

## Basic Income and Wives' and Husbands' Housework Time: Evidence from South Korea

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*This article examines the effects of basic income (BI) on the time spent on housework by husbands and wives in the Republic of Korea. The sample comprises 7,082 married couples drawn from the 2014 Time Use Survey. Results show that without BI, a majority of married Korean women allocate time to housework, increasing as their economic bargaining power decreases. But women whose income is larger than men's do not reduce time spent on housework corresponding to their economic bargaining power, indicating they may compensate for their deviation from their gender role. Time spent on housework by husbands is negatively associated with their traditional gender-role ideology and economic bargaining power. Furthermore, the interaction term between gender-role ideology and economic dependency indicates that husbands with a traditional ideology spend less time on housework than those with a progressive ideology, even if they have the same economic bargaining power. With a BI, there are no changes in the factors associated with women's housework. In contrast, husbands no longer do gender with regards to time allocation to housework.*

**Keywords:** Gender, Housework, Basic Income

## Introduction

Basic income (BI) has recently attracted academic and political attention in both Western (Cantillon and McLean 2016) and Asian societies. BI refers to “an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement” (Van Parijs 2004, p. 8). In other words, it represents an income the state provides to citizens on a universal, unconditional, and individual basis. In the Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”), the debate over the role of the Korean welfare state and the need for a BI is heating up in part as the country faces severe labour market dualization, coupled with a trend towards job precarity (Kim et al. 2018; Lee, Yi and Baek 2016). Against the backdrop of changes in the political environment, including the upcoming presidential election in 2022, BI has become an important part of the agenda for restructuring the Korean welfare state.

BI's effect on the gender division of unpaid work is contested. On one hand, the provision of a universal and unconditional income is necessary for feminist account of justice (Zelleke 2011). On the other hand, some critics argue BI will reinforce privatization of care (Gheaus 2008, p. 1). Robeyns (2001) says BI is insufficient to make transformative changes with regards to gender-related constraints on choices and division of labour. O'Reilly (2008, p. 5) notes that the sources of gender inequalities are complex, and it is unclear how a BI would help.

As elsewhere, in Korea, the debate on BI overlaps with discussions on women and gender. Some question whether BI would enhance women's labour supply (Chang 2001), thus implying an ineffective influence on the gendered division of unpaid work (An 2021a, p. 41). Yoon (2016) argues the universality and unconditionality of BI value all forms of work and therefore may prove ineffective in universalizing care work; in other words, that it will not significantly change the gendered division of care (An 2021a, p. 41). But BI advocates claim that a BI has the potential to realize Fraser's universal caregiver model (Lee and Kim 2020).

These debates and arguments suffer from a lack of empirical evidence in relation to BI's effects on men and women's housework. Admittedly, there are few real-world examples to study. Nonetheless, more empirical research is certainly required (Cantillon and McLean 2016). This paper answers the call by examining wives' and husbands' housework time in Korea, by asking whose housework time changes and why, when different levels of BI are

offered.

## Gendered Housework and Basic Income

Blumberg (1984) argues gender stratification in the division of labour within the family is closely related to gendered power relations at the macro level. Szinovacz (2000) points out that ideology and resource power perspectives refer to relatively entrenched system structures akin to meta-rules. Researchers adopting these perspectives have provided some important empirical evidence on housework division. For example, Fuwa (2004) shows that in a society where power relations are less gendered, time availability determined by working hours and gender ideology has stronger equalizing effects. In those societies, women have more of an advantage than women in other societies where power relations at the macro level are more gendered.

The gendered power relations approach sheds lights on a crucial issue for BI's effects on the gendered division of housework: whether BI empowers women and/or reduces the power of men to draw on their relative economic power and gender ideology in relation to time allocated to housework (An 2021a). Blood and Wolfe (1960) offer useful insights into power struggles within the family. They argue that the sources for marital power include patriarchal culture and relative resources—the difference in resources (i.e., income) husbands and wives bring into the marriage. Regardless of macro-level cultural prescriptions, what matters in relation to distribution within the family comes down to relative resources (Fuwa 2004, p. 752). Lundberg and Pollak (1994) assert that marriage is a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Within the family, there is more than one household good voluntarily contributed. Husbands and wives may have different or conflicting ideas about who supplies good A or B. The chosen equilibrium depends on history and culture which may generate a “self-evident” way to play (1994, p. 136). In other words, the division of labour between spouses is non-cooperative and whose preference is chosen essentially depends on who has more resource power.

