JOURNAL OF ASIAN SOCIOLOGY
Volume 48 | Number 2 | June 2019, 231-261
DOI 10.21588/jas/2019.48.2.004

Article

The Critical Appraisal of Existing Comparison Methods: Bringing the Connected Histories into Chinese Stagnation Studies*

Sung Hee Ru | State University of New York at Binghamtom

This paper introduces the incorporating comparison method into Chinese stagnation studies. Comparative historical scholars of Chinese stagnation have faced methodological culs de sac because the unconditional acceptance of the comparison method has led to the tendency to overlook connected history between West and China in Chinese stagnation. The article is divided into two sections. First, by problematizing the comparison method, this article attempts to debunk long-held problems hitherto neglected in Chinese stagnation studies. I introduce three types of comparison methods that have been widely used in Chinese stagnation studies and then disclose the common drawback of the comparison-oriented approach. Second, as an alternative, I provide the incorporating comparison method to deal with the globalized connected histories in Chinese stagnation. This approach keeps the strong points of comparison methods by transforming the problems with them into advantages.

***Keywords**: Chinese stagnation, comparison method, incorporating comparison method, connected history*

*I am grateful to Prof. Ravi R. Palat, Prof. Philip McMichael, and Prof. Ana Maria Candela for their useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. I also appreciate the profound and helpful comments from three anonymous reviewers of *Journal of Asian Sociology*. Any inaccurate which remain are my own. Direct all correspondence to Sung Hee Ru, Deparment of Sociology, SUNY-BINGHAMTON, 144 Beethoven Street, Binghamton (N.Y.), 13091, 1-607-205-5765, E-mail: sru1@binghamton. edu.

Introduction

The main aim of this paper is to discuss the drawbacks of three types of comparison method in Chinese stagnation studies and to find an alternative. Obviously, comparison methods have been used widely by comparative historical sociologists not only "to identify crucial causal paradigms … that may not be visible in any other way" (Sklar 1990, p. 1114), but also to generalize several configurational cases by juxtaposing two or more cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Even though "comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology, it is sociology itself" (Durkheim [1895] 1938, p. 139), logics of comparison sometimes seemed arbitrary. The fact that comparison is a fundamental research method means that much of what is referred to as comparative historical research can be analyzed by a researchers' presupposition. Chinese stagnation study epitomizes this: Those who are eager to seek out the causes of Chinese stagnation are predisposed to a Europe-centered perspective, whereas *non-Eurocentric scholars* find China's civilization to be an excellent example to refute Eurocentric arguments.[1]

[1] By comparing Western society with China, they have revealed a wide range of causes of Chinese stagnation. Examples are China's less-developed military force (Weiss and Hobson 1995)—in particular, relatively weak naval forces (Crossley 1990); the lack of formal rationality (Sprenkel 1977); the "lack of free market and institutionalized property rights" and the deprivation of "economic potential of its scientific expertise" under totalitarian rule (Landes 2006, pp. 6–7); the shortage of livestock capital (Johns [1981] 2003); the lack of scientific culture (Jacob 1988; Nelson 1981); less-developed agricultural technologies (White 1963); the absence of radical and innovative social change—such as inattention to overseas expansion (Wallerstein 1974a); the absence of competitive relations with neighboring countries (Tilly 1990, 1997); shortages of cultural, social and political pluralism and lack of competitions for revolutionary change (Eisenstadt 1987); constraints facing working women in late imperial China (Goldstone 1996); antagonism between state and civil society or the market economy (Hall 1985); the scarcity of institutional mechanisms to support technological progress (Mokyr 1990, 2003); the underdevelopment of public goods and formal-legal institutions (Shiue and Kellner 2007); the Malthusian trap of late imperial China (Naquin and Rawski 1987); high quantitative growth but decrease in per-capita productivity (e.g. Elvin 1970 with his concept of a "high level equilibrium trap"); under-development (Shi 1990), or—at best—"growth without development" (Huang 1990); and the lack of autonomous cities (Braudel 1979; Eberhard 1956). On the other hand, the non-Eurocentric scholars criticized ill-considered quotations and uncritical acceptance of the Eurocentric view of Chinese stagnation (e.g. Frank 1998; Hobson 2004; Parthasarathi 2011; Wong 1997). Contrary to the unconditionally accepted Eurocentric view, which takes Europe's great divergence for granted, their arguments have garnered attention in today's comparative historical field; however, it is difficult for us to find connected histories between West and China in China's stagnation. By regarding China's stagnation as an isolated case, they have kept discriminating between non-Western merits and Western demerits. Put differently, these approaches still tend to favor one side over the other.

Although the idea of Chinese stagnation has been bifurcated, both the Eurocentric and *non-Eurocentric* sides have adhered to certain comparison methods. The more Chinese stagnation studies have been done, the more comparative historical sociologists have tended to resort to comparison methods (Hobson 2017). When a tendency to use comparison methods is present in excess, its consequences are not always effective. For instance, by reiterating the idea of the fixed European path to modernization as tied to notions of Europe's great divergence, both Eurocentric and *non-Eurocentric scholars* set the European experience as the standard for accepting or rebutting the idea of China's stagnation.[2] In this context, although *non-Eurocentric scholars* harshly criticize the concept of European exceptionalism in various ways (or enthusiastically praise China's socio-economic developments), their imprudent attempts seem to be very Eurocentric. This is because their anti-Eurocentric views, which heavily depend on Eurocentric standards, ironically, aggrandize European experiences (Bhambara 2007). Without connected histories between West and China, *non-Eurocentric* scholars merely fit China into the rule of European standards. As a result, they not only serve the Europe-oriented developmental pattern, but also provide us with an episodic and isolated view of China's history.

To find a resolution to the problem, first of all, I will present a brief genealogy of Chinese stagnation studies to explain how it has been developed and what discussions have been conducted over the long term. After that, I will analyze why the comparison method in Chinese stagnation studies is problematic. In order to disclose what types of comparison method have been widely used, I will provide three, and then I will also show a common drawback of all three types of comparison method. In doing so, I will expatiate on how Chinese stagnation studies have been limited by the comparison method. Last, I will propose incorporating comparison as a solution to invite connected history between West and China within Chinese stagnation studies.

[2] Especially, non-Eurocentric researchers have used European standards for finding similarities between Western societies and China. Examples are the production year of gunpowder or degree of skilled and extensive use of advanced firepower (e.g. Chase 2003; Di Cosmo 2004; Sun 2003), the emergence of autonomous cities (e.g. Rowe 1984, 2013), and a high degree of formal rationality (e.g. Allee 1994; Marsh 2000). This predominant strategy, explicitly or implicitly, forces subsequent non-Eurocentric researchers to use European standards repetitively.

Developmental path of Chinese stagnation studies: Three types of comparison method

The concept of Chinese stagnation has been used as one of the renowned symbols in the comparative historical research field since European scholars first began to analyze imperial Chinese history. Given the fact that the notion originates from comparative studies between advanced Western society (or civilization) and less-developed Chinese society (or civilization), it contains linear, progressive, and teleological Europe-centered views. In fact, many comparative historical studies have been conducted to obtain answers to critical questions about why only modern European civilization had a great transformation, while Chinese civilization did not. It is a common idea in those studies that Western countries are so dynamic that Western-centered modernity is natural and eternal, while imperial China was so static and passive that it did not have a good opportunity to transform its society by itself. In this sense, Chinese stagnation was an opposing conception to European superiority, a derivative of the comparative studies between the West and East (in particular China), and a result of evolutionary and linear historical epistemology; nonetheless, note that there is still conceptual ambiguity of the Chinese stagnation like what exactly defines stagnation. To clarify this, I argue that the stagnation conception refers to a certain fixed mindset that has been embedded in comparison methods of comparative historical researchers. By drawing on the stagnation conception, many comparative historical researchers have attempted to reproduce dichotomous idea like discriminating between Western merits and China's demerits or vice versa. Set within this parochializing trend, the study of connected history between the West and China is left unheeded. To avoid a single dominant methodological idea and to apply the connected history into China's stagnation study, I will borrow a new approaching way of the incorporating compassion. Indeed, in terms of simplifying the argument, for the most part I shall limit myself to exploring Chinese stagnation conception that have been widely used in a comparative historical context.

