean women, the independence model ($L=261.648$, 26 df, $p=.000$), two ($L=39.821$, 20 df, $p=.005$) and three ($L=24.634$, 14 df, $p=.038$) latent classes models do not provide an acceptable fit to the data. However, the model with four latent classes ($L=8.273$, 8 df, $p=.410$) provide a substantially better fit, which we select as the best model for Korean women.

For Korean men, while the independence model ($L=233.620$, 26 df, $p=.000$) produces a poor fit to the data, the models with two ($L=30.416$, 20 df, $p=.063$), three ($L=18.062$, 14 df, $p=.200$) and four ($L=15.161$, 8 df, $p=.056$) latent classes provide an adequate fit to the data. Given that the three ($L=12.354$, 6 df, $p=.054$) and four ($L=15.254$, 12 df, $p=.228$) latent classes models do not provide statistically different fit relative to the two latent class model, we proceed with the most parsimonious among the three models for Korean men.

Turning to Japanese women, we find that two ($L=27.385$, 20 df, $p=.120$), three ($L=14.105$, 14 df, $p=.440$) and four ($L=9.101$, 8 df, $p=.330$) latent classes

TABLE 3. SELECTION OF THE BEST LATENT CLASS MODELS: KOREA AND JAPAN

		Latent Class	L^2	df	p
Korea	Women	1	261.648	26	0.000
		2	39.821	20	0.005
		3	24.634	14	0.038
		4	8.273	8	0.410
	Men	1	233.620	26	0.000
		2	30.416	20	0.063
		3	18.062	14	0.200
		4	15.161	8	0.056
Japan	Women	1	182.579	26	0.000
		2	27.385	20	0.120
		3	14.105	14	0.440
		4	9.101	8	0.330
	Men	1	162.924	26	0.000
		2	36.326	20	0.014
		3	24.223	14	0.043
		4	14.573	8	0.068

models fit the data. A model with three latent classes better fits the data than the two ($L=13.280$, 6 df, $p=.039$) and four latent ($L=5.004$, 6 df, $p=.543$) classes models. Therefore we opt for a three-class model as the best fit for Japanese women.

For Japanese men, we select a three-latent class as providing the best fit. Only the model with four latent classes produce an acceptable fit, given that the p -value ($=.068$) is bigger than $.05$. But the model with three latent classes approach the conventional acceptable level ($=.043$) and the four-latent class model does not provide statistically significantly better fit to the data than the three latent classes model ($L=9.650$, 6 df, $p=.140$). Moreover, we examine the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) index, another statistics frequently used for selection of categorical models, and find that the model with three latent classes (BIC= -59.900) is better than the one with four classes (BIC= -33.498).

THE LATENT STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIED WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT: KOREA

Table 4 presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of (1) the distribution of our sample to each latent class, and (2) the conditional probabilities of the five responses of Korean women and men for each latent class.

The first latent class characterizes almost four out of ten women in the sample ($= 38.3\%$). This group of women expresses very ambivalent beliefs about married women's employment. They tend to agree that pre-school children can grow up well with their mothers at work ($= .884$), but at the same time believe that the mother-children relationship may not turn out to be good if mothers work ($= .792$). They do not think that women hope to stay at home ($= .070$), but also are concerned that married women's employment may be deleterious to family life ($= .662$). Therefore, this class of women may be labeled as a "liberal and family-concerned" group.

The second class is very similar to the first class in its size ($= 37.5\%$). This group evidently shows conservative attitudes regarding wives' paid jobs. This class believes in negative effects of women's employment, with extremely high probabilities of agreeing that little children and family life will suffer if mothers work ($.997$ and $.949$ respectively). Moreover, women in this group value domestic responsibilities, approving that women really want family and children ($= .732$) and that taking care of their home is fulfilling ($= .895$). It is clear that this group of women has "conservative" viewpoints about married women's employment.

In contrast to the second latent class, the third class is liberally-oriented

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF LATENT CLASSES AND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF THE RESPONSES: KOREA

	Women				Men	
	Liberal and Family- Concerned	Conservative	Liberal	Liberal and Pro-Family	Conservative	Liberal
Latent Class Probabilities	0.383	0.375	0.138	0.105	0.665	0.335
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work						
Non-Conservative	0.792	0.642	0.982	0.808	0.663	0.831
Conservative	0.208	0.358	0.019	0.192	0.337	0.169
2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works						
Non-Conservative	0.116	0.003	0.813	0.755	0.105	0.672
Conservative	0.884	0.997	0.187	0.245	0.895	0.328
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job						
Non-Conservative	0.338	0.051	0.918	0.586	0.106	0.918
Conservative	0.662	0.949	0.082	0.414	0.894	0.082
4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children						
Non-Conservative	0.930	0.268	0.984	0.251	0.410	0.779
Conservative	0.070	0.732	0.016	0.749	0.590	0.221
5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay						
Non-Conservative	0.210	0.105	0.488	0.144	0.124	0.265
Conservative	0.790	0.895	0.512	0.857	0.876	0.735

toward women's work, with a high likelihood of believing that little children can grow up without difficulties (.982 for 1 and .813 for 2) and family life is fine (= .918) with mothers working outside the home. Women in this group also tend to disapprove of the statement that women really want family and home instead of jobs (= .984). We label this class as "liberal." This liberal group consists of 13.8% of the Korean women in the sample.