Individuals' power to distribute work between spouses is also influenced by who should do housework according to what they believe is the appropriate gender role. Gender ideology reflects an individual's belief in separate work spheres for each gender (Davis and Greenstein 2009, p. 89). Studies have shown that women with traditional gender ideologies spend more time on housework, while men with a corresponding ideology spend

less (Baxter, Hewitt, and Haynes 2008). Individual gender ideology may be a factor in the division of housework, because people are socialized to conform to gender-segregated work (Coverman 1985; Cunningham 2005). Hakim (2000) argues women's position in the home is determined by their preferences. Socialized gender norms may be identical with individuals' preferences for paid versus unpaid work. Building upon Hakim's view, Kan (2008, p. 50) posits that individuals' gender ideology may lead to differences in the effects of their economic bargaining power, demonstrating "direct" evidence of doing gender (An 2021b, p. 5).

BI is an interesting policy in the context of gendered housework. Lundberg and Pollak (1994, p. 133) argue that who is entitled to public cash transfers makes a crucial difference. They say the voluntary contribution equilibrium within the family is a corner solution whereby only one spouse contributes to the public good of each household. Women do almost all housework; thus, public transfers will affect their labour distribution within the family. When they are targeted to women with children, conditional cash transfers may reinforce women's status as mothers and care providers (Cookson 2018; Molyneux 2009). Generous means-tested child benefits are found to have retarding effects on women's labour supply (Sainsbury 1996; Jaumotte 2003). Thus, it is questionable how BIs would effect on the gendered division of housework.

In any event, BI instantly and directly changes individuals' relative income (An 2021a). Following Sørensen and McLanahan's (1987) formulation, economic dependency (ED) is calculated as follows: 
$$\left( \frac{\text{respondent's income} - \text{his or her spouse/partner's income}}{\text{respondent's income} + \text{his or her spouse/partner's income}} \right)$$
. ED values range from -1 to 1, with 0 indicating equal economic contribution between partners. Women's ED is likely to be lower than 0 and men's is likely to be larger than 0. BI is likely to increase women's ED and decrease men's. For example, if a wife's and husband's monthly income is 3 and 7, respectively, the wife's ED would be -0.4 and the husband's would be 0.4. With a BI of 2 given to both the wife and husband, the wife's ED would become -0.29 and the husband's 0.29. In addition, BI frees women without income from full dependency, making the minimum ED value higher than -1. In other words, no husband would have full economic independency, making their maximum ED value lower than 1.

Logically, we should consider both the positive and negative effects of BI on the time men and women spend on housework. For women, a positive effect is that their housework time may be reduced with greater economic bargaining power. Yet changes in relative income may prove irrelevant to

their time spent on housework. Or conversely, the time women spend on housework may actually increase: women receiving BI who are now earning more than their husbands may spend more time doing housework because of traditional gender-role attitudes. But, if women have a progressive gender ideology and spend more time on housework with the BI provision, this would suggest that their construction of gender goes against their beliefs.

Turning to men, if BI has a positive correlation to the time men spend on housework, this would suggest that men's relative income power is irrelevant. Additionally, BI may make economic processes more powerful so that men in a subordinate position economically may be unable to use housework in order to construct their gender. If BI has negative effects, this may indicate that a BI values men's roles and positions, thus reinforcing the gender display phenomenon, such that those with traditional gender ideologies may spend less time doing housework despite their economic dependency.

In short, BI may have the potential to make the intra-household time allocation to housework more of an economic process. But BI may be a double-edged sword for gender equality. Thanks to BI, women may become agentic with regards to resource allocation within the family. Furthermore, women may become autonomous, so that economically powerful women spend more time doing housework following their traditional ideology. Otherwise stated, their autonomy allows them to do housework because they choose to. Thanks to BI, men may behave as rational actors following economic constraints, so that they may find it difficult to perform gender displays. Alternatively, the BI may reinforce men's power via gender display. For the BI to be a transformative institution for gender relations, women must become more autonomous and exert bargaining power, securing more room to follow their gender ideologies. In contrast, men should have reduced room for performing gender displays, allocating time to housework according to economic processes.