Then, within the comparative historical context, how the Chinese stagnation conception has been developed? The studies of China (or Chinese civilization) were already conducted before Western countries did business on a large scale with China in the 1800s. Earlier studies about China in the Western areas were not much critical to the Chinese civilization (Platt 2018): When it comes to the west's favorable attitude to China, Mongolian clothing styles set the fashion trends in Britain after the Mongols conquered Eastern

Europe (Paviot 2000). European still looked with envy at China's exceptional civilization even after centuries: the ideas of the Jesuit missionaries dispatched to China to spread the gospel and then returned to their own countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gives us a striking glimpse into their impression of China (Hung 2003, p. 259). The missionaries' Sinophilism had a decisive effect on many leading philosophers like Voltaire in the early stage of the Enlightenment who were interested in Chinese civilization. Voltaire regarded Confucian ethics as the best lesson to improve the virtue of the monarch. Thus, if the monarch was well disciplined by Confucian ethics, he or she could withstand baiting by not only greedy nobles but also hypocritical clerics (Voltaire [1760] 1901, p. 32).

However, views of Chinese civilization were soon changed from respect to contempt in the Western societies. In fact, unfavorable views have been prevalent in Western societies since the eighteenth century. For instance, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, defined the Chinese state as "an exemplar of a corrupted tyrant" (Hung 2003, p. 262). And Macartney (1908, p. 386)—who was appointed as Britain's first envoy to China and visited Beijing to discuss opening trade in 1792—thought the empire of China was "old and crazy". Within the Europe-centered epistemological framework, the inferiority of Chinese civilization was taken for granted and it had been reproduced by early comparative historical researches (e.g. K. Marx and M. Weber).

This dichotomized comparison legacy in Chinese stagnation studies has been reproduced by Marxists or Weberian scholars even though much of the thinking in this binary mode is inherently Europe-oriented. And, as a consequence, it is argued that any assessment of how the prevailing Chinese order came into being will evolve in the future to explicitly or implicitly rest on a whole raft of ideas that can be shown to be profoundly mistaken about global and connected historical facts. By problematizing comparison methods that have been hitherto neglected, I will present an opportunity for examination of the parochial comparison method. For this, in the next section, I will show how three types of comparison method ignore connected histories between West and China in illustrating China's stagnation.

Three types of comparison method in Chinese stagnation studies

Type a) Comparison through self-generative disparity

A dichotomous comparison between the West and the non-West that is well-known throughout the comparative sociology field comes from Marx and Weber. There is very little doubt that Marx elevates the idea of "base" (or "substructure"), mainly composed of the socio-economic order and the relations of production between individuals. For Marx, a necessity of historical methodology is to understand a given socio-economic structure. Marx's famous aphorism, "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx [1869] 1973, p. 146), showed how individuals' actions and intentions were likely to be determined in a wider social context.

In contrast with Marx's historical methodology that stressed the larger socio-economic context and historically specific circumstances, Weber's aims to understand the social actions of individuals in that Weber was against the idea of national spirit (*volksgeist*) and evolutionism as a collective entity (Bendix 1977). Weber created the concept of "ideal type" (*Idealtypus*), in this sense, to refute the principles of unconditional nationalism and universal laws highly dependent on natural-science-like models. Contrary to collective values or nomothetic inquiries, Weber stressed individual-concrete economic or historical events that were not evaluated by an absolute and universal standard (Weber [1922] 1949). Given the fact that the basic aim of social science (Weber called it "cultural science" (*Kulturwissenschaft*) is to investigate individual socio-economic events, pursuing universal laws or evolutionary views was ineffective because those shed little lights on *culturally individual-significant* social phenomena.

As seen above, Marx and Weber painted starkly different pictures of individual actions and socio-economic structures. However, both share the concept of Europe's exceptionalism; Marx and Weber strongly argue that the genesis of capitalist modernity was in Europe, whereas non-Western regions did not invent it autonomously. According to Weber, in contrast to China, the West developed formal rationality that contained features of calculability, efficiency, predictability, impersonality, and quantitative calculation. Therefore, Western societies avoided the "magic garden" (*Zaubergarten*).

Western society, in achieving "disenchantment of the world," invented a distinctive form of socio-economic order which swept across the globe. Weber ([1922] 1949, p. 92) emphasized that the sociological method ("ideal type") should be used as a heuristic instrument for understanding historical or time-developmental events or social phenomenon (Kalberg 1994); however, ironically, his ideal type's propensity to evaluate Chinese society was not liberated from preconceived and value-laden Europe-centered epistemology. Marx is no exception. Although K. Marx contended that China's stagnation was partially connected to the coercive and predatory invasion of Western powers,[3] the root of his comparative view is originated from Europe-centered epistemology. For Marx, Asian society did not have its own landed property because all private property was controlled by communes or central government. Marx, therefore, considered Asian society as "not arrival at landed property, not even in its feudal from" (Marx 1978, p. 658). Under the such traditional rules, Marx believed that Asian society could not venerate "all grandeur and historical energy" (Marx 1978, p. 658). Preoccupied with the ideas of Western-centered evolution and unitary historical development, he tended to assign a specific developmental stage or mode of production to non-Western societies. In *Grundrisse*, Marx described Asian society as in the "Asiatic mode." In his theoretical frame, Asian societies, which were not only controlled by despotic rulers but also had agrarian-centered socio-economic orders, were static and passive as compared to European ones. One commonality in Marx and Weber's arguments is that Europe's giant leap was produced by its societies' immanent dynamics and distinctive developmental trajectory. This strongly supports the concept of "the emergence of modernity exclusively within the hermetically sealed and socio-culturally coherent geographical confines of Europe" (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, p. 4). By defining Western development as a self-generative rise, Europe's exceptionalism is conceptualized as endogenous or self-propelling way. On the contrary, China, which do not follow the same developmental course of the West, did not have the chance to attain this advancement. Therefore, China stultified its own social evolution.

In addition to Western-centered historical narratives in Chinese stag-

[3] For instance, Marx ([1853] 1968, p. 3) insisted that the traditional Chinese economy experienced a substantial change caused by unprecedented imports of foreign manufacture. According to him, China's cotton spinners had difficulty competing with British cotton manufacturers because imported machine-spun yarn was cheaper than domestic manufactured goods. Marx and Engels ([1848] 2012, p. 77) also contended that the irresistible temptation of opium is "the heavy artillery with which it battles down all Chinese walls.")

nation studies, a more serious issue is an inattention of unequal and connected histories between West and China in China's stagnation. After presenting Marx and Weber's comparative historical analysis of China's stagnation, a series of comparative historical studies, influenced by Marx or Weber's idea, have been conducted to obtain answers to critical questions about why only modern-European civilization had a great transformation, while Chinese civilization did not. In examining China's stagnation, comparative historical scholar often stressed internal causes of China's stagnation without little consideration of external influences. For instance, Brenner and Isett (2002), affected by Marx's idea on European exceptionalism, contended that a strong tie between Chinese peasants and landlords did not need to heavily rely on the necessary items that were traded on the market. It consequently led to underdevelopment of market. Plus, according to them, the rapid population increase from 1650 to 1850 was an essential factor in Chinese stagnation in that the amount of arable land did not catch up to the increase of population; notwithstanding, they paid little attention to the China's stagnation caused by outside impacts. A major problem with this approach to China's stagnation is the lack of connected histories between West and China. In contrast with Brenner and Isett's view, Mao Tse-tung and Harold Isaacs considered the violence and coercion of the western powers, along with Britain-led free-trade imperialism as a fundamental cause of China's underdevelopment. As Mao (1965, p. 310) noted, "it is certainly not the purpose of the imperialist power invading China to transform feudal China into capitalist China. On the contrary, their purpose is to transform China into their own semi-colony or colony." China's autonomous developmental path was derailed by a predatory invasion of imperial powers. Isaacs ([1938] 1961), in a similar vein, contended that China's underdevelopment was interdigitated with the western powers' political, economic, and social domination.