The last class accounts for 10.5% of the Korean females. This group of women is relatively similar to the third class except for the response about what women really want. While they are in liberal positions concerning the relationship between working mothers and children (= .808) and pre-school children (= .755), and the effect of wives' employment (= .586), like the second class, they are highly likely to think that women hope to stay at home and take care of the family (= .749). Also they have a relatively high probability of believing that being housewife is also rewarding (= .857). This class of women accepts married women's employment and values caring for home and family. We consider this group of women to be "liberal and pro-family."

We turn to the latent structure of the beliefs about married women's employment for Korean men. About 67% of the Korean men fall into the first of two latent classes. This class has extremely high probabilities of conservative responses for the effect of wives' employment on pre-school children and family life (= .895 and .894). This class also tends to agree that 'what most women really want is a home and children' (= .590). This group of Korean men clearly shows conservative viewpoints in their attitudes about wives' paid jobs: it is good for wives as well as for other family members for wives to stay at home and take care of the family. Accordingly, we label this class of Korean men as "conservative."

In contrast, the second group, which accounts for about 33.5% of Korean men, expresses liberal beliefs about wives' outside work. This group has high likelihoods of disagreeing that pre-school children (= .672) and family life suffers (= .918) if mothers work. They are also characterized by low chances of agreeing that a working mother does not establish a warm and secure relationship with her children (= .169) and that most women really want a home and children (= .221). We label this group as "liberal" men.

THE LATENT STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIED WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT: JAPAN

We turn to the latent structure of Japanese attitudes about women's paid work. Table 5 shows (1) the proportions in each latent class and (2) the conditional probabilities of the five responses for Japanese women and men.

The first latent class characterizes more than half of Japanese women in the sample (= 55.0%). Women in this class tend to believe that working mothers are not associated with trouble in their family lives: they can have good relationships with their children (= .916) and children and family life go along with mothers at work (.674 for 2 and .768 for 3). However, it is

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF LATENT CLASSES AND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF THE RESPONSES: JAPAN

	Women			Men		
	Liberal	Conservative	Conservative and Against Housewife	Liberal	Conservative and Working Mother tolerated	Conservative
Latent Class Probabilities	0.550	0.335	0.115	0.439	0.354	0.207
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work						
Non-Conservative	0.916	0.700	0.342	0.806	0.985	0.108
Conservative	0.084	0.300	0.658	0.194	0.015	0.892
2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works						
Non-Conservative	0.674	0.119	0.235	0.737	0.281	0.165
Conservative	0.326	0.881	0.765	0.263	0.719	0.835
3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job						
Non-Conservative	0.768	0.006	0.097	0.875	0.202	0.007
Conservative	0.232	0.994	0.903	0.125	0.798	0.993
4. A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children						
Non-Conservative	0.412	0.131	0.196	0.550	0.150	0.193
Conservative	0.588	0.869	0.804	0.450	0.850	0.807
5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay						
Non-Conservative	0.101	0.007	0.567	0.084	0.088	0.219
Conservative	0.899	0.993	0.433	0.917	0.912	0.781

noteworthy that these women also believe that taking care of home and family is as rewarding as paid work (= .899). We label this class of women as "liberal."

The second latent class, which accounts for about 33.5% of the women in Japan, contrasts with the first class in many respects. They firmly believe that if mothers are at work, it can be harmful to the well-being of pre-school

children (= .881) and family (= .994), even though working mothers can maintain affectionate relationships with children (= .700). Also, they think that home and family are where women hope to be (= .588) and so caring for family members is as satisfying as paid jobs (= .899). This group of women can be considered to be “conservative” in their attitudes toward married women’s employment.

The last and smallest class represents about one-tenth of the Japanese women in the study (= 11.5%). These women show a conservative pattern in that they think that a mother’s work outside the home is harmful to the well-being of her children and family (= .658, .765, .903, and .804 for 1, 2, 3, and 4). But they do not agree that being a full-time homemaker is satisfying for women (= .567). Therefore this class of women can be regarded to be “conservative and against housewife.”

