

NATIONALISM AND BOURGEOIS HEGEMONY IN NORTHEAST CHINA

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This study rethinks the intersection of class and nation in the questions of peasant mobilization and formation of nation-states in twentieth century northeast China. It explores the independent impacts of nationalism on the class relations of the peasants and the material basis of nationalism. The triangular relationships among the Japanese, the Chinese military government, and the Chinese bourgeoisie were expressed not through direct conflicts, but around ethnic nationalism. To counteract Japan's use of Koreans as surrogates for its economic penetration, the government revoked Koreans' economic and civil rights. The Chinese bourgeoisie, meanwhile, mobilized Chinese peasants to confront Korean peasants, inhibiting peasant class unity even into the 1930s.

INTRODUCTION

How do we understand nationalism conjoined with peasant mobilization? If theorizing about nationalism in the literature as "ideas," "inventions," or "imagined community" is not confined only to culture, how is it also played out in the domain of production and related with class? How have the politics of nationality and citizenship organized the ways that peasants have been subjected to production relations, the ways that surplus are expropriated, and the ways that determine the modalities and direction of peasant mobilization? These are the questions that I will explore in locating understanding of nation in material relations.

The empirical case is the identity formation and the mobilization of Chinese and Korean peasants in northeast China during the 1920s. This paper focuses on explaining the formation of national identity of the Chinese peasants against Korean peasants and Japanese in northeast China except Jiandao (Yeonbyon), because the Jiandao region needs separate study.¹ Jiandao, known to kando in Korea, was a district of Jilin province, one of three provinces in northeast China, composed of Koreans as the

¹For the comparison of regional differences, see my dissertation, "Materializing Nation and Gender: Peasant Mobilization in Northeast China from 1911 to 1945" (Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1994). It compares peasant nationalism in Jiandao and bourgeois nationalism in other parts of northeast China.

majority of the population. Jiandao was unique, by being immune to formation of national identity of peasants. Chinese nationalism against Japanese and Koreans was lacking in spirit in Jiandao. Northeast China in this paper indicates the regions of northeast China excluding Jiandao, if it is not specified. The peasants in northeast China did not rebel against high rent and taxation, but instead engaged in national struggle against Japanese and Korean immigrants. A key conflict in northeast China except Jiandao lay not in the landlord peasant relations but in the tensions between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the militarists, and between the Chinese bourgeoisie and Japanese imperialism. These tensions were expressed in Chinese nationalism during the 1920s. The nationalist movement was engineered by Chinese bourgeoisie when their economic activities were threatened by militarist warfare and by the encroachment of Japanese capital. In mustering their forces against these contending powers, the Chinese bourgeoisie mobilized the peasants and landlords in a nationalist bloc.

THEORY OF NATIONALISM

A type of theories of nationalism separates nationalism from revolution. *Nationalism transcends class division* because it is the political response of the peasants to foreign invasion, not to agrarian relations. A example routinely cited in this line of argument is Johnson's (1962) analysis of nationalism in the Chinese revolution. Johnson claims that the mobilization of peasants in the Chinese revolution in northern China from 1937 to 1945 resulted not from the peasants' interest in agrarian and political change but from nationalism, and that the Communists took power in rural areas of China by default, moving into the vacuum created as landlords fled the approaching Japanese. A similar argument that nationalism and class struggle are separate is also found in Bendix's analysis of nation-building in Europe. In seeking to reverse the Marxist position, he argues that it was not class struggle but the struggle for political and civil rights which has been determining primacy in the paths of social change. The origins and development of political change including democratization and nationalism is not conditioned by class conflict, although they may conjoin each other from time to time (Giddens 1985, pp. 201-7).

A different group of theories of *nationalism associates nationalism with the development of capitalism/industrialization*. This group can be again divided into two camps: the structural thesis and the cultural thesis. The structural thesis (Nairn and Hechter) specifies economic factors, if not class factors, as the condition under which ethnic mobilization occurs for national struggle.

The cultural thesis accounts for the processes by which people create political community, which is invented or imagined. The structural analysis is developed by Nairn and Hechter. Starting with the statement that the traditional Marxist theory of nationalism was "Marxism's great historical failure," for Nairn (1977), nationalism is an ideology, not derived from class oppression and class exploitation, but from the frustration that elites feel from uneven development in colonized regions. Nairn argues that national movements in underdeveloped countries result from the diffusion of "modernization" from Europe; and that nationalism and national liberation movements are simultaneously progressive and akin to fascism and fascist movements. If Nairn's view of nationalism is confined to underdeveloped countries, it is Hechter who has formulated similar arguments on nationalism in developed countries. In his "internal colonialism thesis," Hechter (1975) attributes the development of nationalism to an internal cultural division of labor resulting from uneven regional development caused by uneven diffusion of industrialization. He points out that nationalism has re-emerged in the Celtic periphery largely as a reaction to the failure of regional development.

While Nairn and Hechter identify economic causes of nationalism, Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson diagnose cultural change as the cause of ethnic mobilization for nationalism. Hobsbawm (1990) and Gellner (1983) agree that a nation is an invented community which shares a homogenous culture by means such as mass literacy and monolithic education systems. Anderson (1983) elaborates the same idea when he speaks of imagined communities being formed and homogenized by products of the imagination such as newspapers and novels, as well as by the standardization of printing, which made possible the transmission of these homogenizing cultural influences. Yet they agree that whether it was invented or imagined, it was constructed out of necessity as a means of coordinating people who began to disintegrate by the development of capitalism and industrialization.

Tilly (1991) points out that the structural and cultural theses are in neither opposition nor competition, but rather are complementary to each other. They identify different levels in the process of the formation of nationalism. Nairn and Hechter recognize the causes of nationalism in the economic impact of industrialization—uneven development; Gellner and Anderson point out the cultural impact of industrialization—printing, homogenous language, and diffusion of communications.

Both the structural and the cultural theses take the same position on the relations between nationalism and class. They agree that it is not in the class

struggle but in the effects of the expansion of capitalism, that nationalism originated. Because the relationship between class and the construction of national community was omitted from their analyses, however, the connection between class and the formation of the nation-state remained unaddressed. In the models of Nairn and Hechter, peasants and workers do not appear in the arena of politics, or at least not as anything more than the objects mobilized by the elite in carrying out national development. The force driving the mobilization of the masses, Nairn says, is not the economic hardship or exploitation that peasants and workers suffer, but the feeling of inferiority or backwardness that intellectuals suffer. In highlighting changes in the communication system and symbolic system, the cultural thesis also leaves out the question of what group dominates such channels of communication, and for what group's interest.