To examine whether BI has transformative power in the gendered division of housework, we asked the following questions. First, is the time allocated by husbands and wives to housework associated with economic bargaining power and/or gender ideology? Second, with BI, do changes in husbands' and wives' economic dependency lead to differences in time spent on housework? Finally, with BI, do effects of gender ideology change?

## Method

### *Data, Measurements, and Procedures*<sup>1</sup>

This study drew on a sample of married couples from the Time Use Survey (TUS) conducted in 2014. The TUS collected information on the time use of individuals aged 10 years and older using diary entries at ten-minute intervals for two consecutive days on activities including personal care, paid work, learning, housekeeping, family care, social participation (including volunteer work), socialization or leisure activity, travel, and other unclassified activities. In this household survey, all family members surveyed were asked to report time use either for two consecutive weekdays or for one weekday and one weekend day, or for a two-day weekend.

The study sample comprised married men and women who were either heads of the household or spouses of the head of the household, living together. Those individuals who reported they did not work for pay because they were ill were excluded. After considering the missing values of all independent variables and the covariates, the sample size equaled 7,082 married couples. As all reported two days of time use, the total number of days of time use reported for men and women was 14,164 each.

### *Dependent Variables*

Housework time was measured using time use information related to preparing meals, doing laundry, cleaning, shopping for groceries, etc. Time spent caring for pets and plants was excluded as these activities could be viewed as caring rather than consumptive activities. Time spent on main and simultaneous activities were included as well. We used an average of two days of time use as many others have similarly done (An 2020, 2021a; An and Choi 2020a, 2020b; Kim 2016; Yoon 2010) and controlled the days of time use reported (1: two weekdays; 2: one weekday and one weekend day; 3: two-day weekend).

### *Independent Variables*

We used Sørensen and McLanahan's (1987) economic dependency formula-

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<sup>1</sup> Measurements largely follow An's work (2020, 2021a).

tion to examine the effects of economic bargaining power. We also included its squared term to see if income's effects on housework were nonlinear, implying gender display (Brines 1994). The TUS collected information on income using bands: no income (1); less than 500,000 won (2); more than 500,000 won and less than 1,000,000 won (3); more than 1,000,000 won and less than 1,500,000 won (4); more than 1,500,000 won and less than 2,000,000 won (5); more than 2,000,000 won and less than 2,500,000 won (6); more than 2,500,000 won and less than 3,000,000 won (7); more than 3,000,000 won and less than 3,500,000 won (8); more than 3,500,000 won and less than 4,000,000 won (9); more than 4,000,000 won and less than 4,500,000 won (10); more than 4,500,000 won and less than 5,000,000 won (11); more than 5,000,000 won (12). Researchers have used the income information differently, and all decisions for assigning a value are necessarily arbitrary (An 2020). In this study, we recorded those reporting no income as 0, thus changing the income measurements from 1-12 to 0-11 as others have done (An and Choi 2020a, 2020b; An 2020, 2021a). Couples with no income were included in the analysis, because with BI, they have same amount of monthly income although their economic dependency value continues to be 0.

To examine the effect of individuals' gender-role ideology, we used the information collected by the TUS using the statement "A man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to take care of the house," with the following response categories: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), and strongly disagree (4). Finally, because the impact of gender-role ideology may outweigh the effects of economic dependency, according to Kan (2008), we included the interaction between economic dependency and gender ideology.

### *Covariates*

To see if time spent on housework had age effects, we included a squared term for the age for wives and husbands. Education was also measured in eight categories: no education (1); primary school (2); middle school (3); high school (4); 2-3 years college (5); 4-year college (6); master's degree (7); doctorate (8). Time availability was measured as working hours using time use reported in relation to work excluding time spent searching for a job. Both main and simultaneous activities as well as work commute time were included. Health status was considered using the following response categories: very good (1); good (2); neither good nor bad (3); bad (4); very bad (5). Another covariate was retirement, because it is a life event that may critically change the gendered division of housework. Some argue that

gendered housework continues after retirement (Solomon, Acock, and Walker 2004). Others suggest retirement leads to significant changes in housework division because the men's time available for housework changes (Leopold and Skopek 2015).