We turn to Japanese men’s attitudes about wives’ paid jobs. The biggest latent class is made up of 43.9% of the Japanese men in the study. This group of men is “liberal” in their attitudes toward women’s work. Men in this class are highly likely to believe that mothers’ employment does not have deteriorating implications for the well-being of pre-school children (= .737) and family (.875), and that working mothers can work and care for their children (= .806). However, like the liberal group of Japanese women, this liberal group of men still believe that being a housewife is as rewarding to women as paid work (= .917). The second and third latent classes characterize more than three (= 35.4%) and two (= 20.7%) out of ten Japanese men respectively. In contrast to the first class of liberal men, these two groups of men express conservative beliefs with regard to married women’s paid work. Both groups are highly likely to believe that pre-school children (.719 and .835 for the second and third groups) and family life will suffer (.798 and .993 for the second and third groups) if mothers work. Men in these groups strongly stick to the traditional gender division of labor: they believe that home and family are where women want to be (.850 for the second and .807 for the third) and that women can be satisfied with caring for family as with working for pay (.912 and .781 for the second and third classes). What distinguishes the two groups is their attitude regarding the relationship between working mothers and children. The second group has a high probability of believing that the relationship can be fine (= .985) while the third group has a high likelihood of believing that it cannot be fine (= .892). Accordingly, we label the second and third classes as “conservative and working mother tolerated” and “conservative.”

COMPARISONS OF THE LATENT STRUCTURES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIED WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN KOREA AND JAPAN

Comparisons of the latent structures of attitudes toward married women's employment can shed light on differences in the two countries that the conventional methods cannot identify. Let us start with women. Roughly speaking, in both countries, six out of ten women are liberal (38.3% + 13.8% + 10.5% = 62.6% in Korea and 55.0% for Japan), and four out of ten women are conservative (37.5% in Korea and 33.5 + 11.5% = 45.0% in Japan) in their attitudes toward married women's employment.

However we note that liberal women in Korea and Japan differ somewhat in their beliefs about married women's employment, while the conservative women in both countries are similar. Japanese liberal women are more conservative than Korean liberal women regarding women's relationships with home and family. Korean liberal women tend to disagree that women want a home and children (= .984), but Japanese liberal women are likely to agree (= .588). Also Korean liberal females agree reluctantly that the role of housewife is fulfilling as well (= .512), but Japanese liberal females willingly agree that homemaking is as fulfilling as work for pay (= .899).

There are a few sub-groups among liberal women in Korea and among conservative women in Japan. Among Korean liberal women, some are worried that family members may suffer if mothers work (liberal and family-concerned group) and others actively support the value of caring for home and family (liberal and pro-family), in addition to the "pure" liberals. Distinctive groups among liberal women may result from the lack of reliable childcare facilities and other caring systems in Korea. Even though these liberal women hope to work outside the home, some of them are worried that they do not have any dependable options for their family members while they are at work, and so are classified as "liberal and family-concerned."

Among Japanese conservative women, there is one group of women who devalue homemaking (conservative and anti-housewife), besides "genuine" conservatives. Also, this group of women may devalue the homemaking role because of the remaining tradition that depreciates caring for the home and family as "women's work."

We turn to Korean and Japanese males. While Korean men are clearly divided as conservative and liberal in their beliefs about married women's employment, Japanese men consist of three latent classes. We note that Korean and Japanese conservative men differ regarding working mothers' relationships with their children and about what women want. Japanese

conservative males are more conservative than Korean conservative males. While Japanese conservative men tend to think that employed mothers cannot maintain good relationships with their children (= .892), Korean conservative men are likely to agree that working mothers can be on good terms with their children (= .831). Also Japanese conservative males tend to believe that what women really want is a home and children (= .807), but Korean conservatives think so only reluctantly (= .590).

Japanese conservative men are split into those who support the possibility of good relationships between working mothers and children and those who do not. Possibly, this split among conservative Japanese men is due to better quality of the childcare system in Japan. Some conservative men are certain that their children are safe and fine even though they are without their mothers. Therefore they can be favorable toward working mothers despite their conservative beliefs.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we compare Korean and Japanese females' and males' beliefs about wives' economic activities outside the home. First, we find that Japanese women and men are more liberal in their attitudes toward married women's employment than their Korean counterparts. People in the two countries are apparently different in their beliefs regarding the effects of wives' paid work on the well-being of pre-school children and family life.

Then applying the method of latent class analysis, we find that Korean women and men can be classified into four and two groups in terms of their attitudes towards wives' economic activities. In particular, Korean liberal women consist of three distinctive groups depending on how they think about children and family. Also, we find that both Japanese women and men can be divided into three groups. For Japanese, conservative women and men consist of two sub-groups. Some conservative women devalue home management as a rewarding job and some conservative men accept that a working mother can have a good relationship with her children.

Attitudes are formed through assessments of benefits and costs for family members under structural and cultural contexts (Alwin, Braun and Scott, 1992; Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee, 1996), and so distinctive social and historical experiences produce variations in public opinions about gender roles. The observed variations of the two countries in the structure of attitudes toward wives' labor force participation may be due to a number of institutional differences in the labor force experiences of women (Alwin, Braun and Scott, 1992). Especially, the childcare system and gender discrim-

ination seem to be crucial. Due to the poor quality of childcare centers in Korea, many Korean liberal women may be worried that their paid work eventually has negative effects on their family, while wide availability of reliable childcare facilities may make some Japanese men have favorable views about working women. Also, low levels of discrimination against women may lead more Japanese men and women to believe that women can be fulfilled by working outside the home than Korean adults believe.

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