

TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAMILY FARM: THE CASE OF THREE SOUTH KOREAN VILLAGES*

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Scholars have presented diverse views concerning changes in Korean family farms. Marxian-oriented scholars insist either on the socioeconomic differentiation or on the pauperization of peasants. Some of those who have observed the persistence of peasants explain it in relation to family cycle, as did Chayanov, while others project the disorganization of family farms due to off-farm migration. Still others have noted collective efforts to develop agriculture and commercial farming by the modernization of agricultural production. Longitudinal data obtained from a revisit survey offer rare opportunities to examine all of these propositions at once. Examination of these data shows that the theory of Marxian class differentiation does not hold, and that small family farms have survived. This is not because the necessary labor has been supplied along the family cycle but rather that out-migration helped ease the man-land pressure. On the other hand, out-migration resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of farm households, but it is unlikely that all family farms will disappear in near future. By illustrating elements of change that do not support the above propositions, we have demonstrated factors leading to the peasant-into-farmer development. These factors are population growth, man-land pressure, changes in landholdings and farming scale, in- and out-migration, maximization of family labor, government efforts to develop agriculture, mechanization of agricultural production, and commercialization of farm products.

INTRODUCTION

Shanin identifies five generic patterns of peasantry-related changes in the contemporary world. They are: socioeconomic differentiation, pauperization, farmerization, collectivization, and peasantization (Shanin 1989). The categories of differentiation, peasantization and farmerization are derivations from three major theories on peasant problems: Marxian theory, Chayanovian theory, and modernization theory, respectively. The category of pauperization is a generic pattern characteristic of underdeveloped countries, while collectivization is typical of socialist countries. In this paper, we regard the five patterns of peasantry-related changes in terms of theoretical derivations or hypotheses and attempt to examine them.

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The differentiation hypothesis is a derivation from Marxian theory. Marx and Lenin argued that as capitalist economies develop, the peasantry will disintegrate into two classes, the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat. Yet peasants have survived in most societies. Kauski, Marx's successor, explains the persistence of peasantry in terms of the retardation of differentiation due to such factors as underconsumption, overwork, labor flexibility, cooperation among neighbors, immobility of land, and state support (Banaji 1976). This theory does not differ from that of Marx and Lenin insofar as the final destination of peasants under capitalism is concerned.

Chayanov suggests an alternative to Marxist theory regarding the persistence of peasants (Chayanov 1925). He argued that the family cycle is the main mechanism behind the survival of the peasantry, since the cycle maintains the balance between production and consumption. In other words, the peasant economy persists because it is able to reproduce a unit of production characterized by intensive use of family labor. Thus the peasantry do not differentiate, but experience a cycle of mobility along the family cycle. In this presentation on the changing patterns of the peasantry, Shanin does not use the term 'peasantization' in the Chayanovian sense. Rather, he discusses the process in relation to egalitarian land reform and return migration to farm villages. In this paper, we will examine the Chayanovian theory in terms of peasantization.

With regard to the pattern of pauperization, Shanin suggests that the increase of rural population/land ratio, in the absence of alternative sources of income and/or new productive investments, leads to a cycle of poverty and an aggregate economic decline with ecological consequences for a large number of peasants. In many underdeveloped countries, most peasant families suffer from extreme poverty since they have a large number of children to feed but rarely find alternative sources of income. In this connection, it is noteworthy that some dependent theorists attribute rural poverty in peripheral countries to exploitation by core countries.

In order to resolve the problem of rural poverty, the state usually implements an agricultural development plan that transforms family farms into large production units, often operating as cooperatives of production. The socialist collectivization of agriculture provides an excellent example. State intervention in agriculture is by no means limited to socialist countries, however. Many governments, especially those of developing countries, have tried to develop agriculture via price controls, subsidies, credits or monopolies over smallholder inputs. In this paper the term 'collectivization' is used to refer to such collective efforts made by the

governments.

Farmerization or 'peasant-into-farmer' development, Shanin's fourth generic type of peasantry-related changes, takes place when massive investment ties family farms to a capitalist economy. Modernization theorists predict the development of commercial or entrepreneurial family farms in this context.