At the household level, we considered the total number of household members. The TUS survey asked one person in the household to offer information on all household members aged 10-years or more and to give the number of those under 10 years of age. Using this information, we created a variable for total number of household members. We considered if couples had a preschool child and/or adults requiring care. Area of residence was divided into those living in Seoul, Gyeonggi-do and Incheon (metropolitan areas), or other parts of Korea. House ownership was another covariate. Average monthly household income was measured as follows: less than 1,000,000 won (1); more than 1,000,000 won and less than 2,000,000 won (2); more than 2,000,000 won and less than 3,000,000 won (3); more than 3,000,000 won and less than 4,000,000 won (4); more than 4,000,000 won and less than 5,000,000 won (5); more than 5,000,000 won and less than 6,000,000 won (6); more than 6,000,000 won and less than 7,000,000 won (7); more than 7,000,000 won (8). Days of time use differed: some respondents reported time use on two weekdays, some reported one weekday and one weekend day, and some reported Saturdays and Sundays.

### *Procedure*

Several different BI models are available. In this study, we followed An (2021a) and employed 300,000 won per month, referring to the Basic Income Law submitted to National Assembly; 500,000 won per month, the minimum cost of living for a one-person household (more precisely, 501,632 won); and 830,000 won, 50 percent of the median income for a one-person household (more precisely, 836,052 won) (Park et al. 2018).

Before considering basic income, we set up Model 1 with all variables. Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4 predicted housework time of husbands and wives with BIs of 300,000; 500,000; and 830,000 won per month, respectively. Individual incomes in the survey increased by 1, with a 500,000 won per month increase. Thus, we added 0.6 to couples' monthly income when they received a 300,000 won BI, 1 when they received 500,000 won, and 1.66 when they received 830,000 won. For example, a husband whose income was 7 had a monthly income of 7.6 with a 300,000 won BI, 8 with a 500,000 won BI, and 8.66 with an 830,000 won BI.

In addition, household income changes with BI. In the TUS, the value for a household's monthly income increases by 1 when the actual amount increases by 1,000,000 won. When receiving BIs, household income increases by the number of total household members times the BI offered. Thus, for example, a couple with a monthly household income value of 5 has a value of 6.2 when a BI of 300,000 won per month is provided by the state for their 4-member household. This way of testing the effects of BI has a caveat: other sources of income are constant. We ran OLS regression for time spent on housework by wives and husbands and estimated robust standard errors.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. There is a large difference in time spent on housework: on average, wives spend 219.05 minutes per day, while husbands spend 39.76 minutes. The monthly incomes of wives and husbands are also significantly different: wives' income is 1.95 and husbands' income is 5.87. Married women are largely dependent on their husbands, indicated by an ED value of -0.53. Husbands are more traditional about gender roles than wives. Both wives and husbands report that their health is between good and neither good nor bad. About 11.8 percent of husbands report that they do not work for pay because they have retired; the corresponding proportion of wives is 5.3 percent. About one third of respondents live in metropolitan areas, and about two thirds own a house. Proportion of couples whose children attending preschool is 20.7%, and 2.5 percent have adults in the household who require care. About 40 percent of respondents report time use for two weekdays, 40 percent for one weekday and one weekend day, and 20 percent over the weekend.

A BI of 300,000 won per month increases wives' monthly income from 1.95 to 2.55 on average; a BI of 500,000 won increases it to 2.95; and a BI of 830,000 won increases it to 3.61. Meanwhile, with a BI of 300,000 won, husbands' monthly income increases from 5.87 to 6.47; with a BI of 500,000, it increases to 6.87; and with 830,000 won, it increases to 7.53. For the three BI levels, the range of the ED values change from -1 to 1: to 0.9 to 0.9 for 300,000 won, -0.85 to 0.85 for 500,000 won, and -0.77 to 0.77 for 830,000 won. The BIs reduce wives' ED from -0.53 to -0.44 for 300,000 won, -0.4 for 500,000 won, and -0.35 for 830,000 won. In contrast, husbands' ED value decreases from 0.53 before BI to 0.44 for 300,000 won, 0.4 for 500,000 won, and 0.35 for 830,000 won.