Given such absence of consideration of class elements, these two groups of contemporary theories of nationalism reveal their limitations, especially in making sense of how classes construct class hegemony based on nationalism, through commonality of culture, or with an idea of community either inherited or newly imagined with language, ethnic culture, and social networks. Another question is how the politics of nationality/ethnicity, immigration, and citizenship have organized the ways peasants have been subjected to production relations, the ways surplus was expropriated, and the factors that determine the modalities and directions of class formation.

Here, Gramsci's theory of hegemony provides us with insight on the national and colonial question. What is crucial in the account of the formation of nationalism is an analysis of classes who are striving for class hegemony and the advance of social production. Without such an analysis, the cultural formation of nationalism and the cultural influence of intellectuals cannot explain the agency of people in social change. Without it, discussion of the process of the formation of nationalism would be limited to the dimension of ideology and politics. The influence of intellectuals would be limited to a small circle of groups who are detached from classes in shaping the politics of social change (Chatterjee 1986). Reappreciation of Gramsci's concept of hegemony foregrounds the analysis of how, under the specific conditions of the economy and politics of a colonial country, domination rests on a fragile foundation, and the intellectuals' moral leadership of the dominant classes over the new nation remains fragmented (Paggi 1989).

NATION IDENTITY OF THE CHINESE AND KOREAN PEASANTS IN NORTHEAST CHINA

Northeast China was an area equivalent to Germany and France combined. It consisted of three provinces, including Jilin, Fengtian and Heilongjiang provinces. The total population in northeast China including both regions increased from approximately 15 million in 1908 to 30 million in 1931. The Japanese population was negligible in size. Koreans were the minority in northeast China. The total Korean population in northeast China increased from 0.2 million in 1910 to 0.6 million in 1930. The penetration of Koreans first began at the border between China and Korea north of the Tumen River (in the Jiandao region) and north of the Yalu River. The Korean migration then spread from there across northeast China.

Ethnic demographic patterns in northeast China is significant, not in the sense that it solely determined differences in the peasant class struggle and nationalist expression in the region, but in that it laid the grounds for how the Chinese and Japanese launched different political strategies against each other, as it will be clearly explained in this paper. Ethnic distribution alone cannot explain why anti-Japanese nationalism was transformed into anti-Korean nationalism during, but not prior to the 1920s, or why the Chinese did not simply ignore the marginal number of Koreans. It is when the analysis of national, economic, and class politics are conjoined with ethnicity and the size of the population that we reach understanding of the structural conditions under which national/ethnic identity of the Koreans and Chinese was formed.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED KOREAN POPULATION IN NORTHEAST CHINA
(Jiandao and Other Parts of Northeast China)

Year	Northeast China(A)		Jiandao (B)		Northeast China except Jiandao (C = A-B)	
	Korean(a)	Chinese(b)	Korean	Chinese	Korean	Chinese
1910	202,070	16,953,930	109,500	33,500	92,570	16,920,430
1920 (1921)	459,427	21,109,573	(307,806)	(73,748)	151,621	21,035,825
1925	531,857	356,016	86,347	17,584		
1930 (1931)	607,119	28,967,881	(395,841)	(120,394)	211,278	28,847,487
1945	1,511,470					

Notes: (a) Kim, C. (1965, p. 28).

(b) Estimates of the total Chinese population of northeast China in 1910 and 1920 were computed from the estimates of northeast China in 1908 and 1918.

(B) Kim, C.-M. (1976, p.504).

Chinese and Korean peasants in northeast China equally lacked in both class identity and national identity until the 1910s. The two groups had migrated from north China and from Korea beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. These peasants showed little inclination to engage in tenant struggles or other forms of protest against working conditions and regulations imposed by landlords and the state. The only notable difference between the Korean and Chinese peasants was the anti-Japanese nationalism among Korean peasants from northeast China, arising from their support for the independence struggle of exiled Koreans.

During the mid-1920s the antagonistic national identity of the Chinese and Korean peasants was formed in northeast China. Chinese peasants in northeast China (except Jiandao), who comprised the majority of the regional population, were mobilized into a national bloc engineered by the Chinese bourgeoisie. Chinese nationalism was invented by the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie in northeast China as a strategy to halt military-building of the northeast regional government led by Zhang Zuo-lin and Japanese penetration. The Chinese national development plan implemented by the Chinese bourgeoisie institutionalized class hegemony by exclusively favoring Chinese peasant class interests, while denying civil, economic, and political rights to the Korean peasants. The nationalist movement included no call for the reform of class relations, but rather confined itself to advocacy for the anti-Japanese struggle. The nationalist Chinese merchants and civil officials even succeeded in absorbing and neutralizing the Communist movement within their own bourgeois nationalism.

Contending National Formations in the 1910s

National formation is a socio-political category, linked to the reshaping of state boundaries and the nature of state power. According to Prasenjit Duara (1988), the Chinese experience of state formation distinctly different from that which occurred earlier in Europe. In China, statemaking was proclaimed within the framework of nationalism and related ideas of modernization. In eighteenth-century Europe, nationalism occurred after the establishment of a strong state, but in China the two processes were simultaneous. The military forces which contended for state power also sought to strengthen China's capacity to defend itself against the encroachments of imperial Japan, which had been continuous since the late 19th century. The Qing dynasty ended in 1911, and was followed by the Republic period (1911-1945). Although the Republic officially represented a unified China, China did not have a center of gravity, being a battlefield

fought over by local militarists and imperialist foreign powers until 1949 (Ch'i 1976).

Military Warfare for Nation-Building

Northeast China simultaneously experienced reorganization of state power, territorial disputes, and threats from foreign powers. During the Republic period, military buildup and economic development engendered tensions in the process of nation-state formation. The Zhang Zuo-lin faction, which ruled northeast China, engaged in a military buildup, intending to defeat in civil war the other military factions, the Communist Party and the Guomindang Party.