Weberian scholars are no exception. Influenced by Weber's idea that Western cities are critical resources of the development of capitalism and rationality,[4] Saunders (1981), Elliott and McCrone (1982) were subordinated to his primary dichotomy of the West's modern rationality and China's

[4] By examining western cities, Weber examined how only westernized cities supported the development of capitalism. As a way to distinguish between western and non-western cities (including in China), Weber suggested an ideal type of western city: it contains "a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law," "a related form of association," and "partial autonomy" (Weber 1958, p. 81). On the contrary, Chinese cities do not contain a) "urban community," b) "separation from kinship relations," c) "citizenship," or d) the "political and military autonomy of a city." In sum, China does not have western-type cities.

enchantment. Such comparative approaches, nonetheless, overshadowed Chinese city's decline caused by the Western powers' penetrations. For instance, the deliberate hindrance of the British armies during the first Opium War accelerated the decline of the Grand Canal cities (e.g. Yangzhou, Hangzhou) which were among the economic and cultural centers that existed during medieval times. When the British blocked the operation of the canal system in 1842, commercial trades and the grain tribute through the Grand Canal were hit hard by the British armed sea force (Fairbank 1953). As the Grand Canal and waterways through the Yangzi River were, as a commercial channel, considered insignificant, the Grand Canal cities encountered unprecedented economic recession.

In conclusion, China's stagnation, in reality, had not been developed independently; for this reason, comparisons aimed at describing China's stagnation were not be supposed to treat it as an isolated history; nonetheless, Marx (and Marxists) or Weber (and Weberian)'s comparative historical method precluded comparative historical researchers from thinking 'connected historical narratives' between West and China in fostering China's stagnation. It consequently compels us to embrace a dichotomous model of Western assertiveness and Chinese passivity, to ignore Europe's role in China's stagnation.

Type b) Comparison through agreements and differences

To compare the England with China, Kenneth Pomeranz used the "method of agreement" and "method of difference" in comparative historical sociology. As a matter of fact, "method of agreement" and "method of difference" in comparative historical sociology was invented by Theda Skocpol. Skocpol (1979) used John Stuart Mills' "Method of Agreement" and "Method of Difference," to interpret various forms of social revolution. In brief, the method of agreement is a way to find crucial similarities among cases even when they have significant differences. On the other hand, the method of difference is a way to find differences even when there are similarities between positive and negative cases. In order to answer the question of why imperial China experienced a social revolution, she used the method of agreement and method of difference. Despite the fact that France, Russia, and China had different backgrounds, histories, and geographies, all experienced social revolutions—"Bourbon France in the late eighteenth century, late imperial China after 1911, and Tsarist Russia from March 1917"—caused by political crises of old-regime states and changes in class structures. Skocpol

used the method of agreement to elicit the common traits—political crisis and class transformation—of social revolutions. Skocpol used the method of difference to contrast France, Russia, and China with other countries that did not have social revolutions—England, Prussia, and Japan (Skocpol and Somers 1980, p. 185).

Kenneth Pomeranz used this method to present England and China (in particular, the Yangzi valley) as having similar socio-economic developmental patterns until the 19th century and to analyze England's great divergence from China. Just as Skocpol used comparison through agreements to discover similarities between revolutionized countries, Pomeranz also used it to elicit similar traits between Europe and China. For Pomeranz, there is little evidence to support "a quantitative advantage in Western Europe's capitals stock before 1800" or "a set of durable circumstances—demographic or otherwise—that gave Europe a significant edge in capital accumulation" (Pomeranz 2000, p. 31). Therefore, he reveals a similar developmental pattern in terms of measures like life expectancy, wage levels, and patterns of consumption. By adopting reciprocal comparisons between "parts of Europe" and "parts of China, India, and so on," Pomeranz asserts that China's internally driven growth and economic patterns were comparable to Europe's until 1800. Thus, his basic aim, based on "comparison through agreements between Europe and China," was to express doubts about the earlier European victory that had been widely accepted by past Eurocentric scholars.

Simultaneously, Pomeranz used "comparison through difference" to separate England's exceptionalism from China's stagnation. In order to show how England greatly diverged after 1800, he committed to emphasizing two fortuitous factors. The first is the coal deposits in England that contributed to the production of iron and steam engines. The second is the resources from the New World, such as precious metals, large workforces, and massive profits from increased sugar and cotton trading. On the contrary, a sharp population increase in China brought about ecological degradation, such as deforestation and soil depletion caused by the development of farmlands. Unlike England, China did not make a significant breakthrough from its "exceptional resource bonanzas" (Pomeranz 2001, p. 322). Faced with an ecological *cul de sac*, China began to plateau and finally encountered socio-economic stagnation. This strongly indicates that Pomeranz conducted his analysis of England's great divergence and China's stagnation under the principle of "comparison through difference."

Pomeranz's experimental attempt to show differences between England and China is invaluable; nonetheless, there is a serious problem in his

comparison method: Unlike Skocpol's emphasis on the "transnational relations as well as relations among differently situated groups within given countries" (Skocpol 1979, p. 19) in interpreting stagnation of old regime of France, Russia, and China, Pomeranz paid little attention to the connected history between England and China. When he uses comparison through agreements differences, he regards England and China as an independent and mutually exclusive case; however, in reality, China's stagnation process happened under the rule of British global hegemony that had begun in the 1770s. For instance, after abolishment of the East India Company's monopoly in Indian trade (1813), the company struggled to find another trade monopoly in Chinese trade, while escaping the longstanding problem of the trade imbalance between Britain and China (the silver-tea trade). The EIC's opium trade played a decisive role in developing a trade monopoly as well as overcoming trade deficits (Arrighi [1994] 2010, pp. 248–249). The EIC-led mercantile activities had transformed the silver-tea trade into the tea-opium trades. Due to a consequence of structural changes in international trade between Britain and China, Britain found it easier to penetrate the Chinese market, while China began to integrate into the Britain-led transnational commercial network (Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Selden 2003, p. 259). Moreover, regarding China's use of silver to pay for opium, the continued opium imports aggravated the silver-based fiscal system (Arrighi, Ahmad, and Shih 1999; Glahn 2018). The increase in the silver outflow caused inflation for silver in China and it was in response that the government then imposed surcharges on the taxpayers (Hung 2001; Lin 2006). Most taxpayers, however, could not afford to pay the increased taxes after 1800 because of the economic downturn (Frank 1998). The taxpayers' accumulated tax delinquency compromised the finances of the Qing Empire and it led to China's fiscal crisis.

In sum, Pomeranz downplays the importance of exploitation elsewhere, such as India and China, and fails to consider how commercial interactions between England and China contributed to the stagnation of China. In sum, the "comparison through agreements and differences" method that Pomeranz used tends to ignore global historical dynamics caused by the connected histories between Europe's rise and China's stagnation.