**TABLE 1**  
**DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (MEAN/SD, RANGE, %)**

	Husbands (N=7,082)		Wives (N=7,082)	
	Mean/SD	Range	Mean/SD	Range
Housework time	39.76/56.76	0-585	219.05/107.18	0-755
Individual level				
Age	51.84/13.4	17-95	48.8/12.87	19-91
Education	4.48/1.44	1-8	4.14/1.42	1-8
Working hours	324.5/266.84	0-1140	164.14/226.98	0-940
Monthly income				
Without basic income	5.87/2.96	0-11	1.95/2.32	0-11
Basic income 300,000	6.47/2.96	0.6-11.6	2.55/2.32	0.6-11.6
Basic income 500,000	6.87/2.96	1-12	2.95/2.32	1-12
Basic income 830,000	7.53/2.96	1.66-12.66	3.61/2.32	1.66-12.66
Economic dependency				
Without basic income	0.53/0.46	-1-1	-0.53/0.46	-1-1
Basic income 300,000	0.44/0.38	-0.9-0.9	-0.44/0.38	-0.9-0.9
Basic income 500,000	0.4/0.34	-0.85-0.85	-0.4/0.34	-0.85-0.85
Basic income 830,000	0.35/0.3	-0.77-0.77	-0.35/0.3	-0.77-0.77
Gender ideology	2.5/0.79	1-4	2.88/0.82	1-4
Health status	2.65/0.76	1-5	2.76/0.78	1-5
If retired (%)	11.8	0-100	5.3	0-100
Household level				
Metropolitan (Seoul, Incheon, Gyeonggi-do) (%)	31.5	0-100		
House ownership (%)	71.9	0-100		
Presence of preschool children (%)	20.7	0-100		
Presence of adults in need of care (%)	2.5	0-100		
Total number of household members	3.15/1.02	2-7		
Household income				
Without basic income	4.37/1.96	1-8		
Basic income 300,000	5.31/2.1	1.6-10.1		
Basic income 500,000	5.94/2.21	2-11.5		
Basic income 830,000	6.98/2.41	2.66-13.81		
Days (%)				
Two weekdays	39.9	0-100		
One weekday and one weekend day	40.0	0-100		
Two-day weekend	20.1	0-100		

*Results*

Table 2 shows regression results for wives' housework time. Model 1 shows age effects: housework time increases with age and decreases with its squared term. Working hours reduce housework time. Economic dependency reduces housework time, and its squared term has a positive relationship. This indicates that either those strongly dependent and/or strongly independent spent more time on housework. Wives' gender ideology has no relevance. Husbands' longer working hours increase wives' housework time. Living with husbands with a progressive gender ideology means wives spend less time on housework. Although a larger number of household members increases housework time for wives, the presence of preschool children decreases it. Considering that we did not include time for care, the negative relationship between presence of preschool children and wives' housework indicates that if there are young dependents who needs intensive care, women may spend less time on housework. Those reporting one weekday and one weekend day spend more time on housework than those reporting time use for two weekdays.

**TABLE 2**  
**OLS REGRESSION MODELS OF WIVES' HOUSEWORK TIME WITH BASIC INCOME**

	Model 1	Model 2 (300,000 BI)	Model 3 (500,000 BI)	Model 4 (830,000 BI)
	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)
Age	0.84*** (0.100)	0.869*** (0.100)	0.878*** (0.100)	0.887*** (0.100)
Age squared	-0.028*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.028*** (0.005)	-0.028*** (0.005)
Education	-2.777** (0.907)	-2.721** (0.907)	-2.694** (0.907)	-2.661** (0.907)
Working hours	-0.248*** (0.004)	-0.246*** (0.004)	-0.246*** (0.004)	-0.246*** (0.004)
Gender ideology	1.145 (0.980)	1.279 (0.977)	1.302 (0.977)	1.313 (0.977)
Economic dependency	-13.969*** (2.528)	-16.938*** (3.349)	-19.162*** (3.792)	-22.786*** (4.457)
Economic dependency <sup>2</sup>	14.126*** (2.647)	21.983*** (4.101)	26.130*** (5.021)	32.850*** (6.589)