Zhang Zuo-lin had previously been a soldier of the Qing dynasty, a mercenary for Russia during the war between Russia and Japan in China, and a bandit. The central body of Zhang's power in northeast China was the Fengtian (Mukden) clique, based in the city of Mukden in Fengtian province. The clique was organized by Zhang Zuo-lin's loyal relatives, former bandit comrades, and close advisors. After becoming the military and civil governor of Fengtian province in 1916, Zhang Zuo-lin gained enough military power to demand that the Republic government in Beijing appoint his subordinates to the posts of civil governors in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. Zhang's 1917 takeover of Heilongjiang put the province under the control of the Fengtian clique. In Jilin province, Zhang's close associates had by 1919 assumed the positions of military chief of staff, chief secretary, treasurer, and police chief (McCormack 1975).

The military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces assisted Zhang Zuo-lin, the military governor of the Fengtian, in his continuous warring with rival militarists in China. Zhang Zuo-lin's civil governors in the three provinces took charge of administration, taxation, and police functions, exercising their control through the offices of the district magistrates, the lowest-level territorial and administrative officials. Zhang's military power empowered these three provincial governors (hereafter referred to as the northeast government) to control the tax bases in their appointed regions and thereby financially support Zhang Zuo-lin's military operations. The northeast government retained a large proportion of revenue which should have been transferred to the central government (the Republic in Beijing), and by the early 1920s it had also ceased remitting revenues it collected from taxes imposed on large companies, mining operations, and tobacco, wine, and salt (McCormack 1975, p. 911; Suleski 1974).

The northeast government led by Zhang Zuo-lin waged wars constantly,

attempting to forge a unified China by pacifying other militarist factions. The Mukden clique (Fengtian clique), the military base of Zhang Zuo-lin's rule in northeast China, was not a merely a regional faction, but a potential contender for national power with clear ambitions to extend its power into Beijing. Zhang's armies were first involved in the politics of the central government in the spring of 1918, and were involved thereafter in a constant cycle of advance and retreat during the 1920s. In 1920, the Zhang Zuo-lin's Army was involved in fighting central government forces under Tan Chi-jui, who assumed control of the central government following the death in 1916 of Yuan Shik-kai, first president of the Chinese Republic. Zhang Zuo-lin formed an alliance with the Zhili leaders to defeat the Anhwei faction. As his reward, Zhang Zuo-lin was given control over the special zones, including Jehol and Chahar, in northwest China. By the early 1920s, Zhang Zuo-lin had consolidated his power base enough to present himself as a "candidate for the unification of China." Zhang Zuo-lin pursued his drive to form a single nation-state in China until his defeat in the First Fengtian-Zhili war in 1922. Zhang Zuo-lin had entered China proper (the region south of the Great Wall or the region excluding northeast China) to attack the Zhili faction, but was defeated.

The national formation of Zhang Zuo-lin's faction was not based on an unified institutional state apparatus, but was based in and operated by a military clique which was "feudal" rather than "modern" in character, in the view of many historians, who consider Zhang Zuo-lin's expansion of military power toward Beijing as an irrational extension of personal power, not as a campaign to build a modern Chinese nation. Historians' use of the term "warlord" in referring to militarists such as Zhang Zuo-lin is indicative of their historian's understanding of military government as primitive, personal, and premodern in nature. The warlord government was regarded nothing like a modern state, but rather was feudalistic. The claimed evidence were the organizational character of the regime, its origin, recruitment pattern, and orders of hierarchy among the state militarists who wielded power. For example, Zhang Zuo-lin and other militarists originated among bandit gangs. Unable to eradicate the bandits, the local governments during that time resorted to granting bandits military rank in an attempt to pacify them. Bandits and soldiers were often one and the same; warlords recruited bandits into their armies, and ex-soldiers often became bandits (Billingsley 1978). The military armies were built on personal loyalty to the warlord, who surrounded himself at the command level with close personal comrades and blood relatives. Yet, if a "modern" nation-state is one engaged in nation-state building while pursuing industrial and capitalistic

development, then the government of northeast China should be so categorized. The issue in question regarding northeast China is not whether the military government there was feudal or modern, but rather, how government militarists and the national bourgeoisie in northeast China contended to pursue different courses of nation-state building and industrial modernization.

Defeat in 1922 came suddenly for Zhang Zuo-lin who had risen quickly from being a bandit, to military governor of the provinces in northeast China, and a serious threat to the government in Beijing. Defeat in the Fengtian-Zhili War cost the Fengtian Army 3,000 soldiers' lives, weakened the Fengtian faction as a threat to Beijing, at least until the Second Fengtian-Zhili war in 1925, and greatly mitigated its power within northeast China. After his army's defeat in the First Fengtian-Zhili War, Zhang Zuo-lin declared regional independence of northeast China from China proper. This declaration of independence was by no means a withdrawal from Beijing politics, but rather a strategy of embattled retreat, in preparation for another war later. Also at this time, Zhang Zuo-lin faced internal conflict within his Fengtian clique. Resentful of Zhang Zuo-lin's favorable treatment of his exbandit comrades and certain Japanese-trained officers in the Fengtian clique, a group of Chinese-trained soldiers led by Kuo revolted in 1925. Kuo was emboldened in his revolt by his mistaken assumption that he would win Japanese support.

It was the 1922 defeat of Zhang Zuo-lin in Fengtian which provided the Chinese bourgeoisie with the political opportunity to challenge the militarists and Japanese imperialism with their program for "rational" and "independent" economic development.

The Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in the 1920s

The counter-formation of a nation-state by the Chinese bourgeoisie in northeast China was the product of two unique regional conditions. First, there were no strong ties between the landowning gentry and the state, which might have blocked the efforts of the bourgeoisie as happened in China proper. Second, the Chinese bourgeoisie was able to emerge and develop as a class which represented national interest, garnering their power by playing dangerously between militarists and Japan and by mobilizing the peasants in the national bloc.

The Chinese bourgeoisie indeed survived and slowly began to gain power through cooperation and negotiation with the military governments which monopolized market transactions and the flow of currencies until the

defeat of the Fengtian-Zhili war in 1922. Merchants relied on warlords for protection, but their commercial trade was threatened by currency instability caused by constant military expansion. Warlords were the main investors in county banks. Their money secured the financial system. Warlords exercised political control over markets, maintaining a strong grip on the most important centers where market goods and currency traded in large quantities, thereby restricting the activities of the merchants (liangchan) who were trading staple farm products. Under such circumstances, it became compulsory for liangchan or any similar business entities to maintain close relations with the warlords. The merchants' need to peg the rate of fiat money or predict the rate made them dependent on government officials. Because these officials manipulated currency and finance to their advantage rather freely and no one outside of the governmental circle was able to predict changes in exchange rates, merchants were at the mercy of the warlords (*Contemporary Manchuria* 1937, pp. 57-58).