Type c) Comparison through the world-systems method

Since Tilly (1984, p. 82) formulated his three types of comparison method, "individualizing comparison," "universalizing comparison," and "variation-finding comparison," these have become methodological commonplaces in

Chinese stagnation studies. Comparative historical sociologists have examined different theoretical paths of stagnation under the same standard, or attempted to find peculiar causes, or interpreted idiosyncratic characteristics of Chinese stagnation to have certain meanings. These types of comparison, however, contain an implicit or explicit assumption: Each society (or nation-state) being compared is autonomous, self-generating, and self-justifying. There is little consideration of larger forces or external influences from larger entities. Unlike these, the world-systems method accepts the impact of larger entities on each society.

A typical example of the world-systems method comes from Wallerstein's work. According to Wallerstein, cross-national comparisons consider a state (or society) as a self-evident and discrete social unit, and thus, it can be compared to others. Cross-national comparisons, however, are criticized because to make them is "to reify parts of the totality into such units and then to compare these reified structures" (Wallerstein 1974b, p. 388; see also Wallerstein 2004). Cross-national comparisons transform a historical and dynamic society (or state) into an ahistorical structure and unchanged society (or state). In contrast, Wallerstein contended that "social change can only be understood as an historical system that operates at a different level from the conventional national society" (McMichael 1990, pp. 385–386). Unlike cross-national comparisons that "place nations within systemic processes operating at levels 'beneath' and 'above' the nation state" (Wallerstein 1974b, p. 390), Wallerstein proposed the modern world-system, with its "trans-societal structures," that has existed for the last five centuries (McMichael 1990, p. 386). World-systems do not consider a state (or society) as a "universal" and "discrete" category. Rather, a state (or society) is structured and restructured in the development processes of the world-systems (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981). Wallerstein's analysis is compelled to move away from any assumption of a self-regulating nation-state and toward a description of the process of continual change for nation states within the larger canvas of the world-economy. The world-systems perspective's maneuver has successfully challenged exclusive state-based comparisons propagated by past comparative historical sociologists and it also brings in outside influence and the relational processes between the world-economy and states.

Although Wallerstein's idea contributed to inventing a new methodological view contextualized within a broader and longer-term interstate history, his unduly focus on the world-economy revisits a Eurocentric idea in Chinese stagnation studies. Despite the fact that Wallerstein acknowledges the exogenous factor of the modern world-system, his analysis of the world-

economy does not escape from an ontologically singular Europe-centered idea that the Western (or a European world-economy) became a watershed of global history. From the moment the West's rise began, the uneven development of the capitalist world-economy transformed the globe by international division of labor and spatial relationships within a hierarchical world market. In Wallerstein's schema, the West is regarded as the pioneering creator of new world order, whereas the East is a place that is a shadow of its past glory.[5]

A more serious problem arises from the lack of connected history between the world-economy and China. Although Wallerstein (1989) briefly argued that China was eventually incorporated into the Europe-centered world-system in the 19th century after the end of the England-led triangle trades and loss of the Opium Wars,[6] his simple description of China's stagnation (or incorporation process) does not give us explicit clues as to how and why the Chinese empire stagnated.

In sum, three different comparison methods have posited early modern European experiences or the European developmental pattern as the exclusive yardstick have paid little attention to the connected history the West and China in Chinese. As a consequence, the events of China's stagnation are only explained by being subsumed under a comparative or transnational framework. In comparison methods for examining the initial or final stagnation of China, connected historical narratives, in fact, have been marginalized, while comparison methods have been absolutized.

Synthetic discussion: comparison methods' epistemology (unit of analysis) and historical juncture in Chinese stagnation studies

I suggested three different comparison methods that have been widely used by comparative historical researchers and their methodological problems; however, one may pose question like what kind of stagnation that happens at which methodological approach and historical juncture is diagnosed by each type of comparison method given the fact that each comparison method used

[5] Due mainly to inattention of Europe's second-mover advantage, Wallerstein's Eurocentric perspective has been criticized (Abu-Lughod 1989; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015; Frank 1998; Frank and Gills 1993; Hobson 2017).

[6] Wallerstein characterized the connections between world-economy and non-European countries as (external arena's) incorporation process into the capitalist world-economy (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987; Wallerstein 1986, 1989).

different unit of analysis and had different periods of Chinese stagnation.

First of all, comparison through self-generative disparity emphasizing a self-fulfilling or self-congratulatory view of Europe's developmental path draws a boundary line between Europe and non-Europe. Given the fact that this historical narrative has taken Europe's isolated development for granted, its unit of analysis is Europe (European civilization) and China (Chinese civilization). Regarding the period of Chinese stagnation, Marx and Weber assume a long but unspecified time period when they analyze Chinese stagnation; although Marx and Weber do not offer the specific period of Chinese stagnation, they often analyzed long-held Chinese culture (ex. Confucian ideology), absence of formal law, underdevelopment of autonomous city, and Asiatic mode as a mode of product to disclose a reason why China consequently faced with stagnation.

Second, comparative historical researchers who depended on the comparison through agreements and difference used smaller unit of analysis and shorter time frame than those who used comparison through self-generative disparity when they analyzed China's stagnation. Skocpol used state (China) as a unit of analysis in analyzing Chinese stagnation, whereas Pomeranz used a region (Yangzi Delta area) in interpreting Chinese stagnation; Pomeranz, influenced by William G. Skinner,[7] used the Yangzi Delta area as a unit of analysis. In addition, both believe that China's stagnation began since the nineteenth century.

Third, unlike previous two comparison methods, comparison through the world-systems method has a different unit of analysis and historical time in disclosing China's stagnation. For Wallerstein, the unit of analysis is transnational entity itself. Wallerstein believed China's stagnation can be observed by analyzing dynamics of the modern world-system that appeared in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century. Also, Wallerstein believes that the specific period of the China's stagnation (or a transition from a world-empire to a peripheral member of the capitalist world-economy) the can be grasped by

[7] A historical geographer, William G Skinner, had huge influence on regional studies of imperial Chinese history. He argued that each region in China had so unique and distinct characteristics that it was difficult to elicit a "consistent state" conception that originated from Europe. Skinner insisted that China was never understood as "an empire-wide approach." Instead of "state-based explanation," he suggested eight "macro-regional systems"; Based on "physiographical" characters, he separated China into eight major macro-regions (North China, North west China, Upper Yangtze, Middle Yangtze, Lower Yangtze, Southeast Coast, Lingnan, and Yun-Kwei) (Skinner 1977, p. 213). The main criteria of eight regions division was waterways of rivers. He insisted because eight different areas of China not only had unique environmental condition, but also economic cycle, it was difficult to tie the eight different areas in a whole empire conception.

looking into the historical evolution (or the long-term rhythm of the capitalist mode of production) of the modern world-system, even though he does not provide a specific period of time. In sum, three comparison methods have different unit of analysis and period in analyzing China's stagnation.

Incorporating comparison in Chinese stagnation studies: overcoming comparison method's epistemology

As should by now be clear, one of the main purposes of this paper is to explain three types of comparison method in Chinese stagnation studies and to materialize their problems. Whether or not Chinese stagnation scholars have viewed China as a superior or inferior society, they tend to take the comparison methods for granted. As a consequence, the accumulation of Chinese stagnation studies using these comparison methods does not lead to a profound understanding of connected histories between West and China. Considering the fact that the heavy dependence on these comparison methods has prevented comparative historical scholars from studying China's stagnation in-depth, we must rethink their use and find an alternative approach.

The important step to find an alternative comparison method is by overcoming problems of previous comparison methods. The most common problem in comparison through self-generative disparity (Marx and Weber), comparison through agreements and differences (Pomeranz), and comparison through the world-systems (Wallerstein) was a lack of connected histories between West and China. They have paid little attention to relational and connected histories between West and China, believing that China's stagnation did not link to the West's rise. In contrast to the traditional view that China's stagnation was motivated by its own internal causes (unprecedented population increase, ecological disaster, nonexistence of new classmen like capitalists, and decrease of per capita productivity), recent historical studies began to look at the connected histories. For instance, Platt (2018) reminded us of importance of the Opium War in China's stagnation and Chen (2017) stressed the importance of the warlike English merchants (e.g. James Matheson and William Jardine) of Canton in the making of the Opium Wars. The British's economic motives for the Opium War allowed us to interpret it as a part of China's stagnation. Sen (2017) examined how European powers' reliance on coercive force to achieve their political and economic interests turned the peaceful and mutual relationships in Asia including China into

imperial connections. This favorable disposition toward interconnected histories contributes to finding the nineteenth century China's abrupt stagnation.