Gender ideology*	0.752 (1.910)	1.247 (2.321)	1.432 (2.565)	1.631 (2.947)
Economic dependency				
If retired	-13.376** (4.298)	-12.659** (4.295)	-12.530** (4.295)	-12.453** (4.295)
Health status	0.262 (1.052)	0.343 (1.051)	0.355 (1.051)	0.362 (1.051)
Husbands' education	0.563 (0.791)	0.359 (0.791)	0.300 (0.791)	0.245 (0.791)
Husbands' working hours	0.033*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)
Husbands' gender ideology	-4.504*** (0.969)	-4.420*** (0.969)	-4.406*** (0.969)	-4.397*** (0.969)
If retired (husbands)	3.196 (3.404)	3.360 (3.398)	3.356 (3.397)	3.319 (3.396)
Husbands' health status	3.346** (1.047)	3.345** (1.047)	3.337** (1.047)	3.325** (1.047)
House ownership	2.106 (1.752)	1.926 (1.751)	1.870 (1.750)	1.819 (1.750)
Metropolitan	-3.138 (1.659)	-3.004 (1.658)	-2.951 (1.657)	-2.895 (1.657)
Presence of preschool children	-24.895*** (2.310)	-24.956*** (2.307)	-24.916*** (2.306)	-24.836*** (2.304)
Presence of adults in need of care	-7.753 (5.394)	-7.729 (5.392)	-7.802 (5.392)	-7.908 (5.392)
Total number of household members	11.648*** (0.900)	12.492*** (0.943)	13.158*** (0.985)	11.907*** (0.900)
Household income	-1.743** (0.507)	-2.336*** (0.502)	-2.628*** (0.501)	-2.983*** (0.502)
Days of time use (two weekdays)				
One weekday and one weekend day	4.693** (1.698)	4.705** (1.698)	4.701** (1.698)	4.697** (1.697)
Two days during the weekend	-1.718 (2.278)	-1.579 (2.278)	-1.558 (2.277)	-1.544 (2.277)
_cons	221.038*** (6.998)	222.263*** (6.942)	223.404*** (6.919)	224.935*** (6.895)
F	394.76	396.88	397.35	397.75
R-squared	0.337***	0.338***	0.338***	0.338***
Number of obs	14,164	14,164	14,164	14,164

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Model 2, 3 and 4 predict the effects of BIs of 300,000 won, 500,000 won and 830,000 won per month respectively, on wives' housework time. No




FIG. 1.—PREDICTED HOUSEWORK TIME OF WIVES BY ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY (MINUTES PER DAY)

significant changes occur in the associated factors, except that the coefficient value of economic dependency increases with a larger basic income.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to carefully look at the relationship between economic bargaining power and time women spend on housework. Figure 1 shows the predicted housework time spent by women in Model 1, 2, 3, and 4. Housework time of women whose economic dependency is less than 0, which is 80.9% of all women involved, significantly decreases when they have more economic bargaining power and with larger basic incomes provided the negative relationship becomes more evident. But equally important to note is that there are women who do not spend their time on housework as their economic bargaining power increases. Kim and Kim (2007) obtained similar findings for women's housework in dual-earner families. We found that women with an economic dependency value larger than 0 may not spend less time on housework than women with an economic dependency less than 0. This is also the case with basic income, as the predicted time spent on housework Models 2, 3, and 4 show. This suggests that a majority of married Korean women allocate time to housework more as their economic

bargaining power decreases. But there are also women who do not spend time on housework even though their income is larger than their husbands to compensate for deviation from their gender role. Basic income does not appear to transform this.

Table 3 shows regression results for husbands' housework time. Older husbands spend less time. Longer working hours reduces housework time and those with higher education spend more time. Those with a progressive gender ideology allocate more time to housework. Similar to wives' housework time, husbands' housework time significantly decreases with stronger economic bargaining power. The significant positive effect of the economic dependency squared term also indicates that those with either strong economic or weak bargaining power spend more time on housework.