Planted in the cooperative relationship between the military government and bourgeoisie was a seed of conflict. First, the military buildup being pursued for the unification of China was a goal too distant and expensive for the bourgeoisie in northeast China, which as a region was already embarked on a separate course from that of greater China proper. With the highest priority being given to warfare, little revenue remained for spending on economic development. With the government monopolizing market trading to raise profits and issuing currencies to finance the war, economic stability was endangered by inflationary pressure and unpredictable government interventions. Second, as the Zhang Zuo-lin regime's reliance on Japanese military support opened the gate to Japanese monopoly capital investment in northeast China, the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie were threatened by the increasing infusion of Japanese capital. In return for Japanese military and financial support, Zhang Zuo-lin relaxed regulatory barriers against Japanese investment in northeast and establishment of Japanese-Chinese joint ventures in timber, mining and agriculture. The increasing infusion of Japanese money that resulted from these leniencies threatened Chinese merchants and motivated them to form an alliance with civil bureaucrats to pressure the government for a national development plan instead of endless civil wars.

The 1922 defeat of Zhang in the war was the watershed which reversed the power balance between the Zhang Zuo-lin's faction and the bourgeoisie. The 1922 war was expensive and inflationary, and would have been a disaster for the economy even if Zhang Zuo-lin had won. Financing the war

precipitated the breakdown of the financial system, which had been increasingly strained since 1916. Zhang Zuo-lin's Fengtian faction had at least eight large scale loans totaling over ten million yuan from foreign-controlled consortia in Shanghai. Zhang Zuo-lin also drained the provincial treasury by making payments on these loans and accruing interest. The military withdrew surplus funds from the provincial treasury and also issued new currency, draining the treasury by several million yuan. In addition, most of the civil bodies in Shenyang, including the Shenyang General Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry, the Education Society, several banks, and even the Provincial Assembly, were pressed into making monetary donations to the war effort (Suleski 1974, p. 66).

The Chinese bourgeoisie envisioned the formation of a nation-state only within northeastern China. Their intention was to pressure Zhang Zuo-lin to sever northeast China from the rest of the country and abandon his warmaking against surrounding regimes, so that "national" development of the northeast could proceed against the tide of Japanese economic intervention. Within the regional government of northeast China, militarists striving to establish a nation-state throughout China and civil bureaucrats intent on creating a nation-state in northeast China only were simultaneously bound together and driven apart by their interests and their efforts to establish conflicting visions of national identity.

The Chinese bourgeoisie proposed to halt military expansion and pursue independent development of northeast China, separating the region from China proper. This plan gained initial support from civil bureaucrats in the Fengtian province and then received strong support and cooperation from other provinces. Proposed governmental and economic reforms were supported by the chambers of commerce representing the organized business community in the three provinces. The Chinese bourgeoisie allied with civil bureaucrats in carrying out administrative reforms to regulate currency circulation in the markets and to guarantee the use of revenues for economic stabilization and investment.

The military government's dependence on civil bureaucrats and business groups to raise revenue to finance the military gave the bourgeoisie leverage to pursue the administrative and economic reforms for national economic development. As a first step, the Chinese bourgeoisie and civil bureaucrats were able to pressure Zhang Zuo-lin to assure the separation of the civil and military governments. This separation of government was essential to reverse the priority from military spending to economic investment. It would enable civil bureaucrats to monitor military spending, budget preparation, allocation of funds, and the withdrawal and transfer of

treasury funds.

The principle goal of the reforms was to revive the northeastern economy. The popular slogan was "Protect Borders, Pacify the People" (an-min, pao-ching). Although economic reform and the development plan tended to focus on Fengtian Province, the military base of the Fengtian clique, economic reforms were also carried out in collaboration with the business communities and governments of Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. Among several government reforms implemented to secure revenues for economic development, the first was to achieve greater efficiency in tax collection efforts, 372 small tax collection offices, which had been previously operating from inside major cities and trade centers, were relocated to be near the county seats in the provinces for which they had administrative responsibilities. Reports of false tax reports and improper assessments were vigorously investigated to collect revenue due but never received by the provincial treasuries. The reform also included the reorganization of the Finance Bureau to establish complete civilian control over provincial funds, thereby limiting the military's access to them.

In addition, the so-called "Development and Colonization Plan" devised by the civil government was a comprehensive program to develop national economy. Two major undertakings intended to expand national development and restrain the profits of Japanese investment were the establishment of a Chinese textile industry and the construction of Chinese-owned and Chinese-operated railways, which were mostly profitable businesses. As a special project of the Bureau of Industry, a company called the Textile Mill of the Three Eastern Provinces was created in Shenyang (Mukden), the capital of Fengtian province. To meet the regional demand for cotton and cotton goods, the government provided farmers with low-interest loans to grow cotton, and also built factories to take advantage of expanding demand for machine-woven cotton yarn in China and in the international market. Many of the cotton goods sold in northeast China at the time were the inexpensive products of Japanese textile mills, an industry that produced jobs for Japanese workers and acceptable profits for Japanese trading companies. The government-built textile mill was intended to capture some of the cotton market away from the Japanese by producing cotton goods more cheaply than the Japanese mills.²

Railways were the most practical mode of transportation in northeast

²Japanese investment into textile mills went beyond northeast China. According the Kang Chao's (1982) estimates, there were only 111,939 Japanese-owned spindles in 1914; by 1924 there were 1,218,544; and by 1934 there were 2,242,624. Although separate statistics were not available for northeast of China, the most dramatic burst of growth came in the years between

China, because for at least four months of the year waterborne traffic is halted due to frozen rivers. Railways were therefore the most lucrative of all businesses. Although northeast China was relatively well-served by railways, less than 1 percent of the network was Chinese-owned. Chinese merchants had confined themselves to the use of carts to transport their products because the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway (SMR) were prohibitively expensive. Affordable national railways would therefore greatly expand the profits of the Chinese government by facilitating domestic trade and industry. The national development plan called for the construction of the Mukden-Jilin-Hailin railroad, complemented by a new harbor at Hulutao, as an alternative to the SMR rail line connecting at the port of Dalian.⁵) Between 1924 and 1931, Chinese authorities in northeast China financed and constructed some 800 miles of railways designed to compete with the Japanese-operated SMR and the Central Eastern Railway. The new Mukden-Jilin line ran parallel to the SMR on the East. The Chinese made traffic arrangements with all parts of their national railway system and refused similar arrangements between their lines and those of the SMR. Both parties engaged in a rate-cutting war, but the Chinese had the advantage because a fall in the price of Chinese silver currency made the freight rates on the Chinese lines cheaper than the goldbased Japanese rates on the SMR (Jones 1949, p.105).