Given the fact that we need to examine connected histories between Europe and China in China's stagnation, a question to be asked: how can comparative historical researchers capture these connections? Taking this consideration into account invites us to use incorporating comparison. I will use the 'incorporating comparison' that was invented by Philip McMichael to connect the western powers and China within the dynamics of trans-societal entity. McMichael, first of all, accepts the world-economic assumption: The nation-state needs to be reconstructed by the developmental process of the broader totality.

In fact, comparisons between the West and China based on the institutional, technological, cultural advantages of the Europe or China are likely to ignore an important heterogeneous developmental trajectory of the West and China. Considering the fact that the West (or Europe) had China had different development path in building a nation-state and international relations (Arrighi 2009; Fairbank and Teng 1941; Palat 1999, 2015; Perdue 2005; Tilly 1990; Weiss and Hobson 1995), it is nonsense to lump European countries and China into a same category or to attempt a simple parallel comparison between European countries and China. To prevent comparative historical researchers from accepting an idea that a state (each European country and China) is eternal entity and to avoid ahistorical context of the state and to find connected histories between European countries and China that is situated within the trans-national entity of the modern world-system, Wallerstein's idea of trans-national entity is effective. For this reason, McMichael also accepted Wallerstein's idea of trans-national entity.

However, unlike Wallerstein, McMichael problematizes the *a priori* conception of the world-economy. He is not making the case here for the modern world-system of a preconceived entity. Rather, the modern world-system emerges via comparative analysis of "parts as moments in a self-forming whole" (McMichael 1990, p. 386). This implies that the modern world-system also does not exist "independent of its parts," and posits a relational and changing conception. McMichael calls it a "self-forming whole." In his analytical frame, the modern world-system *per se* entails a "non-a priori conception" and is thus self-forming in the incorporating comparison (McMichael 2000, p. 7).

When methodologically applying McMichael's idea into Chinese stagnation study, Wallerstein's idea of the trans-national entity had demerits;

although it enables to compare the West to China and to elicit connected histories between two situated in the largest of macro-structure, Wallerstein often considered dynamics of the European countries or stagnation of China as a merely "jockey for position in the system" (Kimmel 1982, p. 249). The historical momentums of Europe and China and the significance of the historical events occurred in both Europe and China are subordinated to the modeling of the trans-national entity. Due to the overemphasis on the "internal logic of its (modern world-systems) function" (Wallerstein 1974a, p. 347) (e.g. modeling of the economic cycle), Wallerstein's methodology did not provide a thick description of how the western powers influenced China's stagnation. To avoid this methodological trap of the Wallerstein (and to find an alternative to Wallerstein's functionalist approach), I attempt to use incorporating comparison. Given that McMichael stressed the fact that the whole like modern world-system was restructured by the parts like nation-states, it is not nonsense to argue that the ways of colonial powers' penetration like coercive measures (e.g. gunboat diplomacy) and economic exploitation (e.g. opium trade and rise of coolie migration) promote China's stagnation, which connected to the dynamics of the trans-societal entity of the modern world-system.

Especially, the effectiveness of the incorporating comparison method in China's stagnation studies partially can be confirmed by China's incorporation study of the nineteenth century. Then what is incorporation study? An entire process characterized as a coercive expansion of the European-led capitalist mode of production and the responses of external arenas to the world-economy in the *longue-durée* was called as external arena's incorporation process into the capitalist world-economy. By tracing China's incorporation process, we can observe connected history between colonial powers and China within the trans-national context and how these connected histories also affect a restructuring process of the trans-national entity.

Differences between connected histories between West and China before China's incorporation and connected histories between West and Chain after China's incorporation

Considering the fact that China's incorporation study sheds valuable lights on China's stagnation study, the question here is how the connected history of the nineteenth century, called as China' incorporation process, is distinguished from the earlier connection. When China encountered the colonial powers in

nineteenth century, Chinese society was appalled by the unprecedented penetrations of Western power; however, it does not mean that China did not contact with the West beforehand or closed its eyes to the world before the nineteenth century. Before China was subsumed into the capitalist world-economy, late imperial China (the Ming and Qing era) was already interconnected with western countries in different ways. First of all, there was the bullion trade between China and western merchants during the sixteenth century (Flynn and Giraldez 2002; Hung 2016; Von Glahn 1998). Due mainly to silver standard for tax payments in Ming and Qing regime and the lack of silver deposits in China, late imperial China had to import silver from outside the Chinese territory. The adventurous European merchants, supported by the expansionist policies of the European countries, entered the silver trade. They in return could get goods, such as silk,[8] porcelain,[9] and tea at the cost of silver (Stein and Stein 2000), In particular, Spain that was mainly conducted by the Manila galleon (Galeón de Manila) led to the bullion trade with China. Spanish trading ships made round-trip sailing voyages once or twice per year across the Pacific Ocean from the port of Acapulco in Mexico to Manila in the Philippines (Schurz 1939). China was the principal source of the galleon's cargo because China received massive amounts of silver from this trade. For this reason, Gemeli Carrei, the Italian globetrotter of the seventeenth century, said "the Emperor of China calls the King of Spain, the King of Silver; because there being no Mine of it in his dominions, all they there is brought in by the Spaniards in Pieces of Eight" (Schurz 1939, pp. 63–64). As we can see from Gemeli Carrei's word, an enormous quantity of silver passed over the Pacific, especially out of Acapulco and through Manila on its way to China. Second, China imported

[8] Since the sixteenth century, China's silk had been exported to Europe. At a time when Chinese silk began to enter European market, Spanish merchants enjoyed a monopoly in the Sino-Spanish silk trade. Spanish merchants paid silver in exchange for Chinese silk; however, since the late sixteenth century, the monopoly of Sino-Spanish silk trade had been stagnated due mainly to the intense competitions between Spanish merchants and the British East India Company for the Chinese silk. In Europe, Chinese silk products was regarded as a precious item and it also was used in "luxurious bed hangings, blankets and dresses" (Hodacs 2016, p. 92) until China was incorporated into the capitalist world-economy in nineteenth century.

[9] Although when Chinese porcelain entered the European market remains debatable, one thing is for sure that Chinese porcelain, in particular Jingdezhen blue and white porcelain, enthralled European upper classes with its elegance, delicate decoration, and durability during Ming dynasty. Since the Portuguese merchants arrived in China in early sixteenth century, the import of Chinese porcelains had begun in earnest. When the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC) replaced much of Chinese porcelain trade with Portuguese merchants in seventeenth century, the VOC imported close to "43 million pieces of porcelain" from Asia including China (Huppatz 2018, p. 18).

food plants like maize, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, and peanuts from the New World in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which supplied individual smallholders or peasants with daily food (Bray 1986; Mazumdar 1999).

Third, there were Chinese immigrants who moved to the western colonies (e.g. Malay or Batavia) before the nineteenth century (Blussé 1986). China's overseas migration began at least two or three centuries before its incorporation process began. As a Fujian gazette put it, "the fields are few but the sea is vast; so men have made fields from the sea" (Cushman 1993, frontispiece), many Fujian and Guangdong peasants moved to European colonies (Pomeranz 2000). Although Chinese migration during the sixteenth or seventeenth century was more directly related to China's internal problems like a) social and political disorder between late Ming and early Qing and b) the lack of arable lands (and population increase) from the seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century (Wickberg 1999), this Chinese migration to European colonies had connected China with Western powers before China's incorporation process.