Scholars have presented divergent views concerning the change of Korean family farms. Marxist scholars (Park 1984; Yun 1991) argue that Korean peasants have been differentiated into two classes, rural bourgeoisie and proletariat. Some radical theorists have warned of the pauperization of peasant families due to exploitation by capitalists. However, those who are aware of the survival of peasant families try to explain it in the Chaynovian perspective. When the Korean government initiated an extensive agricultural development program, some scholars (Reed 1979; Hong 1988) studied the effects of village solidarity on the development of group farming, while others (Chang 1985; Huh 1986) predicted the development of commercial farming—a type of peasant-into-farmer development. Recently, however, other scholars (Choi and Oh 1992; Chang 1995; Kwon and Chang 1995) insist that Korean family farms will disorganize in the near future, due to the massive out-migration of young adults in reproductive age. This paper examines these divergent arguments through an analysis of data from a revisit survey of three villages in Kyonggi Province. The initial survey was conducted in 1971, and the revisit in 1991. Before the examination, it is worthwhile to describe some demographic changes in the agricultural sector at the national level and in the villages included in this study.

According to government statistics, the number of farm households in Korea peaked in 1967, reaching a total of 2,587,000. By the end of the 1980s, the number was reduced to 1,767,000. The reduction was accompanied by a sharp decrease in average household size, from 5.8 to 3.8 members. Accordingly, farm household population decreased by more than half, from 14,431,000 to 6,661,000. The reduction is attributed primarily to the rural-to-urban migration that evolved along with industrialization and urbanization.

The populations of the three villages in this study also experienced considerably change. The total number of households during the 20-year period covered by the revisit survey increased from 274 to 281 (see table 1). The increase was mainly due to in-migration of non-farm households to one of the three villages, Shindae-ri, which is located near a newly developing industrial area. Limiting the change to farm households, we see that the number of households decreased from 246 to 151, and the average size of farm households was reduced from 6.2 to 4.2. Accordingly, farm population

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF FARM AND NONFARM HOUSEHOLDS BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991
(unit: %)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
Farm	80 (94.1)	98 (98.0)	68 (86.1)	246 (93.2)
Nonfarm	5 (5.9)	2 (2.0)	11 (13.9)	18 (6.8)
Total	85 (100.0)	100 (100.0)	79 (100.0)	264 (100.0)
1991				
Farm	50 (86.2)	60 (75.9)	41 (40.6)	151 (63.4)
Nonfarm	8 (13.8)	19 (24.1)	60 (59.4)	95 (36.6)
Total	58 (100.0)	79 (100.0)	101 (100.0)	238 (100.0)

decreased from 1,518 to 598. In 1971, 90 percent of all households were farm households, but the figure declined to 60 percent due to the combined effects of the out-migration of farm households and the influx of nonfarm households.

MARXIAN THEORY EXAMINED

Marxist scholars have argued that Korean peasants have differentiated into two classes. The argument is partly acceptable concerning the formation of the urban proletariat. The argument is wrong, however, when it refers to changes in the agrarian class structure, simply because peasants were not disintegrated into landowners and agricultural wage-earners. Instead, national statistics, as well as the current survey data, show that the small family farm persists. Although the absolute number of family farms has decreased considerably, neither large-scale family farms nor farm entrepreneurs have developed in their place. On the contrary, the proportion of large landholdings has decreased. Due to the relative underdevelopment of agriculture it would be highly unlikely for farmers to purchase large areas of land for agriculture.

One important factors that retarded the early differentiation of family farms may be the land reform which was carried out in the late 1940s. The land reform of 1947 narrowed the traditional class structure of the rural village, and equalized peasants to small landholders. Thereafter, most farmers passed their land down from generation to generation. Still, some farmers sold their land to raise their children and to invest in other businesses, while others purchased land to expand their farming area. Hence, land ownership changed significantly among farmers.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE SIZE OF FARMLAND OWNED AND CULTIVATED BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: *pyong*)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
Owned	1,928	2,639	2,685	2,422
Cultivated	2,186	2,713	3,138	2,661
1991				
Owned	2,274	1,757	2,205	2,050
Cultivated	2,790	2,457	2,746	2,646

Note: 1 *pyong* = .00081 acre.

TABLE 3. FARMLAND OWNED AND CULTIVATED BY HOUSEHOLD, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: *pyong* (%))

Scale	1971		1991	
	Owned	Cultivated	Owned	Cultivated
Less than 1000	54 (22.0)	31 (12.6)	42 (29.4)	24 (16.8)
1000-1999	53 (21.6)	60 (24.5)	35 (24.5)	31 (21.7)
2000-2999	50 (20.4)	53 (21.7)	26 (18.2)	37 (25.9)
3000-3999	36 (14.7)	52 (21.2)	35 (24.5)	21 (14.7)
4000-4999	25 (10.7)	24 (9.8)	5 (3.5)	11 (7.7)
5000 or more	27 (11.0)	25 (10.2)	–	19 (13.4)
Total	245 (100.0)	245 (100.0)	143 (100.0)	143 (100.0)

Note: 1 *pyong* = .00081 acre.