How National Were the Chinese Nationalisms?

The national development movement of the civil bureaucrats and bourgeoisie inevitably challenged Japanese economic interests in northeast China during the 1920s. The construction of Chinese railways and textile mills posed clear threats to Japanese economic interests. Chinese railways competing with the South Manchuria Railway were the most serious threat. Japanese investment in the South Manchuria Railway Company amounted to 86.7 percent of the total Japanese investment in the Guandong Leased Territory located at the southern tip of Fengtian province, which Japan leased from the central Chinese government at Beijing.

This economic contest between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Japanese

1918 and 1922, when most of the major cotton manufacturing firms in Japan had either purchased plants or built new spinning and weaving mills in Shanghai or Tsingtao. By 1930, the Japanese owned 43 mills, or about onethird of the 127 mills then operating in China.

⁵For more descriptions, see *Manchuria Year Book, 1932-1933*, p. 247; *Gendaishi shiryo (Materials on Contemporary History)*, vol. 3, p. 403; *Nihon gaiko nenpyo narabini shuyo monjo (Chronology and Important Select Documents in Japanese Diplomacy)*, vol. 2.

did not immediately provoke violent confrontation. It was not until 1931 that the Japanese government responded to the plea of Japanese investors, who demanded that the Japanese government take immediate and aggressive action. I argue that the nonviolent expression of conflict between the Chinese and Japan was a result of the triangular relationships, by which I will argue Japan and the Chinese bourgeoisie competed with each other, but at the same time shared a common interest in bringing a halt to the civil wars of the Zhang Zuo-lin regime.

Continuation of Wars

While the economic reforms were being carried out, Zhang Zuo-lin initially seemed to accommodate the plans for the rationalization of the financial system and economic development, but he was soon preparing for a second war against the Zhili faction by forming alliances with their enemies, recruiting bandits to swell his army's ranks, modernizing the army's arsenal, and building a new naval seaport. The separation of the civil and military governments, by which the civil bureaucrats had attempted to guarantee the civil government's control over revenue, did not prevent Zhang Zuo-lin from engaging in civil wars. Indeed, Zhang Zuo-lin's Fengtian clique regained full military power in 1925. Its six reorganized armies attacked the Zhili force in 1924, taking advantage of the fact that factions of the Zhili clique were fighting each other at the time. Zhang Zuo-lin won the Second Fengtian-Zhili war, but his victory and the power he regained over the Beijing central government in 1925 did not bring an end to war in the northeastern provinces. Instead, there were more wars and casualties than ever as a coalition of rival warlords attacked Zhang Zuo-lin together.

The rebuilding of Fengtian military power in just three years following the Zhili defeat in 1922 came at an exorbitant cost to the northeastern economy that the Chinese bourgeoisie and civil bureaucrats had tried to revive. To field his large army in continuous wars, Zhang Zuo-lin commandeered the provincial treasuries. The second war against the Zhili faction alone cost some 70 million yuan. Military expenditures totaled 51 million yuan in 1925, while the entire gross product of Fengtian Province that year was only 23 million yuan. In addition, Zhang Zuo-lin circulated an excessive supply of money and withdrew substantial amounts of hard currency from the treasury and the banks in Mukden, capital of Fengtian Province. Zhang Zuo-lin's warring further deepened the economic crisis, rampant inflation, and currency fluctuation that the civil bureaucrats and

bourgeoisie had sought to control. The currency instability first experienced in 1922 worsened, as did the overburdened economy, throughout the rest of the decade. In addition, most civic organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry, several banks and even the provincial assemblies of Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, were pressured by the government to make monetary donations and to buy bonds to sustain the war effort (Suleski 1974, pp. 66, 171).

When their hard-won negotiation with the militarists to separate the civil and military government was routinely violated by the militarists, the Chinese bourgeoisie found their own power no match for that of the military. But the Chinese bourgeoisie did not just passively watch their economic reforms sacrificed to the expansion of military power. They instead found an ally in the Japanese, who shared their interest in putting a stop to Zhang Zuo-lin's wars which were ruining the economy of northeast China.

Triangular Relations

Prior to the 1920s, the relationship between the military government of northeast China and Japan could be characterized as an ambiguous set of interlocking relations. Japan at first expanded its political and economic influence in the region by providing the military government in northeast China with military aid. Japan's pursuit of its own interests brought contradictions. Japan supported Zhang Zuo-lin initially only because he was strong enough to maintain the political stability in northeast China needed for investment. At the same time, Japan had to try to bring Zhang Zuo-lin under control and prevent him from starting wars with other factions in China proper. At the same time Japan helped him to increase his power over other militarists within northeast China. This, however, enabled him to then wage wars with other factions in China proper, and this Japan did not want. When the Japanese threatened to withdraw their military support in March, 1922, Zhang Zuo-lin issued an order forbidding any Japanese joint ventures in the three northeast provinces. At times, and especially in 1917 and 1918, Japan had also provided military support to the Zhili faction to check Zhang Zuo-lin's power and keep him from growing strong enough to threaten Japan or expand into China proper.

Caught between the complaints of the Chinese bourgeoisie about Japanese economic penetration, and his need for continuing Japanese military aid, Zhang Zuo-lin was responsive to Japanese complaints. In return for Japan's military and financial support, Zhang Zuo-lin relaxed

regulatory barriers against Japanese investment in northeastern China, and allowed the establishment of Japanese-Chinese joint ventures in timber, mining, and agriculture. The increasing infusion of Japanese money that resulted from these leniencies threatened Chinese merchants and motivated them to form an alliance with civil bureaucrats to pressure the government for a national development plan instead of endless civil wars. The Zhang Zuo-lin regime maneuvered between pressure from civil bureaucrats to limit Japanese economic rights and pressure from Japan to extend its economic rights in return for financial support to his military government. Under Japanese pressure, Zhang Zuo-lin gave assurances to Japan in 1923 that he would use force to suppress any demonstrations calling for the return of the leased territory; but at a policy-making conference with his top aides in April of that year, he advocated offering no opposition to the nationalist rights-recovery movement, because doing anything to block it would, he said, "excite the suspicions of the Chinese people" (Young 1929).