An important question then arises: What are distinctions can be made between connected history of pre-incorporated China and that of incorporating (or incorporated) China? What changes occurred in connected history between China and western powers during and after China's incorporation process? Most of all, the China's international trade had been influenced by Western powers since the first sign of China's incorporation process: Before China's incorporation process, from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, China was not a part of the European world-economy, meaning that China could participate international trade without the intervention or pressure of the Western powers; after the beginning of China's incorporation process, however, China's international trades got influenced by Western powers gradually (e.g. opium imports and exports of Chinese coolies). It informs us the fact that although two (pre-incorporated China's international trade and incorporating China's international trades) may be linkable but are by no means identical. The rise of pre-incorporated China's international trade occurred through the will of the China; whereas the emergence of incorporating (or incorporated) China's international trades occurred through the colonial powers.

Second, after China is incorporated into the capitalist world-economy, China had to act as a part of the capitalist world-economy even though China had difficulty in the underdevelopment and socio-economic and ecological problems. For instance, in the mid-eighteenth century, China's tea trade with

western countries, especially the Dutch, was one of several options for China to seize the initiative in trading with western merchants; however, China's international tea trade suddenly became inevitable and inseparable after its trading partner became Britain. Right after the late eighteenth century or early nineteenth century, Chinese tea agriculture came under strong pressure to increase production. The export volume of Chinese tea soared in proportion to the increase of China's imports of opium and increasing tea consumption in Britain.[10] Since then, China tea agriculture became integrally linked to the commercial network of the capitalist world-economy; as a result of this, China had to keep producing tea even though China's tea cultivation areas suffered from economic (e.g. Chinese tea producers' economic disaster after Britain diversified its tea imports) and ecological problems (e.g. deforestation, soil erosion, and landslides) resulted from export-oriented tea cultivation.

Third, before China was incorporated into the capitalist world-economy, state bureaucracy often considered oversea migrants as 'abandoned people' (*qimin* 棄民). This is because they arbitrarily left their homeland, abandoning state's (or emperor's) governance. For this reason, state bureaucracy did not pay attention to the protection of overseas Chinese; however, after China's incorporation process, Qing regime, influenced by the international rules, had to perceive oversea Chinese differently. Qing government did not define oversea Chinese as abandoned people any longer; conversely, overseas Chinese became the object of protection from the Qing government. Since the Qing government itself legalized the overseas migration in 1860, Qing bureaucracy had to redefine oversea Chinese and take the lead in protection of oversea Chinese in accordance with the international norms.

Up to now we looked at differences between connected histories between western powers and China that were formed before the nineteenth century and those that were created after the nineteenth century. Especially, unlike the connected history of pre-incorporated China, incorporating (or incorporated) China's connected history helps us to know how western powers encroach on Chinese territory. Furthermore, the study of the connected history of China's incorporation process informs us the effectiveness of incorporating comparison when comparative historical researchers analyze Chinese stagnation.

[10] After the 18th century, the tea demand in Britain increased dramatically because tea consumption, previously regarded as a luxury item and conspicuous consumption by the upper class, became a daily food item for labourers (Ward 1994). In particular, the combination of tea and sugar captivated British men.

Limitations of past China's incorporation studies

As I discussed earlier, study of China's incorporation enables us to have detailed descriptions of the historical conjuncture between nineteenth century China and colonial powers within the trans-national context. Nonetheless, it is difficult to introduce China's incorporation process in the paper due mainly to inappropriateness of the past Chinese incorporation studies; for instance, So and Chiu (1995) examined China's incorporation process. Although they proposed a historical narrative of China's incorporation process by enumerating the rise of South China's silk industry, the impacts of the Opium War, and the penetrations of Western missionaries, they believed that China has not been degraded to the status of a peripheral country in the capitalist world-economy. The economic dimension of the twilight years of imperial China was largely incorporated into the European-led world-economy; this fact notwithstanding, they insisted that its political and cultural dimensions did not deteriorate, nor were they incorporated into the world-economy. To throw into sharp relief a fundamental reason for China's failure to become a peripheral country in the trimodal hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy, they separated political and cultural incorporation from economic incorporation: by invoking political stability (e.g. China maintained a tributary system with its neighboring countries) and an ingrained long-term or perpetual shared-value culture of China (e.g. a strong Confucianism ideology), they insisted that Qing did not become a peripheral country even after the 1840s.

There was a sense in which highlighting the striking difference between the economic and political (including cultural) aspects of China's incorporation process was a new experiment. Still, two conundrums remained: first, if So and Chiu planned to distinguish the economic aspects of the Chinese incorporation process from its political aspects and to support the idea of the restoration of the traditional political regime after the 1840s, they should have explained specifically how China's government officials and political elites responded to and resisted China's participation in the capitalist world-economy. Without that, his exclusive focus on the China-led tributary system as a proof of its international ascendency and the revitalization of the *ancien régime* as proof of political ascendency after the 1840s were untenable.

The second problem lay with an erroneous combination of China's stagnation based on the dynastic cycle[11] and the process of China's incorporation under the influence of the capitalist world-economy. For

instance, according to So and Chiu (1995, pp. 45–49), China's Self-Strengthening Movement was a resistance movement and rebuilding process that opposed the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. In this regard, So and Chiu argued that the Qing Empire had stagnated because of the fate of the dynastic cycle rather than due to the influence of the capitalist world-economy.

So and Chiu tried his best to make a convincing case about China's unique incorporation process, but their account was theoretically ambiguous. Although they adopted world-systems perspectives to understand the capitalist world-economy's expansion into China, they placed greater emphasis on the dynastic cycle—and exclusive emphasis on internal causes—when they summed up China's incorporation process into the capitalist world-economy. Put differently, their study of Chinese incorporation started from a world-systems analysis, but their conclusion did not escape the idea of the dynastic cycle. Their equivocal statements about the Chinese incorporation process came from confusion regarding the idea of the dynastic cycle and world-systems analysis and failed to clarify the complicated Chinese incorporation process. In fact, their analysis of the Chinese incorporation process made it even harder for subsequent researchers to develop a clear idea of it. So and Chiu's attempts to the Chinese incorporation process created more obfuscation than clarification.[12]

For this reason, studying China's incorporation process remains as an unfinished task; nonetheless, an examination of the incorporating comparison method helps to resolve two paradoxes in Chinese stagnation

---

[11] The dynastic cycle indicates that all Chinese dynasties in the premodern era follow a repetitive and identical pattern of power characterized by peace and prosperity in the upswing when a new line of emperors is established. During this period, the population increases and the economy develops. Later, civil war, misery, and population decline occurred during the downswing when the dynasty becomes old and feeble. An important aspect is that a motive for change in the dynastic cycle is not external pressure but internal pressure, like revolts (Skocpol 1979, p. 75).