Despite ownership changes, the average size of farms did not change much. This is not only because the reform set the upper limit of land ownership to 3 acres, but also because land prices have always been beyond the financial capacity of most farmers. As tables 2 and 3 show, small family farms predominated during the 1970s and 1980s. The average size of agricultural land owned by farm households decreased significantly from 2,422 *pyong* (about 2 acres) to 2,050 *pyong* (about 1.7 acres). The average figure for cultivated land did not change, however. Upon the examination of ownership changes by village, it appears that the average farmland owned in Habonchon-ri, which was observed as the poorest village in terms of annual income and land ownership in 1971, increased considerably, while the reverse situation was experienced by the other two villages. This indicates that the differentiation process did not take place in the villages. In

TABLE 4. AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: Korean won)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971*	1,366,000	1,403,000	1,662,000	1,462,000
1991	10,464,000	8,582,000	9,385,000	9,423,000

* The 1971 figures are real incomes based on the 1991 consumer price.

TABLE 5. LEVEL OF LIVING STANDARD BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: number (%))

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
High	6 (7.5)	9 (9.2)	5 (7.4)	20 (8.1)
Middle	37 (46.3)	47 (48.0)	29 (42.6)	103 (46.0)
Low	37 (46.3)	42 (42.9)	34 (50.0)	113 (46.0)
Total	80 (100.0)	98 (100.0)	68 (100.0)	246 (100.0)
1991				
High	2 (4.3)	4 (7.3)	3 (7.3)	9 (6.3)
Middle	29 (61.7)	33 (60.0)	28 (68.3)	90 (63.0)
Low	16 (34.0)	18 (32.7)	10 (24.4)	44 (30.8)
Total	47 (100.0)	55 (100.0)	41 (100.0)	143 (100.0)

Soha-ri and Shindae-ri the average size of land owned decreased considerably, since in these villages many farmers sold their land to pay for the education of their children. Most new land owners in Soha-ri are identified as in-migrant farmers, while in Sindae-ri most are owners of factories established in the village.

A second popular argument is that Korean farmers have been pauperized due to capitalist exploitation. This argument also does not hold. During the same period, pauperization was not a general feature of changes in family farms. Table 4 shows that the average annual income during the past 20 years has increased greatly. Consequently, as shown in table 5, the number of those evaluating their standard of living as low was reduced from 46 percent to 31 percent. Tables 6 and 7 show that relatively few households have experienced downward mobility. In the 1971 survey, those reporting worse living conditions than their parents comprised 22 percent of the total. In 1991, the corresponding figure was reduced to 7.8 percent. Above all, the 1991 survey data shows that those reporting better living conditions than

TABLE 6. EVALUATION OF LIVING CONDITIONS COMPARED WITH PARENTS' BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: %)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
Better	48 (60.0)	50 (51.0)	35 (51.5)	133 (54.1)
The same	19 (23.8)	33 (33.7)	8 (11.8)	60 (24.4)
Worse	13 (16.3)	15 (15.3)	25 (36.8)	53 (21.5)
Total	80 (100.0)	98 (100.0)	68 (100.0)	249 (100.0)
1991				
Better	39 (83.0)	39 (70.9)	34 (83.2)	112 (78.3)
The same	3 (6.4)	12 (21.8)	5 (12.2)	20 (14.0)
Worse	5 (10.6)	4 (7.3)	2 (4.9)	11 (7.8)
Total	47 (100.0)	55 (100.0)	41 (100.0)	143 (100.0)

TABLE 7. CHANGES IN THE LANDHOLDINGS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS BY VILLAGE, 1991

(unit: %)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
Increased	24 (51.1)	21 (38.2)	19 (46.3)	64 (44.8)
The same	15 (31.9)	23 (41.8)	11 (26.8)	49 (34.3)
Decreased	8 (17.0)	11 (20.0)	11 (26.8)	30 (21.0)
Total	47 (100.0)	55 (100.0)	41 (100.0)	143 (100.0)

their parents comprised 78.3 percent, increasing from 54.1 percent in 1971.