In the 1920s, the relationship between the military government of northeast China and Japan took a turn, in conjunction with the rise of Chinese nationalism. Bourgeois Chinese nationalism turned the ambiguous, strained relations between Japan and the military government of northeast China into a triangular relationship, which assured that no one party among the Chinese bourgeoisie, the militarists, and the Japanese would be able to dominate the others for long. Every party shared interests with the others in one way or another, while every party at the same time tried to use the other powers to their advantage, to extend their influence over the region. The Chinese bourgeoisie were no match for the military's power (as was evident in the military government's frequent violation of the separation of civil and military government agreement). Instead, it was the political stalemates resulting from the three-way split of power that enabled the Chinese bourgeoisie to challenge both the militarists and Japan.

As Japan maneuvered to extend its economic rights from the Guandong Leased Territory to other provinces of northeast China, the Chinese bourgeoisie targeted the military government in northeast China as well as Japan. The Japanese approved of the civil bureaucrats' movement to end the regional wars and separate northeast China from China proper, since these were Japan's goals as well. To the extent that Japan had leverage to pressure Zhang Zuo-lin into withdrawing from political intrigue in Beijing, the Chinese bourgeoisie and civil bureaucrats shared an interest with Japan. Beginning in the early 1920s, Japan acted in league with the Chinese bourgeoisie in efforts to halt Zhang Zuo-lin's military expansion, because his incessant wars were disrupting the stable climate required for the safety

and appreciation of Japanese capital investment.

Koreans as the Medium of National Conflicts

In their respective situations, neither the Japanese nor Chinese bourgeoisie could resort to direct military confrontation. The strategy that the Chinese bourgeoisie adopted against Japan was to challenge the treaties Japan had signed with the Zhang Zuo-lin or the central government, and to monitor and prevent Chinese from engaging in jointventures with or leasing land to Japanese. Another medium of conflict between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Japanese that figured in the triangular power balance was the victimization of Korean peasants and resultant ethnic conflict among Chinese and Korean peasants. The conflict was instigated by the Japanese as part of their strategy for exploiting the Korean presence in northeast China to extend Japanese commercial and military interests. After annexing Korea in 1910, Japan claimed that Koreans in northeast China were Japanese citizens. As Japan exploited the presence of *Korean immigrants in northeast China as a pretext for further economic penetration*, issues of citizenship for Korean peasants (including the rights to reside, work, and own property in northeast China) became the focus of Chinese-Japanese conflict, as each side claimed authority to dictate what Korean peasants could or could not do. This is the context in which the Chinese bourgeoisie mobilized the Chinese peasantry.

In other words, *the class experiences of Chinese and Korean peasants were constructed by national political strategies*, resulting from the balance of power struck between the Chinese military government in northeast China, the Chinese bourgeoisie, and Japan. The national/class experience of the peasants set the pattern for peasant mobilization, which was manifested in nationalist antagonisms between Chinese and Korean peasants. The Chinese bourgeoisie expanded its capacity to exercise class hegemony over the peasants. Their class hegemony was constructed by organizing the consent of the Chinese peasants, without altering class relations. The national reform proposals put forward by the Chinese bourgeoisie entailed material benefits for Chinese peasants while excluding them for Korean peasants. At the same time, the Chinese bourgeoisie engineered antagonisms between Chinese peasants and Korean peasants which would undermine the class capacity of the peasants as a whole.

Class/National Experience of Peasants

1. Common Class Experience

Peasant living conditions further deteriorated with the fluctuation of market prices for agricultural products, while the militarists continued to damage the economic environment and printed excessive amounts of currency causing accelerating inflation. According to the conventional historiography on northeast China, the outcome of these conditions was an increasing peasant impoverishment and polarization of class structure. As self-cultivating peasants became landless and tenants competed for land, the size of cultivated land per household decreased, yielding lower productivity and thus continuing the vicious cycle of exploitation and poverty. Farm prices fell even more drastically with the worldwide depression that struck with a crash in 1929.

In this condition, the landless peasants including tenants and agricultural laborers increased during the 1920s, as land ownership became more concentrated in the hands of a few land owners. Table 2 indicates the numbers of landowners and tenants over the time period from 1917 to 1926. The gap between class structures in the three provinces is less than 5 to 10 percent for each class category.

Despite high level of exploitation, class polarization, and poverty, the peasants did not engage in the collective action for reduction of rent or distribution of land, but instead the peasants were divided by nationality, and the Chinese peasants were mobilized into a nationalist movement at the expense of Korean peasants. It is when we analyze *the class experience of peasants by nationality* that we begin to understand the mobilization patterns of the Chinese and Korean peasants who clashed with each other. *The*

TABLE 2. LAND TENURE IN NORTHEAST CHINA, 1917 AND 1926 (in percent of households)

Province	Owner-Cultivator		Owner-Tenant		Tenant	
	1917	1926	1917	1926	1917	1926
Fengtian	40.6	42.6	29.6	27.9	29.8	29.5
Jilin	46.7	48.4	22.7	23.3	30.6	28.4
Heilongjiang	55.8	56.7	18.9	17.4	25.3	25.9
Average	49.1	49.2	23.7	22.9	28.6	27.9

Sources: For 1917, South Manchuria Railway Company, *Man-Mo Zensho (Complete Works on Manchuria and Mongolia)* (Dalian, 1923), vol. 3, pp. 135-46; for 1926, South Manchuria Railway Company, *Manshu ni okeru nogyo kinyu (Agricultural Credit and Finance in Manchuria)*, recited from Lee (1983, p. 19).

unequal national difference of class experience of the Chinese and the Korean peasants, which is hidden in the various statistics on class structure, resulted from the changing experiences of Chinese peasants under the Development and Colonization Plan that the Chinese civil government employed since 1923 and of Korean peasants subjected to the Japanese strategy of using Koreans as tool of economic intervention.