[12] Excepting So and Chiu (1995) study, Dilip Basu and Frances V. Moulder have examined China's incorporation process. Borrowing the concept of incorporation from world-systems analysis, Moulder (1977) and Basu (1979), albeit Moulder (1977) discussed China's incorporation process in the comparative historical context, sketched the western powers' encroachment on imperial China after the Opium Wars. They assumed that the opium trade led to Chinese incorporation (and decline). They did not, however, delve into the specifics of China's incorporation process. They outlined the connections between the world-economy and China. In their attempts to reveal the uniqueness of the European capitalist path, they erased detailed China's incorporation process somewhat. Moulder and Basu's cursory narratives consequently brought about the relative neglect of China's transformations even though Moulder added a little more to the dynamics of the China's incorporation process.

studies: (1) it brings back in a significant indicator of a trans-societal entity that has been almost entirely ignored in the dominant comparison methods. In doing so, it reveals how China's stagnation was connected to the expansion of the capitalist world-economy and demonstrates the momentum of Europe's expansion under not the cross-national comparison rules but a broader world-economy's rules. Unlike cross-national comparative rules that put emphasis on state autonomy and state capacity, the incorporating comparison enables us to consider the interconnections among Asian societies under the influence of the capitalist world-economy.[13] For instance, the capitalist world-economy's expansion drove the stagnation of the Indian subcontinent; after that, it accelerated China's stagnation, given the fact that the colonization of Indian subcontinent allowed Britain (e.g. through the export of Indian cotton and opium) to extend into China (Sen 2017). Indeed, Europe's colonial powers, that were extended to the Southeast Asia in nineteenth century, induced Chinese people to move to Southeast Asia. To meet Europeans' demand for "rubber, pepper, tobacco, sugar, and other plantations" (Unger 1944, p. 200), actively intervened in raising coolie laborers to secure the cheap labor force, Chinese migrants were moved to South Asia and became coolie laborers during the late nineteenth century (McKeown 1999). What is true of the increase of cheap Chinese labor is that the connection of Asian society had been partially shaped by the logic of the capitalist world-economy, which led to undermine late imperial China's governance system.[14] By observing the interconnections among the stagnation of the Indian subcontinent and China and the development of Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, we may determine that global historical narratives contribute to the profound insight of China's stagnation and its historical evolution of a wide scope of overarching contexts. (2) It allows us to escape from an erroneous assumption of comparison methods. The problem with comparison methods is that both Eurocentric or non-Eurocentric lead us to draw attention to the comparison-centric historical narratives which heavily depend on European standards or similar (or different) developmental paths, while tending to marginalize connected history

[13] Of course, before making the Europe-led China-Indian interconnection, there was a maritime connection between China and India that had been already established by Zheng He; however, Zheng He's overseas expeditions suddenly stopped and happened never again until the demise of the Ming.

[14] As Western powers penetrated into China, many local communities were destabilized due to the peasants' movements from the hinterlands to port cities or overseas. This caused a population decrease in local communities and resulted in a decline in the government's tax income.

between West and China in China's stagnation. Incorporating comparison shows us the multi-dimensional distinctiveness of this phenomenon, which guides us toward more in-depth study.

Conclusion

The major concern of this study has been to problematize comparison methods in Chinese stagnation research. To explicate a common problem—an intention of integrated historiography between West and China in China's stagnation—of comparison methods, this article debunks three prevailing tendencies (comparison through self-generative disparity, comparison through agreements and differences, and comparison through world-systems method) in existing Chinese stagnation studies. To recast a connected world history in China's stagnation studies, I present incorporating comparison. Given the China's connection with the global political economy, we could benefit from this study that provides interconnections between a greater historical analysis and internal details that led to the China's stagnation.

Nonetheless, these criticisms of comparison methods do not mean that all of them are ineffective or unfruitful. I would insist, rather, that comparative methods are necessary if we need to investigate differences or similarities between historical backgrounds for the purpose of heuristic thinking (Goldstone 2000). McMichael (1990, p. 388) notes that "the map and theory are best left provisional, so that research will improve in use." I hope this comparative analysis will be a good guideline for future Chinese stagnation studies.

(*Submitted*: January 17, 2019; *Revised*: April 30, 2019; *Accepted*: June 4, 2019)

References

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Allee, Mark. A. 1994. *Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China: Northern Taiwan in the Nineteenth Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Anievas, Alexander and Kerem Nişancioğlu. 2015. *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. Norwich: Pluto Press.

Arrighi, Giovanni. [1994] 2010. *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*. London and New York: Verso.

Arrighi, Giovanni. 2009. "Reading Hobbes in Beijing: Great power politics and the challenges of the peaceful ascent." Pp. 163–179 in *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy*, edited by M. Blyth, New York: Routledge.

Arrighi, Giovanni., Iftikhar Ahmad, and Miin-wen Shih. 1999. "Western Hegemonies in World Historical Perspective." Pp. 217–270, in *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System*, edited by G. Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Arrighi, Giovanni, Po-keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, and Mark Selden. 2003. "Historical capitalism, East and West." Pp. 259–333, in *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 year perspective*, edited by Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hematite, and Mark Selden. London and New York: Routledge.

Basu, Dilip. 1979. "The Peripheralization of China: Notes on the Opium connection." Pp. 171–187, in *The World System of Capitalism: Past and Present*, edited by Walter L. Goldfrank. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Bendix, Reinchard. 1977. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bhambara, Gurminder. K. 2007. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Blussé, Leonard. 1986. *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications.

Braudel, Fernand. 1979. *Civilization & Capitalism 15th–18th Century, Volume I: The Structure of Everyday Life*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Bray, Francesca. 1986. *The Rice Economy: Technology and Development in Asian Society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Brenner, Robert and Christopher Isett. 2002. "England's divergence from China's Yangzi Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 61(2): 609–662.

Chase, Kenneth. 2003. *Firearms: A Global History to 1700*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chen, Song-Chuan. 2017. *Merchants of War and Peace: British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Chung, Tan. 1978. *China and The Brave New World: A Study of the Origins of the Opium War (1840–42)*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Crossley, Pamela Kyle. 1990. *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and The End of the Qing World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cushman, Jennifer Wayne. 1993. *Fields from The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam During the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Di Cosmo, Nicola. 2004. "Did Guns Matter? Firearms and the Qing Experience." Pp. 121–166, in *The Qing Formation in World historical Time*, edited by L. A. Struve.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Durkheim, Emile. [1895] 1938. *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Eberhard, Wolfram. 1956. "Data on the Structure of the Chinese city in the Pre-Industrial Period." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 4(3): 253–268.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1987. *European Civilization in Comparative Perspective*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Elliott, Brian and David McCrone. 1982. *The City: Patterns of Domination and Conflict*. London: MacMillan.
Elvin, Mark. 1970. *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Fairbank, John K. 1953. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842–1854*, Vol 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fairbank J. K. and S. Y. Teng. 1941. "On the Ch'ing Tributary System." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6(2): 135–246.
Flynn, Dennis O. and Giraldez Arturo. 2002. "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century." *Journal of World History* 13(2): 391–427.
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1998. *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Franks, Andre Gunder and Barry K. Gills. 1993. "The 5,000 year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction." Pp. 3–58, in *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, edited by Barry K Gills and Andre Gunder Frank. London and New York: Routledge.
Glahn, Richard von. 2018. "Economic Depresion and the Silver Question in Nineteenth-Century China." Pp. 81–108, in *Global History and New Polycentric Approaches*, edited by Manuel Perez Garcia and Lucio De Sousa. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillion.
Goldstone, Jack. A. 1996. "Gender, Work, and Culture: Why the Industrial Revolution Came Early to England but late to China." *Sociological Perspective* 39(1): 1–21.
_____. 2000. "The Rise of the West-or Not? A Revision to Socio-economic History." *Sociological Theory* 18(2): 175–194.
Hall, John. A. 1985. *Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hobson, John. M. 2004. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 2017. "Worlding the Rise of Capitalism: The Multicivilizational Roots of Modernity." Pp. 199–220, in *Global Historical Sociology*, edited by Julian Go and George Lawson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hodacs, Hanna. 2016. *Silk and Tea in the North: Scandinavian Trade and the Market for Asian Goods in Eighteenth-Century Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1981. "Structural Transformations of

the World-Economy." Pp. 233–262, in *Dynamics of World Development*, edited by Richard Rubinson. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

_____. 1987. "Capitalism and the Incorporation of New Zones into the World-Economy." *Review* 10(5): 763–779.

Huang, Philip C. C. 1990. *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350–1988*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hung, Ho-fung. 2001. "Imperial China and Capitalist Europe in the Eighteenth-Century Global Economy." *Review* 24(4): 473–513.