Table 7 shows changes in the size of land owned by household heads after they took the status of head. These figures appear to be in accordance with the above findings. That is, the number of those whose landholdings decreased is far smaller than those whose landholdings increased. These observations fail to demonstrate that Korean farmers have been pauperized.

CHAYANOVIAN AND DISORGANIZATION THEORIES EXAMINED

As observed above, small family farms persist. At face value, this fact, seems to support the Chayanovian hypothesis. The main factors underlying the survival of family farms however, are different from those suggested by Chayanov. He asserts that peasant family farms survived by providing labor by themselves and producing what they needed. Therefore, according to

TABLE 8. AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE, NUMBERS OF WORKERS AND OUT-MIGRANTS BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
Family size	6.55	6.76	6.90	6.73
Workers	1.69	2.61	2.47	2.27
Out-migrants	.39	.58	.72	.56
1991				
Family size	5.14	4.58	4.73	4.81
Workers	3.06	3.00	2.66	2.93
Out-migrants	.80	.68	.22	.60

Chayanov, the composition and size of the family are the main factors maintaining the peasant economy. The survey data shown in table 8, do not support the hypothesis, however. In 1971, the average family size was 6.7 and the average number of workers in a family was 2.3. The figures for 1991 were 4.8 and 2.9, respectively. The fact that the average number of workers increased despite of a great decrease in family size indicates, at least, that family size does not determine the quantity of family manpower necessary for the survival of the family farm. The changes in the average family size and number of family workers means that family workers increased not because of the increase in family size but for the opposite reason, that is, because of the decrease in family size. In other words, farming families could have been maintained by maximizing family labor in order to overcome labor shortages.

The maximization of family labor is one of the two major strategies for overcoming labor shortages due to out-migration. The other strategy is the mechanization of agricultural production. As we will see later, between 1971 and 1991 the average annual amount of hired labor and *poomashi* (traditional labor exchange practice) decreased considerably due to the labor shortage. The mechanization of agricultural production, begun in the early 1970s, helped ease the labor shortage. In 1971 only two farm households in the three villages we surveyed possessed a power tiller, but in 1991, 60 percent of the total farm households owned one. In earlier times, except for tillers, no other kind of engine-operated agricultural equipment was available, but in the later times a considerable proportion of households used tractors, rice transplanters, binders, combine harvesters, etc. It may be argued that mechanization is a crucial factor for the survival of family farms, in the sense that, without mechanization, agricultural production

could hardly be maintained. This does not necessarily mean that family labor is not an important factor for the survival of family farm. It simply points to the fact that the reproduction of family members is not a sufficient condition for the survival of the family farm, especially in the face of massive out-migration and a considerable decrease in family size.

Chayanovian theory proposes the family cycle as the key determinant sustaining small family farming. The family cycle can also work in the opposite direction: the disorganization of a family farm due to the failure of reproduction. Recently this has been identified as a serious problem with the Korean family farm (Chang 1995: Chang and Kwon 1995). We have termed it the 'disorganization hypothesis' against the Chayanovian *sui generis* hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, most Korean family farms will disappear in the near future since they are run by household heads who are past the age of child-bearing. Most farming families have no young adult members in the reproductive ages, since most young adults have moved out. In 1971 when our first survey was conducted, the average age of a household head was 45, but in 1991 it climbed up to 58. As shown in table 10, in 1971, household heads in the reproductive age groups of 20-39 comprised 36.6 percent, but the corresponding figure for 1991 was reduced to 7 percent. At first glance, most farming families appear to reproduce sufficiently to sustain family farms.

The aging of the farming family, however, does not necessarily lead to a complete disorganization of family farms. There is no doubt that all family farms managed by aged members will disappear if there are no successors. Our revisit survey data, however, indicates that some of the aged heads of family farms will be succeeded by their sons or daughters, whether they live together or not. The data show that a total of 68 farm households, corresponding to 27.6 percent of total farm households in 1971, moved out of the villages, while in the same period a total of 13 farm households, or 7.3 percent of the total farm household heads, moved into the villages. A more important observation is that 53 farm households, corresponding to one-third of the total farm households in 1991, include return migrants. From these simple facts, we can infer that family farms will be reproduced, more or less, not only along the family cycle but also by in-migration as well as return migration. The relative capacity to reproduce family farms may differ from one village to another.