2. National/Class Experience of Chinese Peasants

When the civil bureaucrats envisioned stabilization and rationalization of the economy, the instability of the regional labor pool seemed to be a barrier. The Development and Colonization Plan enacted in 1923 was intended to stabilize the agricultural and industrial labor forces by offering workers material subsidies and other incentives to stay longer or settle down permanently. Recognizing that enactment of a national economic development plan would require a large and stable labor force that could be allocated as needed to build railroads and other industrial infrastructure, the Bureau of Administration launched a colonization program designed to promote the permanent settlement of migrant Chinese workers in northeast China in 1923. The government wanted to induce workers to move to less crowded regions in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces, instead of continuing to compete with each other for jobs in the already heavily populated areas of southern Fengtian province. Government subsidies were given to Chinese immigrants who enrolled in the Plan, regardless of the occupation they registered.

The provincial government in northeast China offered similar benefits to Chinese migrants to induce them to stay longer. For example, the provincial governments provide cash subsidies to purchase land and to construct dwellings. Permanent ownership of these lands and dwellings would revert to immigrants after five years of their continuous occupation. In some areas of Jilin Province, Chinese immigrants were assigned a plot of government-owned land, and a deed for one-half of the land was given outright to the immigrant, with the remaining half available for purchase later. In the case of both government-owned and privately-owned land included under this incentive program, rent was suspended for the first few years (usually five years) of occupation. Government taxes on the land were also suspended during the same initial period. In addition, immigrants sometimes received livestock from the provincial government or from private owners of the land (*Manshu nichinichi shimbun*, March 27, 1925; May 1, 1926; February 23, 1928).

The goal of the provincial governments was to increase the resident

Chinese immigrant population up to 200,000 households, or a minimum of 400,000 persons annually. In 1924, 384,730 Chinese migrants entered Manchuria and 184,684 remained. In 1925, at least 472,978 entered and of those, 235,232 remained, setting a trend that continued until 1927. The average length of stay for Chinese migrants gradually increased. By the late 1920s approximately 40 percent of the entering migrants stayed for three years, and 15 percent stayed at least four years. This trend continued until 1932.

The Development and Colonization Plan functioned as a means for civil bureaucrats and bourgeoisie to construct hegemony or legitimacy for the peasants, without changing the class relations such as rate of rent and terms of contracts. They did so by providing material subsidies to the Chinese peasants under the so-called colonization plan, while denying the same benefits to Korean peasants, actively preventing them from obtaining work, and fomenting or tolerating acts of ethnic violence against them. The national bloc was then utilized as a political weapon to attack Korean peasants and the Japanese. In contrast to the preferential governmental treatment given to Chinese immigrants, the Korean immigrants were just as actively oppressed. This anti-Korean oppression was a deliberate strategy to counter Japan's opportunistic use of Korean immigrants as instruments of Japanese economic penetration.

3. National/Class Experience of the Korean Peasants

Prior to the 1920s, Korean peasants lived and engaged in agricultural cultivation in northeastern China without ownership of property. Without any recognition in law of their right to own property, their claim to the land they cultivated was weak. Koreans often reclaimed unwanted wasteland, restored it to value, but then were deprived of it by landlords who claimed ownership of the land and compelled the Koreans to pay rent as tenants. This class experience of the Korean peasants began to change during the 1920s, however, as they became caught in the nationalist conflict between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Japanese. As bans on land leasing or participation in commercial ventures with Japanese were strictly enforced during the 1920s, Japan had viewed Korean settlement in northeast China as an exploitable opening for expansion of Japanese economic interests.

To block Japanese attempts to use Korean proxies as business agents, and treaty claims pertaining to the Japanese claim that Korean immigrants were Japanese subjects, the Chinese adopted assimilation policies to naturalize Koreans as Chinese citizens. Naturalization and education in Chinese language and customs were directed toward Korean immigrants as major

policy drives in the early 1920s, although the efforts became more sporadic later in the decade. In addition to educational strategy, the other major attempt to control the Korean population was the naturalization effort begun by the Zhang regime, which had encouraged Korean immigrants to acquire Chinese citizenship. Yet, the naturalization policy was ineffective for being shifted from compulsory naturalization to regulation of naturalization. It was because, the Chinese authority perceived, Korean naturalization was used by the Japanese as a strategy to extend its investment in land, given the condition that the buying and leasing of land by the Japanese was restricted by the Chinese government in northeast China.

Koreans who were naturalized into Chinese citizens were mobilized by the Japanese into buying land on behalf of the Japanese and then working as tenants or managers of land. As the Chinese government found this out, it imposed several restrictions in 1929. Koreans who were eligible to apply for naturalization were those who held a certain amount of property and had been residents in northeast China for at least five consecutive years at the time of application. And then, the naturalization policy shifted back again to compulsory naturalization. In 1931, the Fengtian provincial government declared that Korean residents in Fengtian Province had to be naturalized to qualify for leasing land. The naturalized Koreans were employed to spy on the movements of the Japanese and unnaturalized Koreans. If Koreans refused to naturalize, the Chinese landlords were instructed to repossess their leased land. If governmental measures were insufficient, Chinese mobs would attack the resisting Koreans to make an example of them. If they still refused to cooperate, the Chinese authorities resorted to imprisoning them (Document B, p. 74).

Because Chinese naturalization policy alternated between compulsory naturalization of the Koreans and restriction of naturalization, it seemed ineffective in promoting assimilation of Koreans to become Chinese citizens. As the naturalization policy became inactive, governmental regulation of the Koreans implemented other measures to prevent Koreans from leasing land or even residing in northeast China. The motive for this persecution arose from Chinese belief that some of the land the Koreans leased for a long term was actually paid for by Japanese capital and that the Japanese intended to acquire more land through this method. What should be noted is that these limitations of Koreans' access to land varied in degree and over time. When the regulations for Korean residence and work were not elevated to the level of wholesale eviction of Koreans from land, the government measures included regulation of the term for leasing land,

which would make Koreans be subjected to sudden changes of the terms and rents, evaluation for their qualifications to lease land, imposition of charges for water and fertilizer, and the destruction of their houses. When the oppression of the Koreans was intensified, the regulation of Koreans' lease of land and their work was geared to evict Koreans from land. Contracts were canceled between Chinese and Koreans concerning joint undertakings for the cultivation of paddy-fields, leasing land to Koreans at any term or rate, hiring Koreans as agricultural laborers, or renting houses to them, so that Koreans could do nothing but leave the province. Chinese who sold lands, paddy fields, or other property to Koreans or allowed them to engage in such enterprises were heavily punished.