_____. 2003. "Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories: China and the European Conceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 to 1900." *Sociological Theory* 21(3): 254–280.

_____. 2016. *The China Boom: Why China will not Rule the World*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Huppatz, D. J. 2018. *Modern Asian Design*. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, and Sydney: Bloomsbury.

Isaacs, Harold R. [1938] 1961. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. second revised edition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Jacob, Margaret. 1988. *The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Johns, Eric. L. [1981] 2003. *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kalberg, Stephen. 1994. *Max Weber's Comparative Historical Sociology*. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press.

Kimmel, Michael. 1982. "Review on the Modern World System, Volume II" *Theory and Society* 11(2): 244–251.

Landes, Davis S. 2006. "Why Europe and the West? Why not China?" *The Journal of Economic Perspective* 20: 3–22.

Lin, Man-houng. 2006. *China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Macartney, Helen Henrietta Robbins. 1908. *Our Fist Ambassador to China*. London: John Murray.

Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. "Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas." Pp. 3–40, in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Science*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mao, Tse-tung. 1965. "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party." Pp. 305–334, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Volume II. Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, and Frankfurt: Pergamon Press.

Marsh, Robert. M. 2000. "Weber's misunderstanding of Traditional Chinese Law." *The American Journal of Sociology* 106(2): 281–302.

Marx, Karl. [1853] 1968. "Revolution in China and in Europe." Pp. 1–10, in *Marx on*

China 1853–1860: Articles from the New York Daily Tribune, edited by Dona Torr. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

_____. [1869] 1973. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." Pp. 143–249, in *Karl Marx: Surveys from Exile*, edited by David Fernbach. London: Penguin.

_____. 1978. "On imperialism in India." Pp. 653–664, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C Tucker. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. [1848] 2012. *The Communist Manifesto*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Mazumdar, Sucheta. 1999. "The Impact of New World Food Crops on the Diet and Economy of China and India, 1600–1900." Pp. 58–78 in *Food in Global History*, edited by Raymond Grew, Colorado: Westview.

McKeown, Adam. 1999. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diaspora, 1842–1949." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58(2): 306–337.

McMichael, Philip. 1990. "Incorporating Comparison within a World Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method." *American Sociological Review* 55(3): 385–397.

_____. 2000. "World-Systems Analysis, Globalization, and Incorporating comparison." *Journal of World-Systems Research* VI(3): 68–99.

Mokyr, Joel. 1990. *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress*. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____. 2003. "Why Was the Industrial Revolution a European Phenomenon?" *Supreme Court Economic Review* 10: 27–63.

Moulder, V. Frances. 1977. *Japan, China, and the modern world-economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Naquin, Susan and Evelyn S. Rawski. 1987. *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Nelson, Benjamin. 1981. *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations, Selected Writings by Benjamin Nelson*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Palat, Ravi R. 1999. "Spatial Imaginaries of Capitalism: Dynamics of the Northeast Asian Regional Order." *Asian Perspective* 23(2): 5–34.

_____. 2015. *The Making of an Indian Ocean World-Economy, 1250–1650: Princes, Paddy fields, and Bazaars*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Parthasarathi, Prasannan. 2011. *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia did not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Paviot, Jacques. 2000. "England and the Mongol (c. 1260–1330)." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 10(3): 305–318.

Perdue, Peter C. 2005. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Platt, Stephen. 2018. *Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of*

the Modern World Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

_____. 2001. "Is There an East Asian Development Path? Long-Term Comparisons, Constraints, and Continuities." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44(3): 322–362.

Rowe, William. T. 1984. *HANKOW: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1776–1889*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

_____. 2013. "China: 1300–1900." Pp. 310–327 in *The Oxford Handbooks of Cities in World History*, edited by Peter Clark. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Saunders, Peter. 1981. *Social Theory and the Urban Question*. 2nd edition. London: Hutchinson.

Schurz, William Lytle. 1939. *The Manila Galleon*. New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO.

Sen, Tansen. 2017. *India, China, and the World: A Connected History*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Shi, Zhihong. 1990. "The development and underdevelopment of agriculture during the early Qing Period (1644–1840)." Pp. 69–98 in *Economic and Demographic Development in Rice Producing Societies: Some Aspects of East Asian Economic History (1500–1900)*, edited by Iakira Hayami and Yoshihiro Tsubouchi. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Shiue, Carol. H. and Wolfgang Keller. 2007. "Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of the Industrial Revolution." *The American Economic Review* 97(4): 1189–1216.

Sklar, Kathryn Kish. 1990. "A Call for Comparisons." *The American Historical Review* 95(4): 1109–1114.

Skinner, G. William. 1977. "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China." Pp. 211–249 in *The City in Later Imperial China*, Stanford, edited by William G. Skinner, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Somers. 1980. "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquire." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22(2): 174–197.

So, Alvin Y. and Stephen Chiu. 1995. *East Asia and World-Economy*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publishers.

Sprenkel, Sybille Van Dear. 1977. "Urban Social Control." Pp. 609–632 in *The City in Late Imperial China*, edited by G. William Skinner, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Stein, Stanley, J. and Barbara H. Stein. 2000. *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sun, Laichen. 2003. "Military Technology Transfers from Ming China and the Emergence of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia (c. 1390–1527)." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34(3): 495–517.

Tilly, Charles. 1984. *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York:

Russell Sage Foundation.

_____. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

_____. 1997. *Roads from Past to Future*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Unger, Leonard. 1944. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia." *Geographical Review* 34(2): 196–217.

Von Glahn, Richard. 1998. "Money-use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500–1800." Pp. 51–59 in *Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500–1808: B6 Proceedings, Twelfth International Economic History Congress*, edited by Clara Eugenia Nunex, Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla.

Voltaire. [1760] 1901. *Ancient and Modern History* Vol. 1. New York: St. Hubert Guild.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974a. *The Modern World-system I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

_____. 1974b. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16: 387–415.

_____. 1986. "Incorporation of Indian Subcontinent into Capitalist World-Economy." *Economic and Political Weekly* 21(4): 28–39.

_____. 1989. *The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-economy, 1730s–1840s*. New York: Academic Press.

_____. 2004. *World-systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ward, J. R. 1994. "The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism, 1750–1850." *The Economic History Review* 47(1): 44–65.

Weber, Max. [1922] 1949. "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy." Pp. 49–112 in *Methodology of Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: The Free Press.

_____. 1958. *The City*. Translated and edited by D. Martindale., & G. Neuwirth. New York: The Free Press.

Weiss, Linda and John M Hobson. 1995. *States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

White, Lynn Jr. 1963. "What Accelerated Technological Progress in the Western Middle Ages?" Pp. 272–291 in *Scientific Change*, edited by A. C. Crombie. New York: Basic Books.

Wickberg, Edgar. 1999. "Organization of Overseas Migration." Pp. 35–55 in *Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the 20th century*, edited by Gary G. Hamilton, Seattle, WA and London: University of Washington Press.

Wong, R. Bin. 1997. *China Transformed*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

SUNG HEE RU is a PhD candidate at the State University of New York at Binghamton (Department of Sociology). My dissertation, titled "China's incorporation process into the capitalist world-economy 1780s–1890s," argued that Chinese society experienced unprecedented economic, political, and social changes when the capitalist world-economy penetrated China. I intend to trace China's transformations with a focus on China's incorporation process in the 19th century (1780s–1890s), which represents a watershed era in the relations between China and the capitalist world-economy. Interesting areas are Comparative Historical Sociology, East Asian Studies, World-systems analysis, and classical sociological theory. *Address*: 144 Beethoven Street, Binghamton, New York. 13905 [*E-mail*: sru1@binghamton.edu]