TABLE 3  
OLS REGRESSION MODELS OF HUSBANDS' HOUSEWORK TIME WITH BASIC INCOME

	Model 1	Model 2 (300,000 BI)	Model 3 (500,000 BI)	Model 4 (830,000 BI)
	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)	Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)
Age	-0.202** (0.058)	-0.203*** (0.058)	-0.205*** (0.058)	-0.208*** (0.058)
Age squared	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Education	1.598** (0.470)	1.620** (0.471)	1.630** (0.472)	1.642** (0.472)
Working hours	-0.074*** (0.002)	-0.074*** (0.002)	-0.074*** (0.002)	-0.074*** (0.002)
Gender ideology	4.256*** (0.574)	4.269*** (0.575)	4.268*** (0.575)	4.265*** (0.575)
Economic dependency	-13.835*** (2.408)	-17.571*** (2.914)	-19.652*** (3.236)	-22.812*** (3.729)
Economic dependency <sup>2</sup>	8.770*** (2.267)	13.013*** (3.223)	15.813*** (3.879)	20.696*** (5.004)
Gender ideology*Economic dependency	-2.647* (1.345)	-2.994 (1.589)	-3.170 (1.741)	-3.422 (1.979)
If retired	3.478 (2.374)	3.573 (2.361)	3.609 (2.358)	3.656 (2.355)
Health status	-5.921*** (0.631)	-5.922*** (0.631)	-5.921*** (0.632)	-5.921*** (0.632)
Wives' education	-0.310 (0.530)	-0.331 (0.530)	-0.336 (0.531)	-0.339 (0.531)

Wives' working hours	0.008** (0.002)	0.008** (0.002)	0.008** (0.002)	0.008** (0.002)
Wives' gender ideology	-0.665 (0.576)	-0.699 (0.578)	-0.710 (0.578)	-0.722 (0.578)
If retired (wives)	0.558 (2.748)	0.413 (2.747)	0.333 (2.746)	0.239 (2.744)
Wives' health status	4.130*** (0.629)	4.120*** (0.630)	4.113*** (0.630)	4.105*** (0.630)
House ownership	0.931 (1.066)	0.921 (1.066)	0.914 (1.066)	0.907 (1.066)
Metropolitan	1.927* (0.975)	1.975* (0.975)	1.988* (0.974)	2.000* (0.974)
Presence of preschool children	4.952*** (1.387)	4.947*** (1.386)	4.949*** (1.386)	4.951*** (1.385)
Presence of adults in need of care	3.259 (3.195)	3.324 (3.197)	3.335 (3.198)	3.349 (3.200)
Total number of household members	-1.296* (0.510)	-0.906 (0.530)	-0.648 (0.552)	-0.222 (0.600)
Household income	-1.142*** (0.293)	-1.203*** (0.294)	-1.224*** (0.295)	-1.242*** (0.297)
Days of time use (two weekdays)				
One weekday and one weekend day	5.501*** (1.035)	5.522*** (1.035)	5.527*** (1.035)	5.533*** (1.035)
Two days during the weekend	8.033*** (1.432)	8.027*** (1.433)	8.022*** (1.433)	8.018*** (1.434)
_cons	57.056*** (5.024)	57.729*** (5.017)	57.981*** (5.008)	58.218*** (4.995)
<i>F</i>	105.17	105.16	105.14	105.14
R-squared	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
Number of obs	14,164	14,164	14,164	14,164

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$


Among covariates, time spent on housework by men decreases when they think they are in poor health and increases when their wives are in poor health. Unlike women's housework, the presence of young children means an increased amount of housework. But a larger number of household members means a reduced amount of housework. Husbands' housework time differs by the days of time use reported; those reporting one weekday and one weekend day and two weekend days spend more time on housework than those reporting time use for two weekdays.

Most importantly, without a BI in Model 1, we find that the interaction

term between ED and gender ideology matters significantly, in that time spent on housework by ED value differs depending on husbands' gender ideology. An (2020) reports the same results for married men between the ages of 20 and 64 that men spend time on housework according to their gender ideologies and the role of economic dependency is relatively attenuated. But with basic income in Models 2, 3, and 4, the significance of the interaction term between men's gender-role ideology and economic dependence disappears.