The local authority in the Whinam district in Fengtian province in 1928 ordered Koreans to abandon rented land and houses, and leave. The law was invoked to evict 20 Korean households in Charantun village just before harvest in 1928 (Hyon *et al.* 1985). The Police Affairs Bureau of Fengtian province in 1931 instructed the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety to cancel contracts for renting land and houses that Chinese signed with Koreans. The same law prohibited Chinese from selling land, paddy fields or other property to Koreans (Nukaga 1931, pp. 49-50). In Sanksingpao, Koreans were dispossessed of one thousand acres of paddy fields that they had reclaimed through ten years of labor. During the time when the local governments intended to evict Koreans from land, any charge was brought up against the Koreans. Koreans who traversed the public land were even arrested. In Santokwan, eight Korean families cultivating twenty acres were evicted on the grounds that they had not been naturalized. Koreans who had erected houses with material purchased from Chinese suppliers were arrested, and their houses were torn down, on the charge that the wood had been stolen from Chinese forests.⁶⁾

Imagined National Antagonisms Between Korean and Chinese Peasants

Facing the oppression, some Koreans left, leaving behind the land they had converted from wasteland into tillable land by the investment of their toil and labor in it. They returned to Korea or moved to the Jiandao region where Koreans had the rights of residence and property ownership. Some Koreans who were strong enough to live with fear stayed on the land after bribing local authorities. Some Koreans engaged in the series of anti-Chinese riots which began on July 3 in Keijo and then spread beyond

⁶Recorded in the *Lytton Report*, a U.S. Daily, October 19, 1931, and in *New York Times*, August 3, 1931, recited from Nukaga (1931, p.46).

Jiandao.

The Koreans' anger was aimed not only at Chinese government officials, but also at Chinese peasants. In a single riot in Keijo alone, over eighty Chinese peasants were killed by Korean peasants, according to the *New York Times* on July 6, 1931. It provoked Chinese peasants' riots against Korean peasants; the Chinese looted or destroyed Korean houses and massacred Koreans in many places. Three hundred Koreans were reported to have been killed at Suping kai and as many as 10,000 Koreans in Jilin province alone, according to newspaper reports such as the *New York Times* and *Japan Weekly Chronicle* on October 1 and November 5, 1931.

At first glance, confrontation between Korean peasants and Chinese peasants in northeast China outside of Jiandao emerged from their economic competition for land and resources in northeast China. Yet, if we look closely at the population density and the amount of land available for reclamation or cultivation, we can see that the antagonisms between Chinese and Korean peasants were not likely to be driven by economic rivalry. There was still a vast area untilled and unoccupied in northeast China. In 1910, according to Hosie, no more than one-fifth of the arable land of northeast China was under cultivation. As Table 3 suggests, only about fifty percent of the tillable land in northeast China was cultivated, leaving much land open for reclamation by migrants. At least one-half of Jilin province remained untilled; Fengtian province had three or four tenths which still was untilled; and only a handful of land was under cultivation in Heilongjiang province.

The Development and Colonization Plan, which I have explained earlier, was indeed enacted beginning in 1923 by the northeast Chinese government to exploit these unclaimed and uncultivated areas. The Plan offered material incentives to Chinese immigrants to stay longer or permanently. It is also less likely to expect rapid progress in land reclamation during the latter half of 1920s, because about fifty percent of the Chinese peasants were still transient male migrants. Furthermore, it is not likely that the Korean population, which amounted to about 150,000, caused competition for land

TABLE 3. SIZE OF TILLABLE LAND AND CULTIVATED LAND IN 1930 (in million of acres)

Province	Tillable Area	Cultivated Land	Untilled Land Among Tillable Land
Fengtian	19.1 (36.0%)	12.7 (23.8%)	6.5
Jilin	15.3 (25.8%)	8.6 (14.4%)	6.8
Heilongjiang	20.5 (15.7%)	7.2 (5.6%)	13.2

Source: *Annals of American Academy*, November 1930, p.287, recited from Nukaga (1931).

or threatened the interests of Chinese peasants. The confrontations between Chinese peasants and Korean peasants, thus, do not seem to have resulted from the opposition of their material interests, but rather were the outcome of the ideological, national war between Japan and the northeast Chinese government.

CONCLUSION

Instead of perceiving nationalism as a political or cultural process separate from class struggle, I identified the independent impact of national formation on the class experience of peasants and the impact of class experience on peasant mobilization. In northeast China except Jiandao, the national struggle coincided not with peasant nationalism as it did in Jiandao, but with bourgeois nationalism. The Chinese bourgeoisie opposed taxation, market regulation, and monetary donations required by the military machine that forged an alliance with the Japanese. The 1922 defeat of the Fengtian faction, in the war with the Zhili faction, reordered the alliances.

The Chinese bourgeoisie now forged an informal alliance with the Japanese against Zhang Zuo-lin's military buildup, giving rise to the *triangular relationships* in which any one party was kept in check by alliances among the other two, with the Chinese bourgeoisie shifting allegiance alternately between the militarists and the Japanese, maintaining a balance of power and shared interests among all parties. In their respective situations, neither the Japanese nor Chinese bourgeoisie could resort to direct military confrontation. A medium of conflict instead was the victimization of Korean peasants and the resultant ethnic conflict between Chinese and Korean peasants. As Japan exploited the presence of Korean immigrants in northeast China as a pretext for further economic penetration, issues of the civil and economic rights of the Korean peasants (including the rights to reside, work, and own property) became the focus of Chinese-Japanese conflict. This is the context in which the Chinese bourgeoisie mobilized the Chinese peasantry. The Chinese bourgeoisie constructed national hegemony by satisfying the Chinese peasants' material interests with the government subsidy for relocation and the reduction of rent and taxes.

This analysis of peasant mobilization in northeast China points out the limitation of the pure class and national differences and call for the analysis of the intersection of class and nation. Exploitation and poverty of the peasants in both regions were important conditions, but not sufficient to

explain the lived class experience of the Chinese and Korean peasants and their political propensities. For example, the Chinese bourgeoisie in northeast China except Jiandao offered Chinese peasants with material incentives and created antagonism against Korean peasants. Both factors were detrimental to the outbreak of the peasants' class struggle. The pure ethnic factors were also not strictly causal, but only contributing factors. The hegemony of the Chinese bourgeoisie was relatively well constructed, since the Chinese peasants were the majority of the population. Yet, an ethnic demographic pattern did not explain by itself why anti-Japanese nationalism was transformed into anti-Korean nationalism during but not prior to the 1920s, or why the Chinese did not simply ignore the marginal number of Koreans.

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