We do not regard rural out-migration as a force of disorganization for family farms, since it has exerted a rather positive effect on peasant-into-farm development. Because of decreased mortality rates, farmers in the early modernization period had more surviving children than did their

TABLE 11. AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: year(%))

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
20-29	2 (3.8)	6 (6.1)	2 (2.9)	11 (4.5)
30-39	28 (35.0)	35 (35.7)	16 (23.5)	79 (32.1)
40-49	21 (26.3)	27 (27.6)	34 (35.3)	72 (29.3)
50-59	19 (23.8)	20 (20.3)	19 (27.9)	58 (23.6)
60 or more	9 (10.3)	10 (10.3)	7 (9.8)	24 (9.8)
Total	80 (100.0)	98 (100.0)	68 (100.0)	246 (100.0)
Average	45.2	44.1	46.7	45.2
1991				
20-29	-	-	-	-
30-39	1 (2.1)	5 (9.1)	4 (9.8)	10 (7.0)
40-49	7 (14.9)	9 (16.4)	4 (9.6)	20 (14.0)
50-59	16 (34.0)	24 (43.6)	11 (26.8)	51 (35.7)
60 or more	23 (49.0)	17 (39.9)	22 (53.6)	62 (43.4)
Total	47 (100.0)	55 (100.0)	41 (100.0)	143 (100.0)
Average	58.9	56.0	60.0	58.1

parents. A surplus of children developed in two senses: their total labor was not needed and the land, if divided among all the children, was too small in area to support them all. The extent of man-land pressure may be calculated by constructing a hypothetical population without migration. The total number of out-migrants during the 20-year period is estimated at about 920, corresponding to more than half of the 1971 population. Among the migrants, 78 percent were married sons or daughters of the farmers. If all the married sons did not move out, there would be a total of 170 additional procreated families, which is greater than the total number of farm households observed in 1991. If we construct a hypothetical village population, including both migrants and their children born outside of the villages, it may be three or four times greater than the total population observed in 1991. Under such man-land pressure, farm households may not be able to maintain or improve their economy. In this respect, we may argue that rural out-migration helped develop family farms rather than disintegrate them.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND FARMERIZATION

The fifth hypothesis this paper examines is the collectivization of family farms into large production units. Prior to this examination, it may be

worthwhile to observe the Korean type of group farming. In Korea, the group farm takes two forms: farmer-initiated and government-initiated (Reed 1979). The former, represented by *poomashi*, has a long history, while the latter is a recent phenomena. As introduced above, in earlier times *poomashi* was widely exercised, especially when transplanting rice and weeding fields. Table 9 presents the annual amount of *poomashi* in 1971 and 1991. See that, in earlier times family farms practiced *poomashi* extensively, later decreasing to a negligible amount. In 1971, the average farming family participated in *poomashi* for about 28 days a year, although the average amount varied from village to village and from farmer to farmer, depending on the farming scale and family labor.

We should know that, even in the past, *poomashi* was not the major type of labor used. As shown in the same table, *poomashi* was used far less frequently than hired labor. From this fact it may be inferred that, unlike the frequently made argument, a modern type of group farming will not likely develop voluntarily. Another important observation from Table 9 is that the amount of *poomashi* days was reduced to 6 days during the 20 years beginning 1971. The fact that the decrease was accompanied by the same considerable decrease in hired labor indicates that family labor became a major source of manpower for agricultural production.

Around 1970, the Korean government attempted to develop the agricultural economy through the collectivization of family farms. The government learned, however, that without continuous financial support, group farming could not be maintained. After this failure, the government tried to maximize farmers' income by introducing various cooperative and supportive programs through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the Office of Rural Development. Examples of the programs

TABLE 9. AVERAGE ANNUAL AMOUNT OF LABOR, *POOMASHI* (EXCHANGED LABOR), HIRED AND SOLD BY VILLAGE, 1971 AND 1991

(unit: number of days)

	Habonchon-ri	Soha-ri	Shindae-ri	All areas
1971				
<i>Poomashi</i>	21.9	28.9	32.6	27.6
Hired	94.8	68.4	189.6	110.4
Sold	75.3	80.3	109.6	86.8
1991				
<i>Poomashi</i>	5.2	8.7	1.8	5.7
Hired	12.4	16.0	10.3	13.3
Sold	11.3	8.8	5.3	8.4

TABLE 10. USE AND OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT, 1991

(unit: number (%))