To better understand the interaction effects, we plotted the amount of housework time predicted in Model 1 and Model 2 by husbands' gender-role ideology (see Figure 2). First, those with a strong traditional ideology (9.4 percent of all married men) with an ED value less than -0.5 are predicted to spend 47.09 minutes per day on housework; those with an ED of more than -0.5 and less than 0 will spend 32.08 minutes; those with an ED of 0 will spend 42.43 minutes; those with ED more than 0 and less than 0.5 will spend 30.91 minutes; and those with ED more than 0.5 will spend 25.38 minutes. This indicates that the dependence thesis is not useful to explain housework time in this group of men. Husbands who agree that a man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to care for family (41.4 percent of all married men) are predicted to spend 57.03 minutes on housework when their ED is less than -0.5, 43.76 minutes when their ED is more than -0.5 and less than 0, 40.4 minutes when their ED is zero, 33.84 minutes when their ED is more than 0 and less than 0.5, and 32.6 minutes when their ED is more than 0.5. Husbands who disagree with the traditional gender division of labour (39.1 percent) are predicted to spend 65.23 minutes when their ED is less than -0.5, and 47.51 minutes, 48.38 minutes, 39.87 minutes, and 37.05 minutes for the remaining four groups, respectively. Finally, husbands who strongly disagree with a traditional gender division of labour (10 percent) are predicted to spend 79.76, 59.91, 49.9, 47.75, and 39.02 minutes for the five groups of ED values, respectively.

The plot for Model 2 shows some significant changes. In this case, strongly agreeing to a traditional division of labour substantially increases the time men spend on housework: 73.61 minutes when their ED is less than -0.5. The remaining four groups are predicted to spend less 35.07, 49.92, 29.25 and 28.37 minutes per day, respectively. Amongst husbands receiving BI who agree with the traditional gender division of labour, time spent on housework is predicted to be 67.94, 46.97, 33.05, 33.77, and 33.16 minutes, respectively. Those who disagree with the traditional gender division of labour are also predicted to spend more time on housework when they are



**FIG. 2.—PREDICTED HOUSEWORK TIME OF HUSBANDS BY ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY (ED)**

highly economically dependent, 71.11 minutes; men with a higher degree of economic independency make modest adjustments to the amount of time they spend on housework. Lastly, those who strongly disagree with a traditional gender division of labour are predicted to spend more time on housework when their ED is less than -0.5: 93.32 minutes. In sum, the difference in housework time between men who strongly disagree and strongly agree reduced significantly with BI.

### Conclusions

This article examines the effects of receiving a BI on time spent on housework by wives and husbands in Korea. First, a majority of married Korean women

allocate more time to housework as their economic bargaining power decreases. But there are also women who do not spend time on housework depending on their economic bargaining power and they mostly have an income that is higher than that of their husbands. Basic income does not appear to have a transformative effect on the amount of time married women spend on housework. Second, BI may lead married Korean men not to perform gender display. Without BI, those with high economic dependency do not spend more time on housework when they have a strong traditional gender-role ideology. With BI, however, they allocate more time to housework following the economic bargaining thesis. As a consequence, the differences in time spent on housework between those holding traditional ideology and with progressive ideology decreases.

Would BI be a transformative macro institutional condition for the gendered division of household labour in Korea? Our findings suggest some potential in this direction, as Korean men may not perform gender via housework. But at the same time, the extent to which BI would lead to transformative changes in the housework performed by women is questionable. Even with the substantial BI, women whose income is larger than men's may do gender to neutralize their deviation from gender roles.

This article makes critical contributions to the debate on BI from a gender perspective by offering empirical evidence from contemporary Korea. We have examined how offering a BI directly changes the effects of economic bargaining power and gender ideology of men and women within the family. As we noted, however, other paths of BI may affect housework time allocation, for example, through changes in the employment status of men and women. As An(2021a) suggested, it would be interesting to see if receiving BI leads to changes in labour supply, particularly with regards to women which would in consequence lead to changes in economic bargaining power and gender ideology. Tracing those processes will be important in real-world cases of BI.

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