	Tiller	Tractor	Transplanter	Binder	Combine
Never Used	15 (10.5)	95 (66.4)	38 (26.6)	109 (76.2)	64 (44.8)
Individually owned	83 (57.3)	3 (2.1)	23 (16.1)	4 (2.8)	5 (3.5)
Collectively owned	4 (2.8)	11 (7.7)	19 (13.3)	6 (4.2)	10 (7.0)
Leased	27 (18.9)	16 (11.2)	33 (23.1)	10 (7.0)	27 (18.9)
Operator serviced	15 (10.5)	18 (12.6)	30 (21.0)	14 (9.8)	37 (25.9)
Total	143 (100.0)	143 (100.0)	143 (100.0)	143 (100.0)	143 (100.0)

include financial support for cooperative farming activities such as workteams, collective ownership of agricultural equipment, and collective marketing of agricultural products. Table 10 presents the uses farmers make of modern agricultural equipment. From the table we can observe that the proportion of farm households owning collective agricultural equipment, except tillers, is larger than the proportion of households owning equipment individually, and that the more expensive the equipment, the more likely the farmers are to lease them. In addition, we observe that the proportion of households leasing equipment, with or without equipment operators is generally far higher than the proportion of those owning equipment, either collectively or individually. These and other related observations suggest that collectivization has taken place to a limited extent.

The use of equipment is a substitute for manual workers. Therefore, we can assume that private ownership of equipment is a substitute for family labor, while the collective ownership and lease of equipment are substitutes for *poomashi* and hired labor, respectively. On the basis of this reasoning, we can conclude that mechanization of agricultural production is an important factor in the persistence of family farming.

The final thesis to be examined is the farmerization hypothesis. In general, various government programs for agricultural development have had a considerable effect on the transformation of peasants into farmers. Through this process, the pattern of Korean family farming has shifted from labor-intensivity to semi-mechanization. In the past, farmers cultivated their own land or that which they leased, using family labor as well as hired labor, frequently exchanging labor in times of heavy demand. Most farmers grew various kinds of crops and vegetables for their own consumption. They consumed most of what they produced and produced most of what they consumed. In such essentially subsistence economies, the average family farm had little to sell in the market, and made minimal economic

contact with the outside.

The pattern of farming changed considerably in the 20-year period covered by the current survey. A sizeable proportion of hired labor was replaced by machines, although family manpower remains a base factor of farming. New varieties of crops were introduced, with improved seeds and new greenhouse technologies. With these and other technological advances, farmers grew fewer kinds of crops and vegetables but produced more for the market. They sold most of what they produced and bought most of what they consumed in highly complex and extensively commercialized economies. It should be noted, however, that traditional farming practices did not completely disappear. Such a complete breakdown is not likely in the near future, given that the traditional and the modern sectors are usually integrated into a single system in the developmental process, rather than split into two parts (Schejtman 1980).

CONCLUSION

Through the analysis of data obtained from a revisit study of three villages, we have examined major theories which seek to explain peasant-related changes occurring as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes in farm households. The data yield results which do not support the theories, indicating that no single one of the theories is sufficient to explain these changes.

Marxian differentiation theory and the pauperization hypothesis appear to be the least appropriate for explaining the peasant-into-farm development. Both the Chayanovian peasantization theory and disorganization hypothesis, which are grounded on the same internal dynamics of the family cycle, are defective since they fail to take into account other demographic and socioeconomic changes related to family farming. The collectivization hypothesis could be well confirmed insofar as the state exerts a strong control over the agricultural economy. However, it must be pointed out that the government could hardly control all the factors necessary to maintain group farming.

This study has identified some important factors leading to the peasant-into-farmer development such as in-and-out-migration, return migration, family manpower, availability of agricultural workers, mechanization of production, commercialization, government interventions including collectivization, etc. Rural out-migration, which occurred during the period of rapid industrialization and urbanization, eased man-land pressure in farming villages. Most of the remaining farm households can keep their

land-holdings, since most of their married sons have left the villages for urban jobs. Even poor families have a good chance to lease agricultural land left by out-migrant families and possessed by other absent owners. Labor shortages due to out-migration could be overcome by the mechanization of production and the maximum utilization of family manpower. Agricultural productivity has improved noticeably with the modernization of farming, and the agricultural product market has rapidly expanded with an increase in urban population. These changes have necessitated the modernization of most family farms. Very few, however, are able to extend their land holdings to a size that would require a great deal of hired labor. Small family farms have survived by responding to changes, but their character has been transformed into a more modern form.

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